Intelligent agents-based networks security by Abouzakhar, Nasser Salem
Intelligent Agents-based Networks Security 
By 
Nasser Salem Abouzakhar 
SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHELOSOPHY 
COMPUTER SCIENCE ENGINEERING 
FACULTY OF ENGINEERING 
UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD 
SEPTEMPER 2004 
I yemma d baba 
To my Parents 
Shobana & Salem 
Tanetnerit Feliawen 
II 
Abstract 
The growing dependence of modem society on telecommunication and 
information networks has become inevitable. The increase in the number of 
networks interconnected over the Internet has led to an increase in security threats. 
The existing mobile and fixed network systems and telecommunication protocols 
are not appropriately designed to deal with current developed distributed attacks. I 
started my research work by exploring the deployment of intelligent Agents that 
could detect network anomalies and issue automated response actions. An 
Intelligent Agent (IA) [Knapik et at, 1998] is an entity that carries out some set of 
operations on behalf of a user or other software with some degree of independence 
or autonomy. The investigation of the Agents paradigm led to a deep 
understanding of the underlying problem; therefore, machine learning has turned 
my attention to Bayesian learning and Fuzzy logic approaches. 
A modelled network intrusion detector has been proposed. This model sets Agents 
with learning capabilities for detecting current as well as similar future distributed 
network attacks. In order to detect those anomalies as early as possible, the 
Bayesian network approach has been proposed. This approach is considered to be 
a promising method in determining suspicious network anomaly events that 
consequently relates them to subsequent dependent illegitimate activities. This 
research suggests innovative ways to develop Intelligent Agents that incorporate 
Bayesian learning to address network security risks associated with the current 
Networks Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) designs and implementations. 
Because NIDSs have traditionally focused on detecting attacks, and while 
detection serves a vital purpose, it does not provide the ultimate solution. As a 
result, an effective response mechanism to those detected attacks is required to 
minimise their effect and hence enhance NIDSs capabilities. Therefore, other 
Agents with Fuzzy intelligence capabilities have been proposed to initiate 
successful automated response actions. Fuzzy Agents have been proposed to 
handle this task with the ability to respond quickly and dynamically control the 
availability of allocated network resources. 
The evaluation methodology used to assess the performance of the developed 
models has been concentrated on detecting as well as predicting unauthorised 
activities in networks. By means of evaluation and validation, as well as empirical 
evidence, we are able to determine the effectiveness of the developed models and 
assumptions. The performance of developed detection model algorithms for 
unsupervised learning tasks has been evaluated using well known standard 
methods such as Confusion matrix. The achieved results indicate that the 
developed model led to a substantial reduction of the false alarms, with significant 
increase in the detection rates. This research work is operating within the context 
of two domains the first drawn from the network security community and the 
other from the machine learning community. It investigates the deployment of 
both Bayesian Learning as a probabilistic approach and Fuzzy Intelligence as a 
possibilistic approach to networks security. This is to detect as well as predict 
future evolving network anomalies, and to effectively respond to those developed 
attacks and minimise their effects. Consequently, it may provide innovative 
solutions that can be implemented in a cost-effective manner. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
With the increase of distributed systems and data telecommunication networks, 
the need for automated security tools for protecting data and information became 
an essential requirement. One of those tools used in network security is Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDSs). IDSs [Bace et al, 1999] are software or hardware 
systems that automate the process of monitoring the events occurring in a 
computer system or a network and analysing them for signs of security violations 
or unauthorised activities. For most big business and government corporations, the 
biggest risk of a security breach is loss of income or loss of reputation, either of 
which can be achieved easily by conspicuous distributed activities such as Denial- 
of-Service (DoS) attacks. For organisations with more mission or life-critical data 
online, a DoS attack can literally put people's lives at risk. Distributed DoS 
(DDoS) attacks are a virulent strain of DoS activities. The difference is that there 
is no single source of the attack. There could be hundreds or thousands of 
compromised computer attackers. DDoS activities [Schneier, 2000] are incredibly 
difficult to defend against. The control of resources allocation in networks is 
considered to be the vital issue for an effective solution to DoS attacks. Needham 
[1994] suggests that availability is the major concern of information systems 
design and hence their security as well. As violations of availability easily lead to 
considerable interruptions of telecommunication services, they may result in 
serious disruptions of businesses. 
In this thesis an effective solution to the problem will be presented, which 
indicates possible ways of intelligent detection and automatic response to those 
types of attacks in order to minimise their effects on network resources 
availability. In order to achieve that, Intelligent Agents have been developed. An 
Intelligent Agent (IA) [Knapik et al, 1998] is an entity that carries out some set of 
operations on behalf of a user or other software with some degree of independence 
or autonomy. These Agents are able to detect as well as predict future similar 
network attacks, and are enhanced with Bayesian network capabilities. Bayesian 
network [Heckerman, 1995] provides a set of learning entities that compute 
models over data stored within a network, and each model encodes dependencies 
among all the variables of interest. Also, Fuzzy Intelligent Agents will be 
I 
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presented to handle this task with the ability of launching automated response 
actions to any degraded network traffic services. Fuzzy logic and fuzzy-based 
intelligent systems [Knapik et al, 1998] are mathematically based systems that 
enable computers to deal with imprecise, ambiguous, or uncertain information and 
situations, i. e. the real world. Within this Multi-Agent environment, all Agents are 
uniquely identified and able to co-operate with their home devices. Enhancing 
Agents with Bayesian learning and fuzzy reasoning capabilities would give them 
the ability to deal with imprecise, ambiguous, or uncertain information and 
situations. This chapter introduces the research problem, the aim and objectives of 
the research topic and outlines the thesis structure. 
1.1- Research Outline & Hypotheses 
The features supplied by intelligent Agents have generated an interest in their 
integration into network security and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). Given 
the essential security requirements for any particular information network, this 
task is complicated by the security management of the Agents themselves. This 
complication might result from the security issues associated with the intelligent 
features of some Agents. Also, the unpredictable performances of such security 
architecture might generally hinder the evolution of the Agents' security 
applications. However, the features supplied by Agent entities are expected to 
outweigh any of their limitations. 
This research provides an answer to the following question: 
Is it possible to have an efficient method to learn and predict future evolving 
unauthorised network activities as well as having an automated mechanism to 
respond to those detected attacks in such a way that it effectively controls the 
allocated resources consumption within a network? For the time being and based 
on my research experiments and results I would reply with the following answer. 
Applying Bayesian methods as a learning detection model to this kind of problem 
will show how the probabilistic Bayesian detection model identifies network 
attacks, allowing for the generalization of Network IDSs (NIDSs). The major 
results achieved from the experiments conducted and from testing the developed 
model using a real time datasets as well as the explained observations indicate the 
possibility of improving current IDSs implementations. The Bayesian Learning 
networks approach is considered to be a promising tool used by intelligent Agents 
to determine suspicious network anomaly events that consequently relates them to 
subsequent dependent unauthorised events. While learning detection techniques 
serve a useful purpose and provide a major solution to the state of the art NIDSs, 
these techniques do not provide the ultimate solution to the current NIDSs 
limitations. Therefore, an effective automated response mechanism to those 
detected attacks is required to minimise their effects and hence enhance NIDSs 
capabilities. 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The automated response mechanism in IDSs is a vital issue for improving the 
network security, and represents what I call the "last line of defence" against any 
threatening activities towards network resources. I argue that this mechanism is 
intended to limit network breaches that could not be either easily detected or 
avoided. The main network assets that I have considered in my experiments are 
network servers, routers, switches, firewalls, the applications and any information 
they occupy, and the resources they allocate for each successful network 
connection. The intelligent Agents' automated response mechanisms to network 
attacks introduced in the proposed framework are considerable, because each 
single response can be characterised by a number of features. By analysing the 
network traffic abnormalities or event logs behaviour in order to issue the 
appropriate responses for any confirmed attack, those response actions would be 
in different forms depending on the type of attack and the targeted resource. In 
order to make my solution to the problem achievable within given time and 
considering the practical side of the research regarding this matter (i. e. the 
automated responsiveness), only part of the response actions by the intelligent 
Agents in the framework is considered. In this case only network traffic 
abnormalities are considered. In summary, the major research hypotheses are to 
" Investigate possible ways of intelligent detection of network attacks so as 
to minimise their effects on networks' resources availability. In order to 
achieve that, Intelligent Agents will be proposed to detect as well as 
predict future evolving network anomalies. These Agents are enhanced 
with Bayesian learning capabilities. 
Look at the issue of intelligent intrusion detection more closely, and 
investigate the sort of consequences that will take place with the 
development of intelligent Agents incorporating Bayesian learning for 
networks security. Also, to investigate the issue of having effective Agents 
that are alertly capable of providing detection mechanism to the confirmed 
network DoS attacks, so that the role of those intelligent Agents within the 
whole network security architecture is identified. Also, to take into 
consideration the Quality of Service and network performance 
requirements. 
" Evaluate and validate the developed detection models so to measure their 
performance. In order to achieve that, standard evaluation and validation 
methods must be incorporated. Regardless of the methods used to detect 
unauthorised network activities, the ultimate question would be, how well 
does our model detect or classify attacks? 
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1.2- The Approach of Intelligent Agents Technology to IDSs 
There has been a large movement within the Artificial Intelligence (AI) research 
community to apply Intelligent Agents (IAs) technologies to distributed 
computing and Networking. An Intelligent Agent (IA) [Knapik et al, 1998] 
[Tecuci, 1998] is an entity that carries out some set of operations on behalf of a 
user or other software with some degree of independence or autonomy. Intelligent 
Agents [Bigus et al, 2001] could perform useful tasks for us, make us more 
productive, and save our time. Intelligent Agents represent an emerging 
distributed system paradigm. As more and more networking and distributed 
systems applications are performed, there is more interest in having IA that can 
perform specific tasks efficiently. One of these tasks is network security in general 
and intrusion detection in particular. Intelligent Agents, can provide real value to 
such a problem in this new, interconnected world. Intelligent Agents are able to 
operate asynchronously and independently of the process that initiated them 
(autonomously), they help to construct highly robust, fault-tolerant and cost- 
effective systems. As Agents [Proctor, 2001] are not currently available in any 
commercial IDSs, this thesis looks at this new paradigm and suggest solutions to 
some of current IDSs that can be implemented without major modifications to 
current network systems. 
The proposed Intelligent Agents-based approach to intrusion detection in this 
thesis is based on entities that are capable of performing certain security functions 
individually or in a distributed form. There are three dimensions [IBM, 1996] that 
are used to measure the Agents capabilities, which are Agency, Intelligence and 
Mobility. However, Intelligent Agents [Murch et al, 1999] [Tecuci, 1998] are also 
able to learn and capable by themselves to acquire and maintain their knowledge. 
Learning represents modification of behaviour through experience or judgement. 
Learning Agents could learn from a variety of information sources in the 
environment. Once tasks are learned, the Agent can then instruct or suggests ways 
to improve. Integrating machine-learning solutions to Agents [Tecuci, 1998] can 
take advantage of their complementary natures and using learning techniques to 
automate the knowledge acquisition process and techniques to enhance the power 
of the learning methods. 
In this thesis the main focus is on how to develop lAs that could learn from a 
given data. This data comprises a network traffic that is contaminated with 
different types of network violations and unauthorised activities. This approach 
has been proposed to overcome the limitation in the existing architecture of 
having a single entity that does most of the data collection and processing. The 
suggested lAs can provide a mixture of anomaly detection as well as misuse 
detection capabilities, with the ability of predicting those evolving network 
violations. Those Agents could target a specific network event type, signature type, 
platform, or process depending on the strategy used, and various strategies could 
be available for governing the location of the analysis and response functions. In 
order to achieve that lAs are incorporated with Bayesian learning features and 
hence the focus will only be on the learning elements of lAs and not their mobility 
features. 
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1.3- Aim & Objectives 
This research aims to propose innovative ways to use intelligent Agents to address 
networks security problems associated with the deployment of current Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDSs). It is a response to the rising demand of different 
organisations and the public sector to provide secured inter-network 
infrastructures and reasonably protected interconnection with the Internet from 
different unauthorised activities and security threats. The research also aims to 
develop Agents models with machine learning capabilities and fuzzy intelligence. 
This is to indicate that those Agents with such capabilities could play a major role 
in ensuring network security and effectively overcoming different network 
resources availability and control issues, as follows: 
Developing Agents to intelligently provide real-time detection of network 
systems attacks, which target telecommunications and QoS protocols or 
misuse heavy computations, for example computations resulting from 
cryptographic algorithms. This can be achieved by analysing the network 
traffic and assets behaviour by continuously monitoring and assessing the 
status of the most targeted nodes in a particular network such as servers, 
routers and switches. 
Developing Fuzzy Agents to provide appropriate automated response actions 
based on sufficient analysis of sequence of events for different types and 
levels of DoS attacks. Also, to ensure accurate information gathering and 
intelligence in order to avoid any negative consequences, such as overloading 
network resources. This would provide a step forward to overcome the 
problems currently limiting Intrusion detection systems capabilities from the 
point of view of cost and efficiency. 
Performing the activities of detecting and automatically responding to 
different sorts of Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks and validating those 
response actions to insure and prove network resources availability. Agents 
will need to employ Machine Learning techniques such as Bayesian Learning 
in conjunction with Fuzzy Intelligence capabilities into the system Agents in 
order to predict future, similar, evolving DoS problems. These Agents would 
contain the methods of actively interacting with the security experts and 
intelligently handle their duties. The vital issue here is to embed a learning 
component in the Agent's behaviour, in such a way that learning would 
become an essential effect of the Agent's routine tasks. The key issue will be 
to develop long-life Agents, capable of accumulating knowledge and reuse it 
to guide further learning. 
Providing a mechanism to verify the integrity of the data stored within a 
network in a real-time fashion, report any detected violations to the network 
security personnel, at the same time, with the ability to respond accordingly. 
The possible required responses include ability to dynamically control the 
availability of allocated resources for different network connections and QoS 
provisions. This set of required capabilities implies that security services are 
installed on every network device. 
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Those sorts of areas have been ignored previously by the industry, due to the costs 
associated with their implementation. However, the recent developments in 
Agents technology as well as machine learning solutions have encouraged more 
thought about practical solutions to the underlying problems. This may contribute 
to the current fast development in the telecommunication services and information 
networks security using the state of Bayesian learning and fuzzy Agents 
techniques, so to perhaps offer a solution that can be implemented in a cost- 
effective manner. 
1.4- Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. 
Chapter two outlines the research background. It discusses a brief history of 
Intrusion Detection Systems and their limitations. It reviews the state of the art 
developments and major recent research that is taking place in the area of 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) in general and the application of artificial 
intelligence and machine learning solutions to the current problems of networks 
security and IDSs in particular. This chapter ends with covering the motivations 
behind this research work in general and applying intelligent Agents as the 
evolving distributed systems paradigm in particular. 
In chapter three the literature in the field of Distributed Systems and Networks 
security will be discussed. This chapter aims to provide a summarized background 
theory to the subject and justify the given proposals. In this chapter, the current 
network security issues are identified in the context of security engineering and 
management. It discusses network security threats in general with particular 
emphasis on Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and its distributed version. 
Distributed DoS attacks became a reality due to the limitations and openness 
nature of the Internet. It briefly outlines the major risks in distributed network 
systems, including the major limitations of current network communication 
protocols. This chapter ends with the discussion of the Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDSs), their approaches and types. 
Next chapter investigates Bayesian learning as a probabilistic as well as a 
predictive approach to Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs). It covers 
the concept of Bayesian decisions-based modelling within the context of NIDSs. 
This chapter discusses the matter of knowledge engineering and extraction, and 
considers the majors steps involved in NIDS data modelling using vector 
transformations. A developed Nafve Bayes supervised learning model for 
detecting network attacks is introduced in this chapter. It also covers the detector 
model development to extract the variable nodes of the naive Bayesian network 
automatically from a dataset, which is generated by MIT Lincoln Lab and used to 
train the developed models and evaluate the research in the field of NIDSs. 
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Chapter five discusses the further development of Bayesian supervised learning 
technique which is introduced in the pervious chapter. This modelling technique is 
further enhanced in this chapter using a powerful learning method known as 
Bayesian Networks (BNs). BNs have led to the development of learning Directed 
Acyclic Graphs (DAGs), techniques to extract them directly from datasets of 
cases, rather than relying on the insight of human domain experts, thus turning 
BNs into a powerful tool for knowledge extraction. This chapter shows how 
probabilistically the Bayesian network detects network attacks, allowing for the 
generalization of NIDSs. It describes the major results achieved from experiments 
based on real time dataset as well as the observations that explain the achieved 
results. 
Next chapter proposes Fuzzy intelligence capabilities to initiate successful 
automated response actions. This is to enhance the capabilities of the detection 
models developed in the previous chapter. While those models provide a major 
useful purpose in detecting network anomalies, they lack the required intelligent 
response actions that minimise the effects of those detected network unauthorised 
activities. In this chapter, intelligent Agents that incorporate Fuzzy logic 
techniques, have been proposed to handle this task with the ability to respond 
quickly and dynamically control the availability of allocated network resources. 
Applying Fuzzy intelligence into this kind of problem has not been previously 
explored. This chapter investigates Fuzzy logic technique incorporated with an 
uncomplicated mathematical-based model named N Flip-Fly that leads to 
achieving self-healing secured switched networks. 
In chapter seven the evaluation methodology used to assess the performance of 
the machine learning methods will be discussed. This includes the performance of 
detecting as well as predicting unauthorised activities in telecommunication 
networks using the Bayesian learning technique. By means of evaluation, as well 
as empirical evidence, it may be possible to determine the effectiveness and the 
performance of all the developed models and assumptions in chapters five and six. 
The evaluation and validation criteria as well as the learning prediction 
performance for this task have been discussed in this chapter, together with a 
description of the chosen Bayesian learning tool: the BayesiaLab. This chapter 
covers the performance of the developed detection model algorithm for the 
unsupervised learning task, using well known standard methods such as confusion 
matrix. 
Finally, Chapter eight is the conclusion, which discusses some of the experiences 
gained during the previous period of research. It summarises the major findings 
and research contributions as well as the key issues in the thesis. This chapter 
suggests some possible research to be carried out in the future. It discusses future 
possible areas of research in the field, by applying intelligent Agents and machine 
learning solutions in other aspects of Computer Science and Engineering 
problems in general, and data telecommunication networks security and 
management in particular. 
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Chapter 2 
Research Related Work 
This chapter reviews the state of art, developments and major recent research that 
is taking place in the area of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) in general and 
applying intelligent Agents and machine learning solutions to the current 
problems of networks security and IDSs in particular. In this chapter, the 
motivations behind the development of Intelligent Agents and the main current 
limitations of IDSs have been discussed. It describes the architecture development 
of several prior IDSs, as none of them used Bayesian networks-based Agents that 
are learned from a dataset to build its models and detect network anomalies. Many 
IDSs employ various techniques for both anomaly and misuse intrusion detection. 
In all these techniques, an observed behaviour that does not match expected 
behaviour is flagged due to what might be an intrusion indication. In this chapter, 
the discussion of already known established systems such as traditional rule-based 
IDSs and statistical-based IDSs as well as commercial products has been avoided. 
These types of systems have already been reviewed by many literatures in a great 
detail. This chapter surveys the most recent state-of-the-art research that is 
currently taking place in research laboratories. Also, it only focuses on the major 
current research achievements in this area. The major proposed artificial 
intelligence and machine learning research solutions to current limitations of IDSs 
that are covered in this chapter include, Bayesian learning, Fuzzy Logic, 
Intelligent Agents, Artificial Immune Systems, Neural Networks, Genetic 
Algorithms, and Reinforcement Learning. All these approaches are still under 
research at various established research centres either in universities or 
commercial organisations. 
2.1- Brief History of the Development of IDSs 
The proliferation of computer networks and the Internet has created new 
vulnerabilities, which enable intruders around the world to penetrate network 
resources. This situation led researchers to think about approaches that provide 
improvements to the traditional security systems. Intrusion detection systems 
(IDSs) have been proposed as an approach to cope with security problems, due to 
the growing of the unauthorised access incidents and different security threats, 
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such as, eavesdropping communications, masquerading legitimate users, Denial of 
Service attacks, etc. The main objective of this system is to detect those activities 
that violate or compromise systems security. Intrusion Detection [McHugh, 2001] 
[Proctor, 2001] is the process of monitoring the events that take place in a 
computer system or a network, analysing them for sings of security threats and 
violations for security policy. Intrusion detection techniques have received a vital 
attention during the last few years by the security community to protect network 
systems from different sorts of attacks. Intrusion detection technology has 
progressed to some degree in the last 15 years. Even though there were around 30 
IDS research systems in 1990, this section discusses the most interesting 
developed achievements. 
Intrusion Detection [McHugh, 2001] [Proctor, 2001] [Bace, 2000] has merged the 
traditional Electronic Data Processing (EDP) and security audit with optimised 
pattern-matching and statistical techniques. Audit is defined as the process of 
generating, recording, and reviewing a chronological record of system events. 
EDP audited mirror those of the manual business audit process. The first EDP 
audit program was initiated in the mid 1950s. The evolution of fast and increased 
number of computers during 1970s led to the need for computer security. In 1980 
James P. Anderson proposed in his report some changes to computer audit 
mechanisms to provide information for use by computer security managers to 
identify computer misuse and when tracking security violations. Dorothy Denning 
and Peter Neumann researched and developed Intrusion Detection Expert System 
(IDES) in 1986. It was a model for a real time intrusion detection system and 
proposed a correlation between rule-based and statistical techniques. In 1992 SRI 
International developed the IDES prototype system. The Automated Audit 
Analysis project conducted by Sytek in 1985 demonstrated the capability of 
distinguishing normal from abnormal system usage. 
Multics Intrusion Detection and Alerting System (MIDAS), the first intrusion 
detection system that monitored an operational system connected to the Internet. It 
was developed by the National Computer Security Centre (NSC) in 1989 to take 
data from Dockmaster's answering system audit log to construct session profiles, 
and then compare these to user profiles of normal behaviour. In 1991 Haystack 
Labs developed Haystack for US Air Force. It was designed to help security 
officers detect insider abuse of Air Force Standard Base Level Computers (SBLC). 
During the late eighties Network Audit Director and Intrusion Reporter (NADIR) 
was developed by the Computing Division of Los Alamos National Laboratory to 
monitor user activities on the Integrated Computing Network (ICN) at Los 
Alamos. NADIR monitors the network by processing audit trails generated by 
specialised network service nodes; it performs a combination of expert rule-based 
analysis and statistical profiling. 
The first intrusion detection system managed to monitor network traffic was the 
Network System Monitor (NSM). It was developed at the University of California 
in 1989, and it was designed to capture the network traffic as the primary data 
source for its intrusion analysis to detect anomalous activity. The Safeguards, 
Security Group at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory developed wisdom and Sense. Wisdom and Sense used the anomaly 
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detection approach and performed statistical, rule-based analyses. Screen 
Applications International Corporation (SAIC) developed Computer Misuse 
Detection System (CMDS) in 1992. CMDS is a host-based IDS. In 1999 a US 
Presidential Decision Directive was issued to encourage government sector the 
use of IDSs, and the Federal Intrusion Detection Network (FIDNet) is created to 
monitor government sites against network infrastructure attacks. During mid and 
late nineties the concept of Distributed Intrusion Detection Systems (DIDS) was 
introduced to overcome the problems associated with networks interconnectivity, 
which resulted in spreading worms, compromising systems remotely, and the 
evolving of co-ordinated and distributed network attacks. 
2.2- The Limitations of Current IDSs 
Current Intrusion Detection Systems are still not performing well [Jansen et at. 
2000] [Martino, 1999] [Bace, 2000]. Following is a list of the most shortcomings 
of IDSs. Some of these shortcomings tend to overlap between different types of 
IDSs depending on their approaches, as follows: 
Efficiency: IDSs often lack the capability of real time detection and analysis. 
This is because of the difficult nature of the task to achieve. IDSs often slow 
network systems and are not able to cope with heavy loaded and fast networks. 
In addition to that, the expensive computations conducted by anomaly 
detection to maintain system profiles updated for each suspected event and the 
runtime overheads associated with misuse detection. Current IDSs lack the 
ability to learn and predict future evolving attacks. 
Automated Response Capability: IDSs have traditionally focused on 
detecting attacks, which provides a useful service. However, it is not the 
ultimate solution to the problem. There are other issues that need to be taken 
into account in order to complete the full picture. The immediate analysis for 
the detected attack would allow the system to act quickly by establishing the 
proper response action. This would limit the time available for the attacker to 
operate freely and significantly reduce the attack period as well as its effects. 
Lack of Flexibility: Typically IDSs are designed for a specific environment. 
This has resulted in inflexible deployment of IDSs in a wide range of systems. 
IDSs should be easily tailored to different environments regardless system 
pattern changes or any network infrastructure resources upgrade. This is 
because much of the IDS system has tended to be specific to the environment 
being monitoring. IDSs should be self-regulated and dynamically re- 
configurable in order to avoid any IDS restarting so as to adapt to the system 
or network changes. 
Self defence: The current IDSs are facing the problem of the ability to resist 
attacks that are intended and directed to defeat or compromise them is such 
away that they become useless. IDSs like any other systems, they are also 
susceptible to different sorts of attacks. The most critical components of IDSs 
should be well protected against any attacks. IDSs should be able to defend 
themselves before trying to protect other systems. The current IDSs are 
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lacking survivability features such as Intelligent Mobility, dynamic recovery 
etc... 
No Generic Building Methodology: Generally, designing and building IDSs 
by following traditional engineering development process is costly. This is 
due to the lack of structured methodology for developing these systems. The 
lack of common agreement and wise standards on the applied techniques 
between IDSs community has led to this situation. Taking into consideration 
that IDS is still an evolving field of study and therefore more research is 
required. 
False positives: One of the problems that still exist in IDSs. This is because of 
the way that most IDSs are detecting and analysing security threats. It has 
been proven that detecting attacks on single isolated components of a 
particular environment without full linked analysis feature is not enough. 
Improving IDSs capabilities to accurately detect attacks is the most 
challenging currently factor facing IDS researchers and developers. False 
positives can themselves limit the proper automated response feature, which 
current IDSs are lacking. 
Maintenance: The maintenance of IDSs often requires special skills and 
experience more than just general knowledge of systems security. For example, 
upgrading the rule sets for expert system shells used in misuse detection to 
encode and match pattern signatures. This would require sufficient knowledge 
about modifying the language rules sets used in the intended expert system 
and avoiding any undesirable interactions between already built and new 
signatures. Similar considerations may apply to the addition of statistical 
metrics, which are typically used in anomaly detection to identify unfamiliar 
asset behaviour. 
2.3- Related Research Work 
IDSs can detect when an attacker has penetrated a system by exploiting an 
uncorrected or uncorrectable flaws [Bace, 2000]. It can also serve as a vital 
function in information networks protection, by bringing the fact that the system 
has been compromised and attacked to the network manager attention, which 
should consider all the recovery measures for any resulted damage. There are two 
primary approaches or methods to analysing events to detect attacks, which are 
misuse detection and anomaly detection, as follows: 
" Misuse detection 
In Misuse detection, the data classification engine is built on behaviours described 
in terms of rules or other pattern descriptors or signatures. Misuse detectors 
analyse system activity, looking for events or sets of events that match a 
predefined pattern of events that describe a known attack. These patterns can be 
precisely written in advance. The problem here is that only a small number of 
potential attack methods are known, with new ones being developed constantly. 
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Expert systems perform misuse detection. Expert systems [Proctor, 2001] [Bace, 
2000] make conclusions on information gathered from a knowledge base. The 
knowledge base contains rules feature different system states based on the 
incoming data. In this approach, a knowledge engineer who is familiar with the 
target environment enters knowledge about unauthorised activities as if-then rules. 
Afterwards, the evaluation process of the entered knowledge is established. The 
unauthorised activities are specified on the "if part" of the rule, if satisfied, the 
action on the "then part" of the rule is performed. IDSs such as DIDS, C 
Language Interpretive Production System (CLIPS) and Computer Misuse 
Detection Systems (CMDS), which are developed by NASA as well as MIDAS, 
Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES), and NIDES utilise this approach. The 
main problems with these systems are the large amount of data that need to be 
processed in order to only detect known vulnerabilities as well as expensive 
management and maintenance. 
" Anomaly detection 
In anomaly detection, the classification model usually consists of statistical 
profiles of user or system processes behaviour over time. Anomaly detection is a 
response to the "attack recognition" problems of pattern matching. Anomaly 
detectors identify abnormal behaviour (anomalies) on a host or network. Anomaly 
detectors attempt to evaluate the normal user or system behaviour and consider 
other irregular activities as an attack. Unfortunately, anomaly detection introduces 
extremely high rates of false alarms. 
Anomaly detectors are primarily statistical in nature. Statistical analysis [Proctor, 
2001] can be used for identifying anomalies in behavioural data, damage 
assessment, and behavioural data forensics. Although [Bace, 2000] there are 
assertions that statistical analysis may detect malicious activities which exploit 
previously unknown vulnerabilities that could not be detected by other approaches, 
these assertions have not yet been proven in developed systems. The main 
limitations of purely statistical intrusion detection [Kumar, 1995] are, insensitive 
to the order of occurrences of events, difficult to determine thresholds above 
which an anomaly should be considered intrusive, and limited types of behaviours 
that can be modelled using purely statistical methods. The major concern in 
statistical intrusion detection is the classification of observed user and/or system 
behaviour. Techniques such as supervised classification which create users 
profiles based on each user observed behaviour have already been applied. 
However, unsupervised classification learning techniques are still under research 
and not been implemented yet. 
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Many intrusion detection systems employ techniques for both anomaly and 
misuse intrusion detection. The techniques used in these systems to detect 
anomalies are varied. However, both consider observed behaviour that does not 
match expected activity is flagged because an intrusion might be indicated. Figure 
2.1 [Bace, 2000] depicts a general view of the activity space, reflecting the view 
of misuse detectors, anomaly detectors, and possible gaps between the two. The 
main difference between both techniques centres on the overlap of the regions 
representing "normal", "misuse", and "not normal" activities. 
Activitie 
Normal activities eliesed to 
Misuse 
All System 
Activities 
Figure 2.1: Misuse versus anomaly detection [source: Bace, 20001 
IDSs [Jansen, 2000] were conceived of as a form of expert system that observes 
patterns of activity in user accounts and notifies a system administrator if anything 
unusual is detected. Network intrusion detection is the attempt to monitor and 
possibly prevent attempts to intrude into or otherwise compromise network 
system resources. Most network systems [Cheswick and Bellovin, 1994] employ 
access controls, which include firewalls and authentication and authorization 
systems as the first line of defence to protect resources and information. Access 
controls ensure that all direct access either by users or software is authorized. 
Access control techniques can be broken, so intrusion detection is considered to 
be the second line of defence that sets mechanisms put in place to warn 
unauthorized access attempts. In the following sections, I discuss the main recent 
techniques that are proposed for IDSs as well as current research approaches to 
this field. 
2.3.1- State Transition 
State transition approaches [Bace, 2000] [Kumar, 1995] perform misuse detection 
and use expressions of system state and state transitions to describe and detect 
known intrusions. State transition approaches allow the use of optimised pattern- 
matching techniques in such a way that unauthorised activities are represented as 
a sequence of successive state transitions of the monitored system. These states 
are linked by arcs that represent the events required for changing state. Coloured 
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Petri Nets (CP-Nets) is one of the major approaches that are available for 
implementing state transition approaches to misuse intrusion detection. This 
approach was implemented in the IDIOT system. Figure 2.2 [Bace, 2000] shows 
the CP-Net pattern for a TCP/IP handshake process for network connection 
request excluding retransmissions. 
TCP1 TCP2 TCP3 
T syn RT syn+ack RT ack R 
Token 
0 
Last State 
Initial State syn packet sent syn+ack packet sent ack packet sent 
Figure 2.2: CP-Net sequence for TCP/IP handshake process 
Another state-based approach [Kosoresow and Hofmeyr, 1997] that is using finite 
automata for intrusion detection has been proposed. The finite automata detection 
model has been generated and an audit data was pre-processed so that commonly 
occurring sequences of system or network events could be combined into meta- 
events. Then, the meta-events were used as the alphabet of a finite automation. 
Sekar et al, [2000] have proposed a different approach that does not use a built in 
audit system directly. Instead, it accesses the kernel mechanisms, so that the stack 
can be examined when a call to the operating system takes place. Consequently, it 
is possible to find the location in the program where the operating system request 
was made. This approach concentrates on improving the quality of information 
contained in execution traces whenever states are observed consecutively during 
training. However, Michael and Ghosh [2002] in Cigital Labs have proposed an 
approach that is aimed at improving intrusion detection performance with the 
trace information that happens to be available. This approach presents an 
algorithm for automatically constructing finite automata from training data. It 
builds a finite automaton describing normal program behaviour, using audit traces 
of non-intrusive executions for training data. The finite automaton then treats each 
sequence of audit events as a string that is either accepted or rejected; a rejection 
means that the execution generating the audit events is regarded as being 
anomalous. The finite automaton merely has to accept any training sequence that 
isn't abnormal. Consequently, it should also reject abnormal audit-event 
sequences, but since there are no abnormal audit-event sequences in the training 
data this requirement can not be formalised within the learning algorithm itself. 
2.3.2- Neural Networks 
Neural networks (NNs) serve to characterise anomalous behaviour using adaptive 
learning techniques. The basic approach here is to train a neural network on a 
sequence of incoming user data (commands), therefore neural networks must 
process a dataset to learn before they can be effective. These dataset represent the 
current input command sequences of a user, as well as the past n commands, 
where n is the size of the window of past commands. The neural network model 
accepts these n commands to predict the next user command. Once the neural 
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network is trained using the dataset, the network constitutes the user profile and 
able to predict the variance of user behaviour from his/her profile. 
The researchers [Lippmann et al, 1999] at MIT Lincoln Lab have proposed neural 
networks to address the faults in IDSs that search for key-strings in reconstructed 
sequences of the captured network traffic. These systems often do not detect new 
attacks, and they can have high false alarm rates. The new system uses neural 
networks to weight key-string counts and generic key-strings selected to detect 
common actions associated with many attacks. Receiver operating characteristic 
(ROC) curves were generated to determine the false alarm rate required to detect 
80% of all user-to-root attacks. Lippmann et al [1999] claim that their neural 
network system provided high detection rate at a low false alarm rate for old as 
well as new attacks. Their classification neural network model correctly labelled 
all known attacks in the test data for non-stealthy attacks where some evidence of 
the attack type occurred in the reconstructed sniffed sessions. 
Canady [1998] has utilised the analytical strengths of neural networks to identify 
and classify computer network activity based on limited, incomplete, and 
nonlinear data sources. While neural networks [Proctor, 2001] are excellent at 
detecting patterns of deviation between non-parametric datasets, they are not very 
good at describing the deviation or explaining its significance. However, neural 
networks are still used in intrusion detection research. Figure 2.3 depicts the use 
of neural network as an IDS model. 
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Figure 2.3: Neural network as an IDS model 
Coolen et al, [2002], [Bace, 2000] and Cannady [1998] have summarised the 
major strengths and limitations of neural networks applications in IDSs. The 
major advantages of neural networks are: 
" Self-adaptive: NNs can be trained on the normal event profiles without any 
specific knowledge of the different metrics. A NN can automatically 
account for correlation between the various measures that effect the output 
" NNs do not use a fixed set of features to define user behaviours, feature 
selection is irrelevant 
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" NNs do not make prior assumptions on expected statistical distribution of 
metrics 
" Able to generalize: NN response is relatively insensitive to minor 
variations of the input 
" Able to abstract: NNs are capable of abstracting the essence of a set of 
inputs 
" Efficient: can deal with the changing characteristics of the subject 
" Independent of statistical assumptions on the nature of the underlying data 
" Able to cope well with noisy data 
" Fast 
The major disadvantages of NNs are: 
"A tendency to form mysterious unstable configurations in which the 
network fails to learn certain things for no apparent reason 
" NNs do not provide explanation for the anomalies they find. This made it 
poorly suited to the needs of security managers 
" The initial training period of an NN can be substantial 
" Testing the quality of a NN is not an easy task 
" Due to the distributed nature of the behavior profile in NNs, it is hard to 
understand by security managers 
2.3.3- Genetic Algorithm 
This approach characterises anomaly detection to perform analysis of occurring 
events. Genetic algorithm (GA) [Bace, 2000] utilises encoded forms known as 
chromosomes with methods that allow combination of mutation of the 
chromosomes to form new individuals. These algorithms are capable of dealing 
with multidimensional optimisation problems in which the chromosome is 
composed of encoded values for the variables being optimised. Koza [1997] 
defined Genetic programming as a domain-independent problem-solving approach 
in which computer programs are evolved to solve, or approximately solve, 
problems. 
In a computer simulation [Koza, 1997] [Koza, 1997], a population of many 
individuals is generated and a mathematical model is represented by each 
individual. Each individual has one or more randomly populated chromosomes 
that are functioning as basic instructions to the individual in a cause (input data) 
and effect (output behaviour classification) manner. Each individual of subsequent 
creations pass through randomised mutations. So, a population that pass through 
many generations destroys individuals with bad performance, hence, allowing 
individuals with better performance to replicate and mutate themselves during 
every generation (survival of the fittest). The performance of an individual is 
measured using a fitness function, which rates the performance of an individual in 
its environment by comparing the results of the individual's chromosomes with 
the desired results of the problem. 
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The role of GA [Bace, 2000] in intrusion detection process is to identify improved 
hypothesis, by coding a solution to the problem with a string of bits, and then 
finding a fitness function to test each individual of the population against some 
evaluation criteria. At the French Engineering University [Ludovic Me Supelec, 
1998], GA is proposed to develop a tool that uses both, anomaly detection as well 
as misuse detection to classify system events by using a set of hypothesis vectors. 
In this tool, the iterative process of population creation is achieved by three basic 
genetic operators, which are randomised once. In promising experimental results 
to anomaly detection, the mean probability of true positives (accurate detection of 
unauthorised activities) was 0.996, and the mean probability of false positives 
(inaccurate detection of legitimate activities) was 0.0044. 
Following [Ludovic Me Supelec, 1998] is the general structure of the GA. 
Random generation of the first generation 
Repeat 
Individual Selection 
(Selects the fittest individuals) 
Reproduction 
(Promotes exploration of new regions of the search space by crossing over 
parts of individuals) 
Mutation 
(Protects the population against an irrecoverable loss of information) 
Until stop criteria is reached 
Bridges et al [2000] at the Mississippi State University also used genetic 
algorithm to tune fuzzy logic sets of their proposed IDS. In their developed ID 
model, each chromosome consists of a sequence of fuzzy parameters. An initial 
population of chromosomes is created randomly. The goal is to increase the 
similarity of rules of legitimate data while decreasing the similarity of rules of 
intrusive data. A fitness function is defined to reward a high similarity of 
legitimate data while penalizing a high similarity of intrusive data. The developed 
GA model evolved a population of chromosomes that represent better solutions to 
the problem. The major drawbacks of GAs to misuse detection are [Bace, 2000]. 
GA-based IDS can't take into account attacks characterised by even 
absence, such as a rule in the form of "programmer does NOT use cc as 
complier" 
GA-based IDS can't detect multiple simultaneous attacks, because of the 
binary expressional form for individual event streams 
GA-based IDS can't precisely locate attacks in the audit trail. This 
problem is similar to neural network approach. 
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2.3.4- Immunology Approach 
This approach [Marchette, 2001] [D'haeseleer, 1996] adapts biological immune 
systems to intrusion detection mechanisms. It performs both anomaly detection as 
well as misuse detection techniques. Normally, the organism's immune system is 
capable of determining which materials are harmless entities and which contain 
dangerous factors using peptides. Researchers at the University of New Mexico 
focused on some computer attributes such as system calls that result from running 
privileged processes could be considered analogous to peptides. This is done by 
considering strings of system calls of a fixed size n, so-called "n-grams". The 
basic idea is to generate a collection of "n-grams" which correspond to "self' and 
to use the number of "non-self' mismatches to determine the likelihood that an 
anomaly has occurred. In its first phase, a knowledge base was built to contain the 
profiles of normal behaviour, and any deviations form this profile are considered 
as anomalous. The second phase used the profiles to monitor subsequent system 
behaviour for anomalies. For example [Marchette, 2001] we start by defining an 
alphabet of symbols which correspond to all system calls. Fix a length n, which 
will be the length of characteristic strings. Afterwards, "normal" operations of the 
under testing program are kept in a list which contains all observed dependent "n- 
grams". Consider the following example which consists of six symbols: ABCC 
FAABECDDBF. This sequence results in a set of 6-grams, as following: 
ABCCFA 
BCCFAA 
CCFAAB 
CFAABE 
FAABEC 
AABECD 
ABECDD 
BECDDB 
ECDDBF 
In this example, there are 66 = 46,656 possible distinct 6-grams. Being confident 
that one is able to identify a given percentage of all "normal" n-grams for the 
under testing program, would depend on how long one has to observe the program 
in question. The outcome of this approach was promising however it remains to 
be looked at whether it is possible to be made practical. Moreover, this approach 
did not provide a complete solution to the intrusion detection limitations. 
Unauthorised activities, such as masquerading and policy violations, do not 
involve the use of privileged processes, hence, not subject to detection by this 
approach. The papers [Forrest et al, 2000] [Hofmeyr et al, 1999] [D'haeseleer et a], 
1996] have described techniques for developing self-nonself immune system for 
computers and/or networks intrusion detection. 
At the University College London (UCL), Kim et al, [2001] [1999] have 
evaluated the use of negative selection in an Artificial Immune System (AIS) for 
network intrusion detection. Forrest et al, [1994] [1997] proposed and used a 
negative selection algorithm for various anomaly detection problems. This 
algorithm defines "self' by building the patterns of legitimate activities behaviour 
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of a monitored system. The Human Immune System is able to detect a vast 
number of antigens with a smaller number of antibodies using the development of 
mature antibodies through the gene expression process. When a new antibody is 
produced, the gene segments of different gene libraries are randomly selected and 
concatenated in a random order. However, this process has major problem. The 
new generated antibody can bind not only to those harmful antigens, but also to 
essential self cells. In order to prevent this damage, the HIS employs negative 
selection by only releasing those antibodies which do not bind to any self cell and 
distributed throughout the whole human body to monitor other living cells. 
In their research work, Kim et al, [2001] showed that the negative selection 
algorithm introduced a severe scaling problem for handling real network traffic 
data. This research concluded by suggesting that the most appropriate use of 
negative selection in the AIS is as a filter for invalid detectors, not the generation 
of competent detectors. If this is the case, I think negative selection could be a 
useful to for eliminating one of the major problems in the current IDSs, which is 
the lack of effective automated response actions that could be taken by IDSs when 
particular anomaly activities take place. This would trigger another research point 
in this direction. In this thesis, I proposed another approach to achieve that using 
fuzzy intelligence. 
In an interesting paper [Aickelin et al, 2003] the researchers at the University of 
Nottingham looked at the issue of applying the Human Immune System (HIS) into 
computer security differently by considering an emerging field of `Danger 
Theory' (DT) amongst immunologists. DT was proposed to explain current 
anomalies in the current understanding of how the immune system recognises 
foreign invaders such as bacteria. Aickelin et al, [2003] argue that DT suggests 
that the immune system reacts to threats based on the correlation of various 
(danger) signals and it provides a method of `grounding' the immune response by 
linking it directly to the attacker. The researchers tried to investigate this 
correlation to translate the DT into the problem of information and computer 
security by producing an Artificial Immune System (AIS) that would overcome 
the limitations of self-nonself discrimination. The major limitations of self-nonself 
Immune systems are their impracticality and inability of their privileged processes 
to consider detecting unauthorised activities such as masquerading and policy 
violations. 
The proposed model [Aickelin et al, 2003] considers self-nonself discrimination is 
no longer essential, and centres on understanding how intrusion scenarios would 
be detected by reacting to the balance of various types of alerts. The proposed IDS 
model has been inspired by the difference between two types of alerts, necrotic 
`bad' and apoptotic `good' cell death alerts, with respect to Antigen Presenting 
Cells (APCs) activation in the HIS. The apoptosis has a suppressive effect and 
necrosis a stimulatory immunological effect. In HIS, APCs activate according to 
the balance of apoptotic and necrotic cells and this activation leads to protective 
immune response actions. The researchers claim that the APC activation 
mechanism has the advantage of detecting rapidly spreading viruses or scanning 
intrusions at an early stage using a number of sensors in the proposed model to 
report various low-level alerts. 
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2.3.5- Agents Paradigm 
An Intelligent Agent (IA) [Knapik et al, 1998] [Tecuci, 1998] is an entity that 
carries out some set of operations on behalf of a user or other software with some 
degree of independence or autonomy. It is a knowledge-based system that 
perceives its environment, and acts upon it to realise a set of goals or tasks for 
which it was designed. An IA can then be described in terms of a space defined by 
these two dimensions of agency and intelligence. Tecuci [1998] proposed what he 
called "Disciple Approach", the defining feature of this approach is to build 
Agents that a person (could be a network security expert) teaches the Agent how 
to perform domain-specific tasks. This teaching of the Agent is done in much the 
same way as that of teaching a student or apprentice, by giving the Agent 
examples and explanations, as well as supervising and correcting its behaviour. 
The Autonomous Agents for Intrusion Detection (AAFID) [Balasubramaniyan et 
al, 1998] [Crosbie et al, 1995] is a prototype of an Agent-based intrusion detection 
system that was developed at Purdue University. The developed model is a 
distributed IDS based on multiple independent entities called autonomous Agents 
working collectively. This approach has been proposed to overcome the 
limitation in the existing architecture of having a single monolithic entity that 
does most of the data collection and processing. The system is hierarchically 
structured in multi-layers and Agents report their findings to transceivers, which 
perform housekeeping and monitoring operations. The major drawbacks of this 
approach [Crosbie et al, 1995] is that the autonomous Agents impose an overhead 
on the system as they will consume both memory and CPU cycles in order to 
monitor for intrusions as well as the timing cost in training the Agents. However, 
this is a cost of any intrusion detection system in which the cost must be weighed 
up against the benefits of having a protection mechanism in place. 
The Java Agents for Meta-Learning (JAM) project at Columbia University [Stolfo 
et al, 1997] [Stolfo et at, 1996] uses intelligent, distributed Java Agents and data 
mining to learn models of fraud and intrusive behaviour. The JAM focuses on 
data mining over multiple organisations and learns models of fraudulent credit 
card transactions. The researchers in this project managed to get a real dataset 
from the largest banks in USA who provided them with real-world credit card 
transaction data from which models may be computed to distinguish fraudulent 
transactions form legitimate ones. In JAM, meta-Learning is used to combine 
different classifiers (from different learning algorithms). There are four chosen 
learning algorithms, which are ID3, CART, RIPPER, and Bayes. All the four 
algorithms have been compared based on the true positive rate (fraud catching) 
and false positive rate (false alarm) of each learned classifier. The best classifier 
amongst all generated outputs is Bayes (trained with 50%/50% fraud/non-fraud 
distribution) with the highest true positive rate and lowest false positive rate of all. 
In this thesis, the evaluation results indicate that Bayesian networks outperform 
Bayes classifiers. 
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EMERALD (Event Monitoring Enabling Responses to Anomalous Live 
Disturbances) developed by Porras and Neumann [1997] in SRI International. SRI 
International's System Design Laboratory has been actively involved in intrusion- 
detection research since 1983. EMERALC is another Agents-based architecture 
that utilises a distributed approach to performing intrusion detection. EMERALD 
environment is a distributed scalable tool applicable for tracking unauthorised 
activities across large networks. Its approach is to network surveillance, attack 
isolation, automated response, and event analysis that combine signature analysis 
and statistical profiling to provide localised real-time protection of network 
services on the Internet. The central component of EMERALD [Neumann et at, 
1999] [Bace, 2000] is the EMERALD Service Monitor, which is similar in form 
and function to the AAFID autonomous Agent discussed previously. EMERALD 
is still an ongoing progressive research project by SRI International. 
In the Texas University [Carver et a], 2000], a group of researchers proposed a 
methodology for using intelligent Agents to provide automated intrusion 
responses. This is to minimise the window of vulnerability between when an 
intrusion is detected and when action is taken to defend against the attack. The 
proposed Agents collaborate to protect the computer system against attack and 
adapt their response tactics until the system administrator can take an active role 
in the defence of the system. In their published work, [Carver et al, 2000] the 
paper only describes the functionality of the proposed methodology in a high level 
manner, as the system has not been simulated or implemented yet. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of such a model can not be characterised. 
At the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), [Mell et at, 2000] 
[Jansen et at, 1999] [Jansen et at, 2000] an active research about the deployment 
of mobile Agents into intrusion detection systems has been published. Mobility 
allows Agents to move between systems in a network, but, introduces additional 
complexity to Intelligent Agents. A Mobile Agent [Pham et at, 1998] [Lange et at, 
1998] is a software entity that can move within a network, able to transport itself 
from one machine to another, and act on behalf of the user or another entity. At 
the NIST, the research work has focused on the benefits derived from mobility 
and those associated with software Agent technology. In their work, they tried to 
propose a number of improved ways to apply Agent mobility to address the 
shortcomings of current IDSs such as tracing an attacker or evidence gathering. In 
a joint project at the Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA) and the 
Waseda University in Japan [Asaka et at, 1999] a group of researchers have 
developed a network IDS called the Intrusion Detection Agent system (IDA), 
which employs mobile Agents to trace intruders, collecting information only 
related to the intrusion along the intrusion-route, and decide whether, in fact, an 
intrusion has occurred. However, [Jansen et at, 2000] the main obstacle to 
applying mobile Agents to intrusion detection is the security problem. Mobile 
Agents could introduce vulnerabilities that can be exploited (brain washed) by 
attackers to propagate a particular attack or subvert detection by the IDS. 
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Traditionally, distributed systems applications have used the client-server 
architecture, in which the client sends its request to the server to process it, and 
waits for the result to be reported back. Mobile Agents are able to overcome 
some of the problems associated with the current distributed architectures. The 
obvious disadvantage of using Mobile Agents is the concern that they will 
introduce vulnerabilities into the network. However, there is a lot of active 
research regarding mobile Agents security, and we would expect contributions in 
this area of research. Never the less, [Garms et al, 2001] for the time being we can 
use the current authentication and encryption methods that many technologies are 
capable of, for example Java, which has well developed security functions. In 
addition to that, Mobile Agents solutions [NIST, 1999] [Greenberg et al, 1998] 
may not perform fast enough to meet their applications needs. Finally, limited 
industry experience and modelling tools for formulating Mobile Agents solutions 
to applications are also factors that need to be taken into consideration. 
In the Mitsubishi Electric Research Lab (MERL) and Lotus Research Lab, USA, 
[Rich et al, 1997], have developed a COLLAborative interface AGENt paradigm 
(COLLAGEN). The Agents can both communicate with and observe the actions 
of the user. Agents can watch a user interact with an application and figure out the 
task that the user is trying to perform and give assistance. One of the Agent's main 
responsibilities is to maintain the history and context of the collaboration. This 
approach is useful and can be applied to secure networks by teaching security 
Agents their daily tasks and how to respond automatically in case of any 
unauthorised incident or security threat. At MIT [Maes, 1994] identified four 
ways that learning can occur. First, an Agent can learn by watching over the user's 
shoulder, observing what the user does and imitating the user. Second, the Agent 
can offer advice or take actions on the user's behalf and then learn by receiving 
feedback or reinforcement from the user. Third, the Agent can get explicit 
instructions from the user. Finally, by asking other Agents collaborate primarily 
with the user, not with other Agents. The Open Sesame application [Caglayan et 
al, 1997], on Macintosh an Agent watches a user, learns their behaviour, and 
offers to automate repetitive tasks. 
2.3.6- Reinforcement Learning 
Reinforcement Learning [Sutton et at., 1998] [Mitchell, 1997] addresses the 
question of how an autonomous Agent that senses and acts in its environment can 
learn to choose optimal actions to achieve it goals. In a Markov Decision Process 
(MDP) the Agent can perceive the entire state of its environment at each time step. 
The Agent can perceive a set S of its environment states, and has a set of A of 
actions to perform. The environment responds by giving the Agent a reward or a 
punishment based on the Agent's action consequences, and the succeeding state is 
produced. 
The goals of reinforcement learning Agent can be defined by a reward function r, 
= r(s,, ad that assigns a numerical value in a form of immediate payoff to each 
distinct action at the Agent may take from each distinct network state st and by 
producing the succeeding state s, +j = 6(sr, at). For example, the goal of detecting 
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network anomaly attacks can be captured by assigning a positive reward (e. g. 1) to 
state-action transition that immediately result in attack detection and a reward of 
zero to every other state-action transition. This reward function could be known to 
a human security expert who trains the Agent to achieve its goals and provides the 
reward value for each action performed by the Agent. The task of the Agent is to 
perform sequences of actions, observe their consequences, and learn a control 
policy is: S-*A. 
The control policy that we are aiming for is one that, from any initial state for the 
network, the Agent would choose only actions that accumulate positive reward 
and consequently maximise network security. A cumulative reward value V" (s, ) 
gained y applying the control policy it from an initial distinct network state s, is 
equivalent to i yr, +, 
[Mitchell, 1997], where 0<_ y<l is a constant, which 
1=o 
represents a measure for immediate versus delayed reward. The immediate reward 
is only considered when y=0 . 
The general notion for the learning Agent 
interaction with its network environment is characterised with a sequence of 
discrete time steps (t, t+], t+2 ..... t+n), as shown 
in figure 2.4. Notice that the 
learning Agent accepts rewards either from the network environment or the 
security expert trainer. 
Learning Agent dialog 
(executes sequence « ----- 0! 
of actions) 
-- 4 st 
of+, -- rt+, St+, Trains the 
at+z - rt+z --- St+2 
Agents 
at+n rt+n St+n 
Network environment 
Figure 2.4: Learning Agent's interaction with its network environment 
When a class i network connection is requested by a particular user, if the Agent 
detected a suspicious event contained within the user request, which happened to 
be a valid attack, the Agent only collects a specific amount of scores/7, E [0, oo]. 
These scores can be interpreted as the average reward for detecting the attack 
within that ith class connection, and the clever Agent would make scores off 
attacks detection. The ultimate aim is to find a policy it that for every network 
system state, s, the Agent chooses the correct control action, a, so that we 
maximize the security subject. The following problem will be considered to find 
the Intrusion Detection and Response (IDR) policy it that maximises S(, r) , 
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xe (set of all policies), where S(ic) characterises the average network scores 
under policyn. 
We choose the network state description to be asS = (n,, ±x, t) , where n, is the 
number of class i connections in progress, x represents an event that occurs at 
random times indicating for new incoming class i connection request, and t is the 
included time to facilitate the occurrence of successive events. +x, stands for 
arrival of a legitimate new class i connection request, -x, stands for arrival of a 
new class i suspicious connection request. When an event x occurs, the learner 
Agent has to choose a proper action for that event. The action set is 
A(s) = {0 = normal, 1 = abnormal) upon a new connection request packet arrival. 
The actions available at state s, A(s), in general depend on s. For example, if 
receiving a new connection request at a state s will violate the security constrain, 
then the action set at that state should be constrained to A(s) ={l} . At some 
subsequent random time, another event occurs, and this cycle repeats. The Agent 
only earns scores for detected attacking connection requests r (s, a) = 17, if x= -x 
and a=1, and r(s, a)=0 , otherwise, where r(s, a) is the reward function 
associated with the gained score. 
At the University of Johns Hopkins [Awerbuch et al, 2003] a group of researchers 
have proposed a distributed reinforcement learning in order to develop provably 
secure traffic routing in ad hoc networks against Byzantine adversaries. The 
developed flooding-free routing protocol attempts to provide throughput 
competitive route selection against detected an adversary which benefits from 
complete collusion of adversarial nodes. This adversary can engage in arbitrary 
Byzantine behaviour and can mount arbitrary selective adaptive attacks, 
dynamically changing its attack with each new packet. The results of this work 
claim validity of their approach. 
He et al, [1999] at the University of Maryland, have developed a reinforcement 
learning-based fast algorithm which learns a Partially Observable Markov 
Decision Process (POMDP) decision-rule for network proactive fault detection 
and management. This type of management depends on monitoring the network to 
obtain the data on which to base manager decisions. However, due to the overhead 
costs that are associated with this management approach, reinforcement learning- 
based Agents have been proposed. These Agents take optimal management 
actions (polling, repairing, etc. ) based on network states and minimising operation 
costs while observing network status when anomalies arise. For an intelligent 
Agent, who either resides in a network node or acts as a stand-alone proxy, should 
react to the changing network environment intelligently instead of solely 
providing management information base (MIB) entries when being polled. In their 
proposed model, the solution of the POMDP is used to construct the decision rule 
for the intelligent managers and Agents. 
In a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [Mitchell, 1997] the Agent can perceive the 
entire state of its environment at each time step. The Agent can perceive a set S of 
its environment states, and has a set of A of actions to perform. The environment 
24 
CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH RELATED WORK 
responds by giving the Agent a reward or a punishment based on the Agent's 
action consequences, and the succeeding state is produced. In Partially Observable 
MDP (POMDP) the environment states are not completely observable and in 
many practical situations the environment may provide only partial information. 
In such a scenario, it may be required for the Agent to consider its previous 
observations together with its currently gathered data in order to decide its actions. 
Using this approach, network intrusion detection operating in a real time manner 
would be regarded as a POMDP. However, reinforcement learning [Thottan et al., 
1998] [Brown, 2000] can be used for solving POMDP by learning good 
approximations to the optimal policy. Applying reinforcement learning into 
network security in general and intrusion detection is a topic of hot debate and a 
new trend that is still in its primary research stage. 
2.3.7- Bayesian Learning 
Bayesian learning is a probabilistic as well as an intelligent predictive approach. 
In Bayesian learning, probability is used to represent uncertainty about the 
relationship being learned. As a machine learning technique [Lane, 2000], 
Bayesian approach to Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) represents a 
data intensive domain with a classification as well as a prediction model. Bayesian 
learning [Heckerman et al. 1995] has two distinct advantages over classical 
learning. Firstly, it combines prior knowledge and data, as opposed to classical 
learning, which does not explicitly incorporate user or prior knowledge. Secondly, 
in Bayesian learning, there is no need to introduce external methods to avoid over 
fitting. Inference methods [Marchette, 2001] for detecting unauthorised activities 
in networks either use signature analysis or statistical anomaly detection 
approaches. The main advantage of the former approach is attack specificity, 
however, may not be able to generalise. The latter detects attacks probabilistically, 
allowing for generalization, however, may not be able to specify. Generally, 
statistics involve the fitting of models to data and making inferences from these 
models. 
Bayesian learning approach [Lane, 2000] to NIDSs represents a data intensive 
domain with a hierarchical classification model hence, utilises anomaly detection 
techniques. The upper layers of the hierarchy are computationally intensive that 
determine the identification and classification features. The lower layers provide a 
data management mechanism to train developed detector models. The purpose of 
training is to make predictions for future similar network attacks possible. 
Bayesian learning discovers consistent useful patterns of system features that can 
be used to characterise users, software processes, or network activities behaviours. 
Classifiers are modelled and extracted from large datasets to process system 
features in order to recognise and discover useful facts such as anomalies. The 
results of experimental work introduced in the next few sections using live data 
are promising. However, the developed Bayesian detection models have not been 
commercialised yet. 
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Pikoulas et al, [2001] have used Bayesian forecasting technique to predict the 
behaviour of computer users. The proposed system is based on Bayesian 
multivariate statistical model that should determine if a user is acting 
unpredictably or has changed their normal working patterns. The model has three 
main stages, observation, evaluation, and One-step prediction. Observation stage 
is monitoring the user and records its behaviour. Evaluation stage makes a 
prediction and calculates the result. One-step stage makes a single step prediction 
once the model is trained in monitoring the user behaviour for fifteen times. The 
developed model seems reacted as expected to all the tests that were applied. 
However, relying on only fifteen times of user interactions may not be sufficient 
enough to train the model and take trustable detection actions. 
Valdes et al [2000] have proposed Bayesian Network (BN) based na7ve bayes to 
present a high-performance and adaptive detection model to analyse bursts of 
network traffic. The model sensor examines TCP headers hence called eBayes 
TCP. The eBayes TCP model structure represents the unobservable session class 
at the root node, and several observed and derived variables form the TCPDUMP 
data as children. The eBayes TCP is coupled with an eBayes service availability 
monitor, which learns valid hosts and services in the protected network via a 
process of unsupervised discovery. The developed model shows an interesting 
capability in detecting TCP major anomalies. However, the main limitation of the 
proposed model is that, as a naive Bayes model eBayes TCP assumes conditional 
independence of the child nodes given the single parent. This is a simplistic 
assumption and not really characterising the nature of TCP protocol mechanism, 
taking into consideration the handshake processes and connection request 
procedures. Other naive Bayes detection models [Schultz et a], 2001] and 
[Burroughs et al, 2002] have already been proposed to improve current intrusion 
detection systems. 
At the AT&T Labs-Research, [Schonlau et at, 2001] have compared the 
performance of a number of statistical methods including Bayes One-step Marcov 
in detecting computer masquerades. The Bayes One-step Markov approach is 
based on one-step transitions from one command to the next. The approach uses a 
Bayes factor statistic to test the null hypothesis that the observed one-step 
command transition probabilities are consistent with the historical transition 
matrix. This approach seemed performing reasonably acceptable however, it was 
uniformly inferior to two methods which are Sequence-Match and IPAM 
(Incremental probabilistic action modelling). This evaluation is based on 
comparing the produced ROC curves of each method. These curves show the 
functional relationship between false alarms and missing alarms. 
In Hewlett Packard (HP) [Bronstein et al, 2001] developed Bayesian Network 
model for detecting email anomalies such as mail loops and virus attacks. In their 
model, they defined `self-awareness' as the ability to autonomously detect 
behaviour deviations. Also, they defined `self-control' as the ability to respond to 
this information in a positive manner. However, in [Bronstein et at, 2001] 
published the `self-awareness' part of their model. Their approach to model BN is 
rather simple, as only nine variable nodes were considered hence; the BN model is 
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manually structured. The detector model has been validated using HP's corporate 
email service as well as ROC curves. The results were quite promising. 
Despite the fact that the developed model by [Schonlau et at, 2001] at the AT&T 
managed to detect masquerades behaviour, however, the models were only testing 
one variable of every user commands. In IDSs, it is often required to check for 
many command variables and identify the inter-relationship amongst them. This is 
to give a clear insight on whether unauthorised user activities are really taking 
place. Also, in the BN detection model developed by [Bronstein et at, 2001] at HP, 
only few variables were considered such as the incoming message rate, to/from 
ratio and max same size. This could be sufficient for specific email unauthorised 
activities therefore the BN model is manually structured. I think the developers at 
HP have not effectively used the capabilities of BN by only considering few 
variable nodes in their detection model. 
Bayesian Network is a powerful tool with the ability of considering tens or even 
hundreds of variables and learning the inter-relationship between all these 
variables hence, able to generalise its models. BN has the advantage of being able 
to detect anomalies probabilistically, allowing for generalization potential. Also, 
IDSs are often generalised enough in such away to detect many types of 
anomalies for various applications at different levels. Therefore, in this thesis a 
dataset of thirty variables that is prepared by MIT Lincoln Lab was used to learn 
the structure of a proposed Bayesian network detection model. The developed 
model has been evaluated using ROC curves as well as other standard methods 
used to validate machine learning algorithms. This thesis discusses the evaluation 
of the developed detection models. 
2.3.8- Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy Logic [Zadeh, 1994] is defined by its founder in 1965 as, "In a narrow 
sense, is a logical system that aims at a formalization of approximate reasoning. 
As such, it is rooted in multi-valued logic, but its agenda is quite different from 
that of traditional multi-valued logical systems, e. g., Lukasiewicz's logic. In this 
connection, what should be noted is that many of the concepts which account for 
the effectiveness of fuzzy logic as a logic of approximate reasoning are not a part 
of traditional multi-valued logical systems. Among these are the concept of a 
linguistic variable, canonical form, fuzzy if-then rule, fuzzy quantifiers, and such 
modes of reasoning as interpolative reasoning, syllogistic reasoning, and 
dispositional reasoning. In a board sense, fuzzy logic is almost synonymous with 
fuzzy set theory. Fuzzy set theory, as its name suggests, is basically a theory of 
classes with non-sharp boundaries. Fuzzy set theory is much broader than fuzzy 
logic in its narrow sense and contains the latter as one of its branches. Among the 
other branches of fuzzy set theory are, for example, fuzzy arithmetic, fuzzy 
mathematical programming, fuzzy topology, fuzzy graph theory, and fuzzy data 
analysis. What is important to recognise is that any crisp theory can be fuzzified 
by generating the concept of a set within that theory to the concept of a fuzzy set. 
Indeed, it is very likely that eventually most theories will be fuzzified in this way. 
The impetus for the transition from a crisp theory to a fuzzy one derives from the 
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fact that both the generality of a theory and its applicability to real-world 
problems are substantially enhanced by replacing the concept of a set with that of 
a fuzzy set. " 
Bridges et al, [2000] argue that fuzzy logic is appropriate for the intrusion 
detection problem for two main reasons. Firstly, intrusion detection involves 
many quantitative features, such as CPU usage time, network connection duration, 
and the number of different TCP/IP services initiated by the same source address. 
Secondly, security itself includes fuzziness. Having a quantitative value such as an 
interval measurement, all values falling inside the interval would be relatively 
considered normal. Similarly, all values falling outside the interval would be 
relatively considered anomalous. Fuzzy representation to these quantitative 
measures could help in smoothing the sudden change between normal and 
abnormal behaviour. 
At the Iowa State University [Dickerson et a], 2001] [Dickerson et at, 2000], a 
group of researchers designed a fuzzy based anomaly IDS called Fuzzy Intrusion 
Recognition Engine (FIRE). FIRE is a network IDS that uses fuzzy logic to assess 
malicious activity against a computer network. It employs a number of agents to 
perform separate monitoring tasks that are particularly significant to anomaly 
detection. Some agents perform their own fuzzification of input data sources. All 
agents communicate with a fuzzy evaluation engine that combines the output 
results of individual agents using fuzzy rules to trigger alerts that are relatively 
accurate. The results of the designed system show that it can easily identify port 
scanning and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, and is able to detect some of 
backdoor and Trojan horse attacks. A sample of fuzzy rules used to detect host 
and port scanning in FIRE are as follows: 
If the COUNT of UNUSUAL SDP on PortN is HIGH 
And the COUNT of DESTINATION HOSTS is HIGH 
And the COUNT of SERVICE Ports observed s MEDIUM-LOW 
Then Service Scan of PortN is HIGH 
where SDP represents a unique connection between a source, destination, and a 
service port. 
Also, at the Mississippi State University [Bridges et al, 2000], researchers have 
developed a prototype Intelligent Intrusion Detection System (IIDS) to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of fuzzy logic techniques in anomaly detection. 
Fuzzy rules have been developed to look for deviations from stored patterns of 
normal behaviour. Genetic algorithms are used to tune the fuzzy membership 
functions and to select an appropriate set of features. The fuzzy rules in IIDS are 
quite similar to those of FIRE. The fuzzy rule for detecting port scanning in IIDS, 
as follows: 
If the DP = high 
Then an unusual situation exists. 
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where, DP is a fuzzy variable that represent the addressed destination port, and 
high is a fuzzy set. The degree of membership of the number of destination ports 
in the fuzzy set high determines whether or not the rule is activated. 
In IIDS, Bridges et al [2000] demonstrate that the false positive rate for 
identifying intrusions obtained when fuzzy frequency episodes were used, were 
much less than those obtained when non-fuzzy frequency episodes were used. 
Roberts et al, [2003] at the University of Nottingham have proposed fuzzy rules to 
replace the signatures identified in SNORT rules. SNORT is a popular and 
actively developing open-source IDS. Analysing the results found by these new 
rules produced better understanding of undetected attack patterns by SNORT. 
Wilamowski [2001] achieved to produce qualitative fuzzy decision system using 
different fuzzy set operators. Smoother results have been obtained in which the 
final outcome dependence on correct determination of fuzzy values out of 
signature attacks. The main limitation of all the previously proposed systems 
seems to be the lack of automated response actions that could minimise the effects 
of those detected attacks. In order to achieve that, I proposed a fuzzy based 
Agents model. Generally, the major shortcomings of fuzzy logic modelling are, 
firstly, it relies on the information provided by human experts who must be 
familiar with the target system, secondly, in many occasions fuzzy logic relies on 
trial and error method. 
2.4- Motivations for Developing Intelligent Agents to Networks 
Security 
The motivation for researching about applying Intelligent Agents into networks 
security stems from the strengths of Intelligent Agents and the current limitations 
associated with the Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). There has been [Knapik 
et al, 1998] [Tecuci, 1998] a large movement in the Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
research community to apply at least the basic Al techniques to distributed 
computing and Networking. As more and more networking and distributed 
systems applications are performed, there is more interest in having Intelligent 
Agent (IA) that can perform specific tasks efficiently. Intelligent Agents, can 
provide real value to businesses and users in this new, interconnected world. 
Intelligent Agents are able to operate asynchronously and independently of the 
process that initiated them (autonomously), they help to construct highly robust, 
fault-tolerant and cost-effective systems. 
The limitations of IDSs are inherited from the shortcomings of networking 
systems and protocols such as TC/IP and QoS protocols. The major limitations of 
IDSs are discussed in section 2.3. Intelligent Agents-based approach to intrusion 
detection is based on entities that are capable of performing certain security 
functions individually or in a distributed form. Agents tend to operate 
autonomously, could learn from experiences and communication with other 
similar Agents. They can provide a mixture of anomaly detection as well as 
misuse detection capabilities, with the ability of responding to detected 
unauthorised activities. There are three dimensions or axes [IBM, 1996] that are 
used to measure the Agents capabilities, as follows: 
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Agency: deals with the degree of autonomy the Agent has in representing the 
user to other Agents, applications, and computer systems. 
Intelligence: refers to the ability of the Agent to capture and apply application 
domain-specific knowledge and processing to solve problems. Agents can be 
relatively sophisticated using complex Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based 
methods and Machine Learning algorithms such as inferencing, learning and 
automatic control. 
Mobility: allows Agents to move between systems in a network. Mobility 
introduces additional complexity to Intelligent Agents. A Mobile Agent [Pharr 
et al, 1998] [Lange et al, 1998] is a software entity that can move within a 
network, able to transport itself from one machine to another, and act on 
behalf of the user or another entity. 
The question that might arise is what do we mean by Intelligent Agents? 
Intelligent Agents use the latest Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques to provide 
autonomous, intelligence, there by extending the influences of users across 
networks. Bigus et at, [2001] assume that intelligent Agents act rationally. They 
do the things we would do, but not necessarily the same way we would do them. 
Intelligent Agents could perform useful tasks for us, make us more productive, 
and save our time. Intelligent Agents represent an emerging distributed system 
paradigm. The Agents tasks are determined by their applications, and they range 
from information gathering to e-commerce to telecommunication services to 
scientific applications and different sorts of distributed computing. Intelligent 
Agents [Murch et at, 1999] [Tecuci, 1998] are those who basically able to learn 
and capable by themselves to acquire and maintain their knowledge. Learning 
represents modification of behaviour through experience or judgement. Learning 
Agents could learn from a variety of information sources in the environment. 
Once tasks are learned, the Agent can then instruct or suggests ways to improve. 
The learning process is gradual and interactive. 
Integrating knowledge acquisition and machine-learning (KA & ML) to Agents 
[Tecuci, 1998] can take advantage of their complementary natures, using machine 
learning techniques to automate the knowledge acquisition process and knowledge 
acquisition techniques to enhance the power of the learning methods. As 
illustrated in Figure 2.5, in such an approach the expert interacts with the 
knowledge-based system via a (KA & ML) component, which performs most of 
the functions of the knowledge engineer. This would allow the expert to 
communicate expertise in a way familiar to him/her and is responsible for 
building, updating and reorganising the knowledge base. Such an Agent 
[Hopgood, 2001] [Wooldridge et al, 1995] is said to be deliberative. Since it 
explicitly represent a symbolic model of the world and makes decisions via 
logical reasoning based on pattern matching and symbolic manipulation. A 
deliberative Agent's knowledge [Newell, 1982] determines its behaviour in 
accordance with Newell's Principle of Rationality, which states that: If an agent 
has knowledge that one of its actions will lead to one of its goals, then the agent 
will select that action. 
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Figure 2.5: Knowledgeable & Learning Agent 
We might argue that systems such as Network Intrusion Detection Systems 
(NIDSs) could be qualitatively better using Al techniques than they would be 
otherwise. Also, Intranets and LANs are particularly interesting environments for 
intelligent mobile Agents to roam because they require less security than in the 
case of wide-open Internet. So, my main goal is to think of producing better and 
smarter systems that are able to learn detecting network anomalies and to respond 
to them so to minimise their effects. Agents [Proctor, 2001] are not currently 
available in any commercial IDSs. The realization that everyday there are newly 
developed network security threats in general and the evolving Denial of Service 
(DoS) attacks in particular require that these challenges be overcome. Since 
detecting those DoS attacks is not enough, we need to have an automated response 
mechanism to act as soon as those attacks are detected to reduce the amount of 
damage that could take place as a result of those destroying attacks. Also, to 
reduce the cost associated with manual response mechanisms. This will not only 
protect our information, it will also protect human's life that is relying on 
biomedical networks in hospitals. In addition to the need to intelligently respond 
to the growing threat resulted by the cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism and hence 
increasing demand by the public sector to have more secure information network 
infrastructures. The W3 organisation [Miller, 1999] states that protection from 
DoS attack tools is an active field of current security research. The features 
supplied by those Intelligent Agents encouraged me to reason that this new 
paradigm would improve the current telecommunication and information 
networks security. 
Recently researchers [Bace, 2000] at different academic as well as industrial 
institutions came up with different proposals to deploy Agents into Intrusion 
Detection Systems. This approach could utilise a number of autonomous Agents 
with variable targeting strategies. Each Agent could target a specific event type, 
signature type, platform, or process depending on the strategy used, and various 
strategies could be available for governing the location of the analysis and 
response functions. However, still a lot of research needs to be done in order to 
improve the Agents capabilities from the point of view of learning and 
responsiveness. Learning and the ability to respond are considered to be vital 
features for Agents to operate efficiently. This thesis addresses these issues and 
investigates the interaction between Intelligent Agents with some learning 
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capabilities such as Bayesian learning and Fuzzy intelligence to secure 
information networks. 
2.5- Summary 
In this chapter, the state of art developments and major recent research that is 
taking place in the area of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) in general and 
applying intelligent Agents and machine learning solutions to the current 
problems of networks security and IDSs in particular have been discussed. This 
chapter covered the architecture development of several prior IDSs and their main 
current limitations. Many IDSs employed various techniques for both anomaly 
and misuse intrusion detection. In all these techniques, an observed behaviour that 
does not match expected behaviour is flagged due to what might be an intrusion 
indication. This chapter surveyed the most recent interesting and state-of-the-art 
research that is currently taking place in research laboratories and focused on the 
major current research achievements in this area. The major proposed artificial 
intelligence and machine learning research solutions to current limitations of IDSs 
include, State transition models, Neural networks, Genetic algorithms, Immune 
systems, Agents paradigm, Reinforcement learning, Bayesian learning and Fuzzy 
logic. All these approaches are still under research at various established research 
centres either in universities or commercial organisations. The development of all 
these IDSs is stemmed from the distributed nature and openness of the Internet, 
which poses a threat to current networked systems. 
State transition approaches perform misuse detection and use expressions of 
system state and state transitions to describe and detect known intrusions. Neural 
networks (NNs) serve to characterise anomalous behaviour using adaptive 
learning techniques. Genetic algorithms (GAs) utilise chromosomes with methods 
that allow combination of mutation of the chromosomes to form new individuals, 
hence, perform analysis of occurring events. The organism's immune system is 
capable of determining which materials are harmless entities and which contain 
dangerous factors using peptides. The Immunology approach adapts biological 
immune systems to perform both anomaly detection as well as misuse detection 
techniques. Reinforcement Learning addresses the question of how an 
autonomous Agent that senses and acts in its environment such as a computer 
network can learn to choose optimal actions to achieve it goals. The environment 
responds by giving the Agent a reward or a punishment based on the Agent's 
action consequences, and the succeeding state is produced. Applying 
reinforcement learning into network security in general and intrusion detection is 
a topic of hot debate and a new trend that is still in its primary research stage. 
An Intelligent Agent is an entity that carries out some set of operations on behalf 
of a user or other software with some degree of independence or autonomy. It is a 
knowledge-based system that perceives its environment, and acts upon it to realise 
a set of goals or tasks for which it was designed. The "Disciple Approach" defines 
Agents that a person (could be a network security expert) teaches the Agent how 
to perform domain-specific tasks. This teaching of the Agent is done in much the 
same way as that of teaching a student or apprentice, by giving the Agent 
examples and explanations, as well as supervising and correcting its behaviour. 
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Agents that are incorporated with Bayesian learning and Fuzzy intelligence will 
dramatically enhance their learning and controlling capabilities. This chapter 
ended with the discussion of the motivations behind the development of 
Intelligent Agents; as none of the current approaches neither used Bayesian 
networks-based Agents that are learned directly from a dataset to build its models 
nor applied Fuzzy intelligence to automate the response actions. The next chapter 
discusses the major concerns in networks security. 
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Chapter 3 
Distributed Networks 
Security Concerns 
In this chapter, the current network security issues are identified in the context of 
security engineering and management. There are a variety of security threats that 
are often presented in the discussion of networks security. In the following 
sections, the major risks in distributed network systems are briefly outlined, 
including the major limitations of current network communication protocols. 
These limitations have led to the development of evolving distributed attacks, 
such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. These attacks have been 
developed to use the features provided by the distributed nature of the Internet. 
This chapter ends with the discussion of the Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), 
their approaches and types. 
3.1-Background Statistics 
The increase in the number of interconnected networks to the Internet has led to 
an increase in security threats and unauthorized activity. Distributed systems and 
network security [Atkins et al. 1996] is concerned with protecting the hardware 
and software resources in a network as well as stored information. In its annual 
report [CSI, 2004] "CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey" for 2003, 
Computer Security Institute (CSI) conducted a survey of 530 organisations across 
different categories. The statistics indicate that organisations security threats 
involve different sorts of problems from Denial of Service (DoS), unauthorized 
access to financial fraud ... etc, as shown in figure 3.1. The 2003 findings show 
that there is no shortage of attacks. Despite the lower number for aggregate 
financial losses in 2003, the risk of cyber attacks continues to be high. Even 
organisations that have deployed a wide range of security technologies can fall 
victim to significant losses. Although 15% of the organisations could not identify 
the attacks took place in their networks, only 47% of the organisations (251 of 
them) could actually quantify their losses, with a total of $201,797,340. 
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Figure 3.1: CSI Survey of 530 organisations (Types of Attack or Misuse) 
The second most expensive computer crime among survey respondents was 
Denial of Service, with a cost of $65,643,300, as shown in figure 3.2. Dos attacks 
covered the second most reported incidents (35%) in 2003, see figure 3.3. DoS 
attacks prevent legitimate users from using normal communication services and 
network resources. Virtually all organisations use anti-virus software (99%) 
Lirewalls (98%), and most (92%) employ some measure of access control. Other 
US government statistics show that cyber crime total losses of companies are 
about $202,000,000,000 per annum, 300,000 Internet attacks per year, more than 
40,000 WWW sites contain some form of hackers tools, and one Internet crime 
per 20 seconds I Preneel, 2001]. Those figures provide further evidence 
surrounding the severity of the problem in protecting information networks. 
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3.2-Networks Security Engineering & Management 
Security engineering [Anderson, 2001] is about building systems to remain 
dependable in the face of malice, error, or mischance. The engineering discipline 
of security focuses on the tools, processes, methods to design, implement, and test 
complete systems, and to adapt existing systems as their environment evolves. 
Security engineering requires cross-disciplinary expertise. It includes managing 
polices and procedures, and managing the individual components within the 
security architecture including: cryptography and certification methods, firewalls, 
hardware tamper-resistance, formal methods to knowledge of applied psychology, 
organisational and audit methods and the law, etc. Security management [King et 
al. 20011 [Bace, 2000] basically, is the process of managing and maintaining 
security within the whole organisation network. It has always been an important 
function within an organisation. In today's high speed networks, with the 
increasing risk associated with internetworking, the importance of effective 
security management is essential to an organisation's ability to manage risk and 
reduce it whenever and wherever possible. Security management provides a 
framework for the change and incident management procedures, which 
consequently provides a framework for identifying, responding to, and reviewing 
security incidents. Figure 3.4 [Race, 2000] shows a general process model to 
security management for network systems. 
Network 
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identifier! Detected 
Figure 3.4: A general model for networks security management 
Generally, providing 100% secure system is currently not possible. Security 
products provide two primary benefits [Intrusion. com, 2001]: visibility and 
control. And, it is the combination of these two benefits that make an enterprise's 
private computer network secure: 
" Visibility: the ability to see and understand the nature of the network and 
the traffic that passes through it. Visibility is paramount to decision 
making. 
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Control: the ability to affect network traffic including access to the 
network or parts thereof. Control is paramount to enforcement. 
3.3-The Major Risks of Distributed Networks Security 
Most organisations have wisely installed filtering routers and firewalls to protect 
their investment on the Internet; many of these countermeasures can go wrong 
because of their limitations and can not withstand distributed systems threats, such 
as DoS and Web vulnerabilities. A useful categorization of network attacks can be 
classified in terms of passive attacks and active attacks [Stallings, 1999]: 
" Passive Attacks 
These types of attacks are concerned with only either eavesdropping or 
monitoring of networks traffic. The main aim of the attacker is to obtain 
information that is being transmitted. 
" Active Attacks 
These types of attacks do involve some modification or disruption of the data 
traffic within a network. These attacks take three different categories: 
1- Masquerade: conducted when the attacker pretends to be a different valid user. 
2- Message Modification: which means that a message transmitted within a 
network is captured, altered, and then retransmitted to a legitimate recipient. 
3- Denial of Service (DoS): These attacks prevent legitimate users and network 
managers from the normal use or management of the communications services 
and network resources. 
In addition to those attacks, the Internet has inherited vulnerable transport and 
network protocols like TCP/IP, UDP, RIP, and ICMP ... etc. This made 
it easy for 
attackers to exploit those protocols and apply different sorts of network security 
threats. 
3.3.1-Classifications of the Major Risks 
Distributed systems are more vulnerable than centralised systems because of their 
frequently widespread geographical locations, and because of their increased 
complexity. However, the very nature of a distributed system frequently means 
that facilities can be readily duplicated, thus providing a degree of resilience not 
readily available in other types of environment. The major risks in information 
network systems can be classified under three headings, Confidentiality, Integrity, 
and Availability [Stallings, 1999] [ Jackson et al. 1992], as follows: 
Confidentiality: is concerned with preventing unauthorized access to 
information that is confidential to organisation. 
Integrity: is concerned with maintaining accuracy, completeness of the 
information being processed in the system. 
Availability: is concerned with preventing the failure of computing 
resources and telecommunication services. 
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Most of the concerns in information network security protection are 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. However, there are additional 
requirements in authentication, authorization, access control, and non-repudiation, 
which are also significant when implementing security controls [Stallings, 1999]. 
Network Managers must consider the unique blend of requirements they must 
manage to adequately protect valuable resources and information in a distributed 
network, as follows: 
" Authentication: is concerned with ensuring that the origin of a message 
or any electronic data document has to be correctly identified proving that 
the identity is valid. 
" Authorization: is concerned with characterizing polices, rules and 
procedures. It is a process of granting certain rights to users once they 
have satisfactorily identified themselves. 
" Access Control: is concerned with the requirement to access information 
or network resources, which may be controlled by the target system. It 
works closely with the authorization to protect against forbidden use of 
resources. 
" Non-repudiation: is concerned with confirming that the data transaction 
between the two communicating parties has taken place. It requires that 
neither the sender nor the receiver of a message be able to deny the 
transmission. This is in order to protect against the later denying 
responsibility for involvement in a communication. 
3.3.2-The Approach of Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks 
It is often much easier to disrupt the operation of a network or system than to 
actually gain access. Networking protocols such as TCP/IP, which were designed 
to be used in an open and trusted communities have inherited flaws. In addition, 
many network operating systems and devices have flaws in their network stacks 
that weaken their ability to withstand DoS attacks [Schneier, 2000] [Northcutt, 
1999]. DoS attacks could cause major damage to vital systems. A company that 
relies on electronic transaction for its daily businesses could suffer serious 
financial loss if its systems became inaccessible for even a short duration. DoS 
attacks could have life-threatening impact in health care operation. Some attackers 
target Mail servers, others target routers or Web servers. The idea is to flood the 
target with useless traffic and connection requests until it shuts down. DoS attacks 
do harm just by the attempt to deliver packets, whether or not the packets would 
authenticate properly is completely irrelevant. Mandatory authentication would do 
nothing to prevent these attacks [Schneier, 2000]. 
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The four major high level DoS cases have been identified by Leiwo and Zheng, 
[1997], where any resource request should be denied: 
" The user has already allocated too many resources. 
" The process has already allocated too many resources. 
" Too much of a particular resource have already been allocated. 
" The request is acceptable, but no instances of the requested resource are 
available. 
For the cases 1,2 and 3, it is necessary to specify the amount of available resource, 
maximum amount of resources a user can allocate, and a maximum amount of 
resources an individual process can allocate. While there are many tools available 
to launch DoS attacks, it is important to identify the main types of DoS attacks, so 
later on to understand how to detect and prevent them. The three most common 
categories of DoS [Skoudis, 2002] [Northcutt, 1999] are: Bandwidth (BW) 
consumption, Resource starvation, and Resource exploitation, as follows: 
" BW consumption 
Bandwidth (BW) Consumption represents the most insidious forms of DoS 
attacks, where the attacker consumes all available BW either locally or remotely. 
System performance problems will only be detected in DoS or computation- 
intensive attacks. 
" Resource starvation 
Resource Starvation is meant to consume system resources, such as CPU 
utilization, queuing buffer or embedded logic chip to handle exceptional 
conditions. Resource Starvation DoS attacks generally result in unusable system 
hardware resources. 
" Resources exploitation 
Resource exploitation attacks exploit a flaw in the target system's software in 
order to cause a processing failure or to cause it to exhaust system processes and 
resources. Flaws Exploitations represent failures of an application, operating 
system, or by deliberately execute excessive cryptographic computations, for 
example at an access control server. These exceptional conditions normally result 
when a user sends unintended data to a vulnerable element or execute privileged 
commands, for example to kill local processes in a running server. 
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3.3.3-The Evolution of Distributed DoS (DDoS) Attacks 
A DDoS attack [Stein, W3C] [Skoudis, 2002] harnesses the distributed nature of 
the Internet. It uses many computers to launch a coordinated DoS attack against 
one or more targets, as shown in figure 3.5. The attacker is able to multiply the 
effectiveness of the DoS significantly by harnessing the resources of multiple 
unwitting accomplice computers, which serve as attack platforms. Typically, a 
DDoS master program is installed on one node using a stolen account. The master 
program, at a designated time, then communicates to any number of "agents" 
programs installed on computers anywhere on the Internet. The agents, when they 
receive the command, initiate the attacks. The master program can initiate 
hundreds or even thousands of agent programs within seconds. Many other attacks 
can be mapped into a distributed model. For example, an attacker can set up a 
group of agents to conduct a more stealthy port scan or network mapping. 
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Figure 3.5: Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
Similarly, an attacker could distribute the work of password cracking among a 
number of machines, thereby exploiting more processing capacity to crack 
passwords more quickly. This is how the entire attack from multiple systems 
compromise to final assault typically occurs. We would expect many tools to use 
the distributed nature of the Internet in the near future, as reported by the National 
Infrastructure Protection Centre (NIPC). DDoS attack, for example, is executed by 
flooding one or more of the site's servers with so many requests that they become 
unavailable. If legitimate users make normal requests during a DDoS attack, the 
requests may fail completely. 
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The DDoS attack typically is prefaced by a reconnaissance probe process, which 
might take just few minutes, hours, days, or even months before the attack takes 
place. In order for the attackers to have a successful DDoS attack, they should 
gather as much information as possible about all aspects of the targeted 
organisation's security position. This will help attackers to end up with a complete 
footprint of their Internet and remote access presence. Foot printing is necessary 
to systematically and methodically ensure that all pieces of information related to 
the targeted organisation's network infrastructure are identified. Reconnaissance 
probes are often come in the form of a series of whois queries and pings or 
exploratory packets sent to one or more systems on a network. A complete 
understanding of the typical network traffic patterns should help identifying a foot 
printing in progress. Figure 3.6 [Chappell, 2000] shows a typical time line for 
DDoS attack. Detecting the reconnaissance probes is not an easy task, as 
sophisticated attackers may intentionally randomise or slow down their 
reconnaissance actions in order to be undetected [Scambray et al. 2001]. 
4- Preparation Phase -º 
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Figure 3.6: A typical time line for DDoS attack 
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3.3.4- The Limitations of Current Distributed Network Protocols 
Within Connectionless Network Protocol (CLNP) [Halsall, 1996], the flow 
control is not applied on a per call or end-to-end basis within the Internet. 
Congestion arises when the packet traffic entering a particular network starts to 
approach the total resources available within that network to handle them. Since 
most subnets operate in a store-and-forward mode, the resources include the 
processing capacity within each router for example, which used to process 
received packets and the number of memory buffers that are available to store 
incoming packets waiting to be forwarded on a particular outgoing link. 
As the Internet load increases and the rate of arrival of packets traffic increases, so 
the size of output queues will build up and increasing the delays will be 
experienced in each network. This signals the start of congestion and, in the limit, 
if all the buffers become full, the available resources are exceeded. The network is 
said to be overloaded and delays experienced by packets traffic will increase 
rapidly. The effect of congestion on the performance of a network is shown in 
figure 3.7 [Halsall, 1996]. However, as such current congestion control schemes 
are not perfect the actual throughput is less than that in the ideal case. The 
difference between the two is a measure of the efficiency of the congestion control 
scheme. 
-Ideal 1.0 ---------- - 
Depends on Efficiency 
" of Control scheme 
on 
," With Congestion Control s 
Without Congestion Control 
Deadlock 
1.0 Offered Load 
Figure 3.7: The effects of congestion on throughput 
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Now, let us consider the distribution and use of the memory buffers associated 
with the Network Layer. A typical layout is shown in figure 3.8 [Halsall, 1996]. 
Let us assume that the three-subnet inputs are operating near their maximum 
capacity and that all received packets from these links, after reassembly, require to 
be forwarded on the same output link of Subnet 1. If the three links operate at the 
same rate, the output queue associated with link Subnet I will start to build up, 
thereby increasing the transit delays experienced by packets using that link. If this 
condition continues, all the buffers will become full and queued for output link to 
Subnetl. Any new packets will then be discarded, as there are no free buffers to 
store them, even though they may require a different output link. 
Reassembly Buffers 
Receive H ISO HForward 
process CLNP process 
Free 
buffer 
pool 
Ad OQI AM OQ2 J OQ3 
IBI IB2 IB3 
Subnet 1II Subnet 211 Subnet 3 
IB-Input Buffer OQ-Output Queue 
Figure 3.8: Buffer distribution at ISO network layer 
Note that increasing the number of buffers does not necessarily ease the problem 
since this may simply allow a single output queue to become even longer. 
Therefore, the increased delays experienced by packets waiting to be forwarded in 
those queues are likely to cause the timers being used by the transport protocol 
entities to expire. These will start to retransmit the affected packets, and hence 
will simply increase the load on the affected links. In practice, determining the 
optimum number of buffers to be queued for a single output link as a percentage 
of the total number of buffers available is a complex problem and depends on the 
number of output links and the routing scheme being used. Also, the optimum 
value is not static since it varies with the loading of the system, thus implying 
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some form of dynamic allocation. Note that this control congestion scheme is not 
part of the protocol as such, but rather is example of buffer management. In 
normal circumstances, discarding packets is not an ideal solution since it 
inevitably leads to an increase in the transit delay associated with the Internet. 
In today's Internet, most network systems use First-In First-Out (FIFO) scheduling, 
Drop-Tail, or Random-Early-Detection (RED) buffer management schemes. 
These schemes are vulnerable to DoS attacks. The Priority Queuing (PQ) 
scheduling scheme was designed to give mission-critical programs higher priority 
than less critical traffic. There are two problems with this scheme [Ye, 2001]. 
Firstly, as long as attackers can spoof the priority field, priority service misuse 
could take place, which leads to DoS against legitimate users. Secondly, to assign 
priorities for all user traffic in an open environment such as the Internet is almost 
impractical. 
Fair Queuing (FQ) scheme [Ye, 2001) restricts every node to an equal share of 
network bandwidth. This scheme promotes DoS attack, as it makes it easy for any 
attacker to flood the network resources without being punished, because all users 
equally share the same bandwidth. This scheme can not guarantee fairness when a 
network is under DoS attack. The Weighted Fair Queuing (WFQ) gives low- 
volume traffic flows preferential treatment and allows higher-volume traffic flows 
to obtain equity in the remaining amount of queuing capacity. This scheme itself 
is prone to DoS attacks. WFQ enables DoS attackers to generate deliberate 
excessive short traffic flows, by giving these low-volume traffic flaws a 
preferential treatment. 
In today's Quality of Service (QoS) implementations [Ye, 2001] [Freguson et al, 
1999], all current QoS protocols are built on the functionality of the Internet 
Protocol (IP). Currently, there are two major QoS strategies being proposed, 
Differentiated Service (Diff-Serv) and Integrated Service (Int-Serv). Diff-Serv 
sets bits in an IP header field at network boundaries. Diff-Serv is essentially a 
refined priority-scheduling model, which does not solve the flooding DoS 
problem. First, the priority set up is determined by boundaries or end-hosts. Policy 
set up only reflects a sender's request not network conditions. Second, it is 
possible that crackers can manipulate the bits in ToS/IPv4 fields or TC/IPv6 fields 
resulting in disrupt-of-service, which leads to DoS to legitimate users. Int-Serv, as 
a model that predominantly focuses on real-time classes of applications in order to 
provide guaranteed service for both delay and bandwidth, it does not address the 
issue of DoS problems. 
The QoS aware network is configured to give better service to mission-critical and 
delay-sensitive applications. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, which have been 
proven to work against IP, can be deployed within a QoS enabled environment 
[Miller, 1999]. However, other new aspects of concern will be raised with respect 
to the features introduced by QoS. DoS problems would enable attackers to 
remove availability of resources from providing the QoS that was offered. QoS 
could be degraded to a noticeably poor level, such as higher packets drop rate, 
longer delays, bigger jitter and so on. An unauthorised user can take advantage of 
any QoS protocol by deliberately forcing unnecessary resources reservations to be 
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provided. This act could lead to completely destroying resource availability and 
consequently severe DoS problems. Therefore, protection measures need to be 
considered for any network technology that plans to support QoS. 
3.4-Types of Intrusion Detection Systems 
Currently there are three major types of IDSs, which are Network IDSs, Host 
IDSs, and Applications IDSs [Bace, 2000] [Proctor, 2001]. 
3.4.1- Network-based Systems 
These types of systems are placed on a network, nearby the system or systems 
being monitored. They examine the network traffic and determine whether it falls 
within acceptable boundaries. These IDSs detect attacks by capturing and 
analysing network packets and listening to a network segment or switch. One 
network-based IDS (NIDS) can monitor the network traffic affecting multiple 
hosts that are connected to a network segment, there by protecting those hosts. 
For a network intrusion detection system, there are two ways to detect intrusion 
[PMG, 2001]: string matching and context analysis, as follows: 
String Matching: also known as a network gripping in the UNIX world, 
matches a series of characters to identify a threat. String matching offers 
tremendous speed in identification and additional signatures are easy to create 
and customise. The negative aspect of string matching is that it is prone to 
false-positives. 
Context Analysis: also known as a signature analysis, builds on string 
matching by allowing a scripted analysis of the context of the string thereby 
dramatically reducing false positives. The negative aspect of context analysis 
is speed; it simply takes longer to detect attacks in context. 
3.4.2- Host-based systems 
These types of systems actually run on the system being monitored. These 
examine the system to determine whether the activity in the system is acceptable. 
This vantage point allows Host-based IDSs to analyse activities with great 
reliability and precision, determining exactly which processes and users are 
involved in a particular attack on the operating system. Host-based IDSs can 
directly access and monitor the data files and system processes usually targeted by 
attacks. Host-based IDSs normally utilize information sources of two types, 
operating system audit trails and system logs. 
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3.4.3- Application-based systems 
Application-based IDSs are a special subset of Host-based IDSs that analyse the 
events transpiring within a software application. The most common information 
sources used by application-based IDSs are the application's transaction log files. 
3.4.4- Hybrid IDSs 
Hybrid Intrusion Detection combines capabilities from both Host-based and 
Network-based IDSs [Proctor, 2001]. Hybrid IDS features Compound signatures, 
which have several advantages in comparison to the other two IDSs. Compound 
signatures provide a pattern of activity that can be analysed in a trustworthy 
manner. As most host-based attacks may occur during a session that began with a 
network-based attack, Compound signatures make it easier to track the full impact 
of the network attack. 
3.4.5-Commonly Detected Attacks by NIDSs 
NIDSs commonly report three types of attacks, these are [Bace, 2000] [Northcutt, 
1999]: 
" System or Network Scanning 
A scanning attack occurs when an attacker probes a target network or 
system by sending different kinds of packets. Using the responses received from 
the target, the attacker can learn many of the system's characteristics and 
vulnerabilities. 
" System or Network Penetration 
These sorts of attacks involve an unauthorised acquisition and/or alteration 
of system privileges, resources, or data. 
" Denial of service Attacks 
DoS attacks attempt to slow or shut down targeted network systems or 
services. DoS cause wasting people's time, system link bandwidth and sometimes 
crashing a system. In the vast majority of these attacks, the source address is faked 
or "spoofed". The approach of DoS problems has already been discussed in 
section 3.2.2. 
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3.5- Incident Response Options in IDSs 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) can be classified as passive or active [Tucker, 
1997]: Passive response systems generally operate offline, analyse the audit data 
and bring possible intrusions or violations to the attention of the auditor, who then 
takes appropriate action, see figure 3.9. Active response systems analyse audit 
data in real time. Besides bringing violations to the attention of the auditor, these 
systems may take an immediate protective response on the system, see figure 3.10. 
The protective response can be executed after the violation has occurred, or pre- 
emptively, to avoid the violation being perpetrated to completion. Protective 
responses include killing the suspected process, disconnecting the user, disabling 
privileges, or disabling user accounts. The response may be determined in total 
autonomy by the intrusion detection system or through interaction with the auditor. 
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Figure 3.9: Passive intrusion detection 
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The incident response [Mandia et al, 2001] consists of real-time decisions and 
actions of asset managers. These actions are intended to minimize incident-related 
effects on systems or network assets and to mitigate residual security risk based 
on available evidence from the incident. A generic incident response process 
[Amoroso, 1999] can be characterized as shown in figure 3.11, as consisting of a 
collection of normal and subverted system states, as well as a collection of 
dormant and active response states. 
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Figure 3.11: Generic incident response process 
The Response Initiated state [Amoroso, 1999], in which a response to a particular 
incident is initiated, has three possible ways of responsiveness, human response, 
automated response, and hybrid response, as shown in figure 3.12. 
Intrusion Detection System 
Automated Hybrid Human 
Response Response Response 
Set of 
Automated 
Response 
Processes 
Figure 3.12: Three ways of incident responsiveness 
49 
CHAPTER 3. DISTRIBUTED NETWORKS SECURITY CONCERNS 
In the System Recovered step of figure 3.11, the system is restored as a result of 
the incident response activities. This step is considered the most important one in 
the incident response process. System restoration is not a straight forward process 
of simply turning things back into normal. However, restoration corresponds to 
one of the following three situations [Amoroso, 1999]: 
Ls Degraded restoration 
In this case, the system is restored after a particular incident has taken place, but 
some set of assets or system attributes remain in a degraded or damaged situation. 
It may be that degraded restoration is an intermediate state in the incident 
response process that is used as a short-term bridge to a more acceptable 
restoration state, see figure 3.13. 
" Mirrored restoration 
This case corresponds to restoration of a system from its pre-incident state to 
exactly the same state after an incident. Currently, very limited automated 
mechanisms are available to handle this task effectively. 
I 
Incident Interim 
System in occurs System in restoration System in 
Enhanced State Out-of-Service Degraded 
State State 
Direct enhanced restoration 
System in 
Normal State 
Enhanced restoration Restore to normal 
through intermediate 
Figure 3.13: System restoration process 
" Improved restoration 
This case is the best of all in that it allows the incident to provide information that 
can be used to prevent future occurrences of the incident in question. Intermediate 
steps through degraded or mirrored restoration states should be considered 
common in this scenario, as shown in Figure 3.13. IDSs that incorporate a 
learning element could achieve this task feature. 
3.6-Summary 
In this chapter we reviewed the main issues related to the current concerns and 
security problems of distributed network systems. It aimed to provide a 
summarised background theory to the subject, so later on to justify the given 
proposals. The major network systems risks have been discussed, including 
current network security threats in general with particular emphasis on Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks and its distributed versions. The current network systems, 
congestion control and QoS schemes have flaws in their protocol stacks that 
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weaken their ability to withstand DoS attacks. Those attacks could cause a major 
damage to vital systems. The three most common categories of DoS are 
Bandwidth (BW) consumption, Resource starvation, and Resource exploitations. 
Distributed DoS (DDoS) is an evolving network attack that harnesses the 
distributed nature of the Internet and uses many computers to launch co-ordinated 
attacks against one or more targets. The current Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDSs) can only help to detect network attacks, yet are not able to reduce the 
damage that DoS can launch against network resources. 
This chapter discussed the main types of IDSs, commonly detected attacks. The 
incident response options for IDSs have been outlined. Those responses consist of 
real-time decisions and actions, which can be characterised as a collection of 
dormant and active restoration processes. Improved system restoration is 
considered to be the most important step of the response action, as it allows the 
incident to provide information that can be used to prevent future occurrences of 
the incident in question. In order to achieve that a learning mechanism and 
intelligent control feature is required. A promising approach for future IDSs might 
involve these features that utilise machine learning strategies. The next chapter 
will discuss how Bayesian learning as a probabilistic approach could be 
incorporated into Networks Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) to detect 
network anomaly activities. This is to allow NIDSs to learn detecting as well as 
predicting those evolving network attacks. 
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Chapter 4 
Investigation of naive Bayes 
Approach to IDSs 
This chapter investigates naive Bayes model as a simple probabilistic as well as a 
predictive approach to Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs). In naive 
Bayes [Wikipedia] the probability can be derived from Bayes theorem that it 
incorporates independences assumption and hence considered to be an 
independent feature model. Naive Bayes models can be trained efficiently in a 
supervised learning setting. This chapter covers the concept of Bayesian 
decisions-based modelling within the context of NIDSs. It discusses the matter of 
knowledge engineering and extraction, and considers the major steps involved in 
NIDS data modelling using vector transformations. A developed naive Bayes 
supervised learning model for detecting network attacks is introduced. The 
detector model is developed to extract the variable nodes of naive Bayes model 
directly from a dataset. This dataset [MIT Lincoln Lab] is generated by MIT 
Lincoln Lab and used to train the developed models. The purpose of training is to 
make predictions for future similar network attacks possible. The dataset 
simulates a network traffic contaminated with different network unauthorised 
activities. It has been generated to evaluate and enhance the research in the field 
of NIDSs. 
4.1- Bayesian Probabilistic Approach to Networks Security 
Naive Bayes modelling incorporates independences assumption amongst its 
variable nodes. One thing [Witten et al, 2000] that can go wrong with naive Bayes 
is that if a particular attribute value does not occur in the training set in 
conjunction with every class value, things go badly wrong. The assumption of 
navie Bayes that attributes are independent in real life certainly is a simplistic one 
and hence makes it a good starting point for modelling intrusion detectors. This 
would enable us to explore the behaviour of the detector in its simplistic Bayes 
model. Once this achieved, the next step will be to investigate the dependency 
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amongst our variables of interest and explore how such a dependency affects the 
detection mechanism. In many practical applications [Wikipedia], parameter 
estimation for naive Bayes models uses the method of maximum likelihood; in 
other words, one can work with the naive Bayes model without believing in 
Bayesian probability or using any Bayesian methods. Bayesianism [Wikipedia] 
"is the philosophical tenet that the mathematical theory of probability applies to 
the degree of plausibility of statements, or to the degree of belief of rational agents 
in the truth of statements; when used with Bayes theorem, it then becomes 
Bayesian inference. ". 
As a machine learning technique [Lane, 2000], Bayesian approach to NIDSs 
represents a data intensive domain with a classification as well as a prediction 
model. Inference methods [Marchette, 2001] for detecting network attacks either 
use signature analysis or statistical anomaly detection approaches. The main 
advantage of the former approach is attack specificity, however, may not be able 
to generalise. The latter detects attacks probabilistically, allowing for 
generalization, however, may not be able to specify. Statistics involve the fitting 
of models to data and making inferences from these models. For example, given a 
traffic trace of a network that represents a dataset, we want to classify it either as 
an attack or not. Regardless of the models used, the ultimate goal would be, how 
well does our model detect or classify attacks and respond to them later on? 
Therefore, in any statistical anomaly detection approach, the system requires the 
estimation of two quantities: the probability of detection (PD) and the probability 
of false alarm (PFA). In general, it is not possible to simultaneously achieve a PD 
of I and PFA of 0, and one generally can not simply state the PD and PFA that 
one wants and design the algorithm to provide them. When we say or hear a 
statement of the kind "the network has 70% probability of being attacking", this 
probability expresses a subjective degree of belief, and this leads to the Bayesian 
formulation of probability. Therefore, we can 
" Use a value of I to denote complete certainty that an attacking event will 
occur 
" Use a value of 0 to denote complete uncertainty that an attacking event 
will not occur 
" Intermediate values denote corresponding degrees of belief 
" Bayesian theorem provides a quantitative method for updating these 
probabilities when new data arrives 
" The prior probability represents our own or agents degree of belief before 
the data arrives 
" After the data has arrived, we use Bayesian theorem to convert this prior 
probability into a posterior probability 
Suppose that we have received a large amount of traffic packets and found that 
(for example) the incoming abnormal ICMP ECHOREPLY packets are three 
times more likely to occur than the legitimate ICMP ECHOREPLY packets. We 
formalise this by introducing the prior probabilities of an incoming packets 
belonging to each class Ck. Thus, p (C, ) = 0.75, and p (C2) = 0.25, where C, is 
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the class of an abnormal ICMP ECHOREPLY packets and C2 is the class of a 
legitimate ICMP ECHOREPLY packets. Therefore 
" If a new packet is to be predicted, then we would assign it to class C, 
because it has the higher probability of occurring. 
" But this implies that all new incoming packets are assigned to this class, 
even though some packets belong to class C2. 
" If we measure a feature of this new packet, then we can combine this 
information and the prior probabilities to obtain a better classification. 
" This is achieved by using Bayesian theorem. 
Suppose that the feature variable x, can take any of the values {X'}, I =1,....., M. 
p V, Vk) P (C 
then P(Ck 1 X') = 
pýX 
where, p (Ck ý X') is the posterior probability, p(Ck) is the prior probability 
of Ck ,P 
(XI ý c) is the class-conditional probability of X' for class Ck, and 
p(X') is a normalisation factor. Since the new incoming packet must be assigned 
to one of the two classes, P (CI I X') +p (C2 I XI)=1 and 
thus p(X')= p(X' I C, ) p(C, )+ p(X' I C2) p(CZ). The prior probabilities p(CI) 
and p(C2) are known from trials, the class-conditional probabilities 
p (X' I C, ) and p (X' I C2) can be calculated from a probability histogram (see 
Figure 4.1). This enables us to calculate p(X'). 
The posterior probabilities p (C1 I X') and p (C2 I X') can now be calculated as 
follows: 
P r 
(XI C1) P (ý C) 
P(ckix 1_ , k=1,2 l1Y. 
p(c, )p(` ' ici) 
0-1 
Let C be the event that our classifier tell us it has detected an attack (raises an 
alarm), C, be the event that it really is an attack, and C2 the event that it is false 
alarm (for this case, n is equal to 2). Suppose a network receives 1,000,000 
packets per day, and of these 20 packets per day correspond to attacks (on 
average). That means the probability of receiving abnormal (attacking) packets 
p(C, )= 20 / 1,000,000 =1/ 50,000. Suppose that our detection rate is 99% and 
false alarm rate 0.1%. This means that the posterior probability p (C, I X') = 0.019, 
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or about 2%, so only I alarm out of 50 is an attack. If we can get our false alarm 
rate down to 0.01%, things look a little better: p (C, I X') =0.1653, or about 17%. 
It takes a false alarm rate of 0.001% (a probability of 10"5) to bring our probability 
of intrusion given an alarm up to 66%. A security manager may very well ignore a 
system that is right only 2/3 of the time, but as we have seen, it takes an 
extraordinary good system to obtain this level of performance. The main problem 
lies in the huge amount of network packets traffic, and this is what always makes 
the reduction of false alarms in networks intrusion detection systems (NIDSs) a 
serious issue. 
This version [Witten et al, 2000] of Bayes rule is known as Naive Bayes, because 
it assumes that the variables are independent. It is only valid to multiply 
probabilities when the events are independent. The assumption that attributes are 
independent (given the class) in real life certainly is a simplistic one, especially, 
when we are dealing with network packets traffic. However, Naive Bayes works 
very well when tested on actual datasets, particularly when combined with some 
of the attribute selection procedures, that serve to eliminate redundancy, and 
hence non-independent attributes. 
4.2- Knowledge Engineering and Extraction 
Knowledge [Witten et at, 2000] is defined as the accumulation of a set of 
expectations. If data is characterised as recorded facts, then information is the set 
of patterns, or expectations, that underlie the data. Knowledge Engineering (KE) 
[Studer et al. 1998] is about turning the process of constructing Knowledge-based 
Systems (KBSs) from an art into an engineering discipline. In KE, it is required to 
develop a formal Knowledge Base (KB) for a particular problem. This requires 
the analysis of the building and maintenance process itself and the development of 
appropriate methods, languages and tools specialised for developing Knowledge 
Base Systems. According to [KEL] Knowledge Engineering is the process used to 
acquire and structure information about a particular subject. It is about developing 
automated systems to organise, integrate, and interpret existing knowledge. 
Knowledge Engineering is an activity that embraces a set of concepts and 
methodologies dealing with 
" Acquisition of Knowledge 
" Analysis and synthesis of data and information 
" Integration and interpretation of Knowledge quantities and 
qualities 
Knowledge acquisition [KEL] is associated with three basic activities, as follows: 
" Defining relevant data and information follows from a systematic 
evaluation of the problem of interest. 
" Acquiring information directly from an expert. 
" Evaluation of the data and information that form the knowledge base for a 
particular problem. 
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Analysis deals with separating or breaking up of any whole into its parts so as to 
find out their nature, proportion, function, or relationship, e. g., analysis of 
variance. There are three common approaches to analysis: graphical, numerical, 
and statistical. Synthesis deals with the putting together of parts or elements so as 
to form a whole, i. e., it is the antithesis of analysis. There are three common 
approaches: simulation, optimization, and visualization. Each approach represents 
a substantial and well-developed discipline that can be further 
compartmentalized. For example, simulation can be viewed as continuous 
(systems of differential equations) or discrete (object-oriented simulation). 
Optimization (in relation to restrictions) includes linear programming, non-linear 
programming, dynamic programming, and control theory. Visualization includes 
graphics, animation, and four-dimensional representations. Knowledge integration 
and interpretation deals with quantitative as well as qualitative information to 
solve problems, make decisions, and develop plans. The integrative systems are 
based on technologies adapted from a variety of subject domains, e. g., computer 
science, engineering, mathematics, cognitive psychology, management science, 
etc. Several types of integrative systems have been used to address intelligent 
systems problems: expert systems, intelligent information systems, intelligent 
database management systems, object-oriented simulation, and knowledge-based 
systems. 
Knowledge Engineering plays a key role in the process of building IDSs, which 
requires an evaluation of the extant data and information that form the KB. For a 
quite complicated problem, such as modelling IDS capable of learning to detect 
and predict future evolving network attacks, a variety of sources and types of data 
and information are involved. Therefore, it is extremely useful to order and 
organise extant data and information. KE is focused on collecting, arranging and 
manipulating knowledge in such a way that the developed IDS model can engage 
in an intelligent dialogue with for example a network security manager and/or 
perform learning tasks by itself. In order to effectively practice KE, two main 
areas need to be considered, which are Knowledge Modelling and Knowledge 
Extraction. 
Studer et at. 1998, argue that due to the important role of knowledge for an 
expert's problem solving capabilities, the process of building a KBS has been 
recently seen as a modelling activity. Therefore, building a knowledge base 
system means building a computer model with the aim of realising problem 
solving capabilities for problems in the area of concern. However, knowledge is 
not always directly accessible, but has to be built up and structured during the 
knowledge acquisition stage. So, knowledge acquisition process is seen as a 
model construction process. 
4.3- Bayesian Decisions and Knowledge Modelling 
In Bayesian decision, a decision rule to be made to allow for a classification of 
patterns. It induces a partitioning of the measurement space into a set of disjoint 
regions. The decision rule can be stated as "if a measurement vector x lies in 
region A, then the pattern belongs to class w, . Suppose that it is required to 
distinguish the incoming traffic packets of normal content from those with 
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anomaly ones. This is a two class pattern recognition problem in which the 
patterns to be classified are the various incoming packets content. One can form 
an observation vector whose ith component is the sample of the packet content at 
timet,. The observation vector x is passed to a learning or pattern recognition 
algorithm which classifies it as being derived from either a normal packet, class 
w, or from an anomaly packet with attacking content, class w2 . There are two main 
issues that need to be considered, as follows: 
" The patterns are represented by vectors in multidimensional space 
" It is not possible to have an exact description of the various classes of 
objects 
Thus [Jang et al. 1997], 
" We need to consider vectors and linear transformations (which are 
represented by matrices), and 
"A statistical approach to classification is required 
4.3.1- Traffic Patterns & Vector Representation 
There are two steps involved for identifying statistical Network Intrusion 
Detection System (NIDS) with vector transformations. Firstly, structure 
identification, which involves applying a priori knowledge about each entity 
within the modelled system, so to determine a class of models in order to conduct 
the search for the most appropriate model. This class of models is identified by the 
function y=f (u, 9) , where y is the model's output, u 
is the input vector, and A is 
the parameter vector. Secondly, parameter identification, in which after 
identifying the structure of the model, we need to apply optimization techniques to 
determine the parameter vector B=9, which will lead to the resulting 
model y=f (u, B) that can describe the system appropriately. The input training 
dataset will compose of a desired input-output pairs (u,, y) , 1= 1,2,3,..., in, that 
represent the input training dataset to the modelled Bayesian NIDS under 
consideration. The system optimization [Jang et al. 1997] is not a one-pass 
process, it requires to conduct both structure and parameter identification 
repeatedly until a satisfactory model is found. The output for a linear model y is 
given by the linearly parameterized expression: 
y= Ofi(u)+BZf2(u)+..... +0. f(u) (4.1) 
where u= [u1....... u1, ]T is the NIDS model input vector that represents the network 
traffic dataset, f,,....., f, are known detection functions of u input vector, and 
8,,....., 8 are unknown parameters to be estimated. Equation (4.1) represents a 
regression function, and the 6, s are representing the regression coefficients. In 
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order to identify B, , we have to supply a training 
dataset, which is in a form of 
network traffic packets. This dataset composed of data 
pairs {(u,, y, ), i =1,2,3....... m}, as they represent the desired input-output pairs of 
the NIDS model. By substituting each data pair into Equation (4.1) yields a set of 
linear equations: 
f(M)oll +12(UI)e2 +..... +f() en =A 
J1(u2)e1 +12(u2)02 +..... +ff 
(u2)en = y2 
(4.2) 
Jl 
(Um)el +f2(Um)e2 +..... +fn(Um)On = Ym 
Using matrix notation, the preceding equations can be rewritten as: 
A0=y (4.3) 
where A is an mxn design matrix 
f (u, )..... ln(u1) 
A= : 
JI 
(um )..... fn (um ) 
0 is an nxI unknown vector: 
B, 
, 0=: 
en 
and y is an mx1 output vector: 
YI 
Y= 
Y. 
The i'h row of the joint data matrix [A : y], denoted by [aT : y, ], is related to the iah 
input-output data pair (u,, y, ) through a, r =[f, (u, ),....., f (u)]. It is necessary to 
have in >= n, which is always the case in any active data network traffic. This 
ensures that we always have more data pairs than fitting parameters, such as 
protocol type, service type, connection duration and so on. The network traffic 
dataset is often contaminated by noise. This sort of contamination usually leads 
NIDS systems to inaccurately activate there alert, which is known by false 
positives and false negatives. Therefore, Equation (4.3) should be modified to 
incorporate an error vector to count for random noise, false positive or false 
negative as AG+e = y. 
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4.3.2- Statistical Classification 
Most Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) [Stallings, 1999] are 
primarily concerned with the problem of detecting attacking packets traffic. 
Therefore, they are considered a two-class classifiers, with the two classes being 
"attack", which is represented by class I (w, ) and "not an attack", which 
represented by class 2 (w2). In my developed detection models, I tend to go 
further and determine what sort of attack it is, so to determine what the potential 
consequences are, but first and foremost is the detection of the attack. Since we 
are currently concerned with two classes, and the feature vector x must belong to 
one of the classes, p (w, ) +p (w2) =1, a simple decision rule would be, as follows: 
IF p(w, Ix)>p(w2lx), THEN w,, ELSE w2 
But P(w, 1x)=P(11w)P(w, 
), 
i=1,2 
P(X) 
Thus IF 
Al Iw. )>P(W2), 
THEN wl, ELSE w2 
P(xIw2) Pk) 
This is a Bayesian decision rule, and the left hand side is called the likelihood 
ratioL(x): 
P(XIw1) 
P(xIwz) 
The right hand side is called the likelihood threshold z2, and is assumed to be 
known a priori or it can be learnt empirically): rz, - 
P(W2) ý 
P(WI) 
By examining the likelihood ratio for Gaussian distributions, the measurement 
vector x reduces to a scalar x that belongs to two classes. Thus, assuming 
Gaussian distribution, Let 
2 
P(xl )= 
I 
exp 
(x 
6ý'ý 
and 
_z 
P(xIw2)= 
2 
exp 
(z 
C2 
be the class-conditional probabilities. 
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Figure 4.1 [Stallings, 1999] suggests, in very abstract terms, the nature of the task 
confronting the designer of an Intrusion Detection System. Although the typical 
behaviour of an intruder differs from the typical behaviour of an authorised user, 
there is an overlap in these behaviours. Thus, a loose interpretation of intruder 
behaviour, which will catch more intruders, will also lead to a number of "false 
positives, " or authorised users identified as intruders. On the other hand, an 
attempt to limit false positives by a tight interpretation of intruder behaviour will 
lead to an increase in false negatives, or intruders not identified as intruders. Thus, 
there is an element of trade off in the design and practice of any IDS. 
Profile of intruder Profile of authorised user 
behaviour p(x/w) behaviourp(x/w2) 
Probability 
density Towards w, decision Towards w2 d cision 
function Overlap in observed 
or expected behaviour 
Average behaviour Average behaviour Measurable behaviour 
of intruder[[ of authorised user/I2 parameter 
Figure 4.1: Profiles of intruders and authorised users behaviour 
IF p(w, )=p(wz)=1, 
The Bayesian decision rule will be: 
(x-, [t, ýz 
= 
exp 
IFL(x)=p xi w2 
- Q` 
>1, choose w ' ) (x w 
exp 
6Z 
IF L(x)= pxl w' 
exp 
P(xIw2) 
at 
< I, choose w2 
(x-, uz)z 
eXp - 
a2 
This condition could be simplified to: 
IF (x-p, )2-(x-p2)2 <0, choose w, 
IF (x-A)2-(x-p2)2>0, choose w2 
Or 
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IF x<I 
P2 -' u1), choose w, l 
IF x> 
(PZ 
2 
ý' ), 
choose w2 
Recall that a decision rule for a two-class problem is 
IF P(KI W. 
) 
> 
P(w2), THEN w,, ELSE w2 
P(xIw2) P(Wl) 
If the measurement vectors x are characterised by a Gaussian density with mean 
A and covariance matrix 1: 1, then the likelihood ratio L 
(x) is 
Ftl 
1 
*exp 
I_ý(x-, 
Iý +1(x-/l2)r1: 
2-, 1x-J12/ 22) 2) 
and H(x) is defined by 
H(1)=-21nL(x) 
=(x-, u, 
)T ý, -'(x-, tt, )-(x-, u2)T +InlZ-1 
I 
r12 
and thus, by definition IF H(x) <T, THEN w,, ELSE w2 
(w2) 
is called Gaussian or quadratic classifier. where T= -2 In 
p(WI) 
Identifying and collecting the major useful data generated by a target system, 
network protocol and/or application activities are essential for unauthorised 
activities analysis. This is to ensure the defining vulnerable network states and 
consequently detecting any signs of network violations and unexpected (abnormal) 
behaviour, such as DoS activities. Table 4.1 lists the major state components that 
could be analysed by a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS). 
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Table 4.1: Network states of the major components 
Component States Network anomaly Description for 
events abnormal states 
TCP/IP (normal, Violated connection -invalid sequence numbers in a TCP 
connection abnormal) flow packets 
establishment -receiving TCP/IP out-of-spec packets 
-timing out half-open TCP/SYN 
handshake process 
Application (ON, OFF) Unexpected system -port scanning 
processes or server -buffer overflow 
(WWW, DNS, misbehaviour, -files exceeding allocated size 
ftp, and Email) shutdowns and -unexpected running processes 
restarts -repeated failed access attempts to 
privileged accounts and restricted 
resources 
-violations in time consistency between 
event records, such as time gaps in log 
files 
-unexpected cryptographic checksums 
for sensitive data files, such as 
password files, Access Control List 
(ACL), firewall-filtering rules etc.. 
ICMP (normal, Violated relationship -receiving irrelevant ICMP packets 
Rxed/Txed abnormal) between resources (Bandwidth (BW) consumption) 
packet traffic consumed by specific 
processes 
ARP packet (normal, Illogical source and -violated ARP cache 
traffic abnormal destination addresses 
QoS provision (normal, Unexpected presence -unexpected QoS request and provision 
abnormal) of new services and 
processes that lead to 
Theft of Service 
PKI (normal, Performance statistics -degradation of computational and 
cryptography & abnormal} (violated with storage resources (CPU & buffer) 
Access request previous statistics) 
for resources 
utilization 
4.4-Bayes Learning and Knowledge Extraction 
In Bayesian statistics [VALPOLA, 2000], probability measures the degree of 
belief as well as the probabilities of hypotheses and parameters. The probability 
distribution of a parameter, for instance, quantifies the uncertainty of its value. 
Bayes Learning, which is based on Bayes theorem constitutes a probabilistic view 
of learning. The underlying assumption is that there is a set of hypotheses, each 
having a certain probability of being correct. Receiving more information changes 
the probabilities from a learner's point of view. The aim in this setting is to be able 
to find a hypothesis with highest probability of being correct, given a specific set 
of data or piece of information. In Bayes learning, probability is used to represent 
uncertainty about the relationship being learned. 
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Bayesian learning [Heckerman et al. 1995] has two distinct advantages over 
classical learning. First, it combines prior knowledge and data, as opposed to 
classical learning, which does not explicitly incorporate user or prior knowledge, 
so that ad hoc methods are needed to combine knowledge and data. Second, in 
Bayesian learning methods, there is no need to introduce external methods to 
avoid over fitting. As a machine learning technique [Lane, 2000], Bayesian 
learning approach to NIDSs represents a data intensive domain with a hierarchical 
classification model. The upper layers of the hierarchy are computationally 
intensive that determine the identification and classification features. The lower 
layers provide a data management mechanism to train developed detector models. 
The purpose of training is to make predictions for future similar network attacks 
possible. 
Bayesian learning is able to extract knowledge using the discovery of association 
amongst variables of interest. Knowledge extraction plays a key part in today's 
machine learning applications. However, knowledge extraction [Muller, 2000] 
from a finite set of data poses many problems, because it is a process which can 
be characterised by: 
" Inadequate a priori knowledge about the object of interest 
" Large number of potential often immeasurable variables that may 
describe the target object's behaviour 
" Noisy and few data samples 
" Fuzzy objects 
Knowledge extraction is relevant to learning and may influence the classification 
results within each step of the learning process. Therefore, a coherent 
formalisation of knowledge extraction, would determine a significant role in 
modelling any learning algorithm in general and Bayesian learning in particular. 
Naive Bayes model, offers a supervised learning from a dataset. The supervised 
learning is facilitated due to the fact that the induction of the model is completely 
guided throughout the characterization of a particular node. Naive Bayes reads a 
set of data in attribute-value representation, estimates the posterior probabilities of 
all classifications, and the highest posterior probability is chosen as the prediction. 
Naive Bayes would be applied to Bayesian network to feature the target node as 
the father of all other network nodes. In this structure, knowing the value of the 
target makes each node independent of the others. The low number of 
probabilities to be estimated makes this a robust structure with a very fast learning 
process. 
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Figure 4.2 shows the variable nodes that represent the dataset being used to 
determine whether captured network traffic indicates an attack or not. These 
variable nodes are based on a standard dataset provided by MIT Lincoln Lab. This 
dataset includes a wide variety of network attacks simulated in a distributed 
network environment. The next sections discuss in more details, the properties of 
this dataset. 
". " 
duration wrong fragment su attempted 
"" 
protocol type urgent 
"" 
service hot 
" 
flag 
" 
sro bytes 
" 
num root 
"0 
count dirt srv rate 
"" 
srvcount sry-diff_host rate 
""" 
num file creations serror rate activity type 
""" 
num piled Jogins num shelIs srv senor rate 
""" 
logged in num aocess files rerror rate 
"". " 
dst bytes num compromised is host login srv rerror rate 
"""" 
land root shell is_puest login sanx sry rate 
Figure 4.2: Bayesian dataset variable nodes 
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4.4.1- The Dataset Source 
In 1999 MIT Lincoln Labs prepared and managed DARPA Intrusion Detection 
Evaluation Program. The objective was to survey and evaluate research in 
intrusion detection. A database contains a standard set of data to be audited, 
which includes a wide variety of intrusions and network attacks was provided. 
This set of data is simulated in a military network environment. The 1999 
[Heftich et al, 1999] Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining 
Tools Competition KDD intrusion detection contest uses a version of 1998 dataset. 
This competition was held in conjunction with KDD-99, The Fifth International 
Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. The competition task was 
to build a network intrusion detector and a predictive model capable of 
distinguishing between "bad" connections, called intrusions or attacks, and 
"good" normal connections. In the year 2000 MIT updated this dataset, hence 
both datasets are used. 
MIT Lincoln Lab set up an environment to acquire several weeks of raw TCP 
dump data for a local-area network (LAN) simulating a typical U. S. Air Force 
LAN. They operated the LAN as if it reflects a real Air Force environment, but 
contaminated with multiple types of network attacks. The last version of the raw 
training data was about ten gigabytes of compressed binary TCP dump data from 
several weeks of network traffic. This was processed into more than five million 
connection records. Similarly, the two weeks of test data yielded around two 
million connection records. A similar simple sample of this dataset has been 
generated locally at the Centre for Mobile Communications Research (C4MCR), 
University of Sheffield. However, we realised that a local generated database 
similar to MIT generated version would require a lot of time to setup the test-bed, 
collect the attacking tools as well as a lot of cleaning and data translation 
processes. Consequently, needs several months to complete the whole project of 
dataset preparation. Therefore, a decision has been made to use the dataset that 
already being provided by MIT Lincoln Labs. 
The Lincoln Lab dataset represent a sequence of network traffic packets mostly in 
the form of TCP connections including other different communication protocols 
traffic. A network connection is a sequence of packets starting and ending at some 
well defined times, between which data flows to and from a source IP address to a 
target destination IP address. Networks use some well defined communication 
processes to complete any required connection. Each dataset record contains 
information about a number of variables that constitute network connections. Each 
connection is labelled as either normal, or as an attack, with exactly one specific 
attack type. 
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Each connection record consists of about 100 bytes. The attacks fall into four 
main categories: 
" Probing: reconnaissance and other probing, e. g., port scanning, 
" DoS: Denial-of-Service attacks, such as smurf, 
" R2L: unauthorized access from a remote node, e. g. guessing password, 
" U2R: unauthorized access to local super user (root) privileges, such as 
various "buffer overflow" attacks. 
It is important to note that the test data is not from the same probability 
distribution as the training data, and it includes specific attack types not in the 
training data. This makes the task more realistic to develop a detector capable of 
predicting future similar attacks. Some intrusion experts believe that most novel 
attacks are variants of known attacks and the "signature" of known attacks can be 
sufficient to catch novel variants. The datasets contain a total of 24 training attack 
types, with an additional 14 types in the test data only. 
4.4.2- Knowledge Extraction 
Items of knowledge (facts, concepts, ideas ... ) are often spread over a given set of data. Recent studies [Fayyad, 1996] [Shen et al. 1996] have indicated that 
knowledge extraction process can take a great advantage of current powerful 
knowledge representation and acquisition tools. Knowledge extraction from a 
dataset involves three main aspects, as follows: 
" The model used to extract knowledge, which is Bayesian learning 
model in our case 
" The type of representation for the acquired knowledge, and 
" The constraints to be over imposed on the representation in order to 
judge the validity of the acquired knowledge. 
In our dataset, each row represents more than forty variables that determine 
network connections using different communication protocols. Each row ends 
with a value that represents whether any particular connection is normal or 
abnormal (i. e., an attack). Here are two sample lines of the dataset, as shown in 
Table 4.2. The first line corresponds to the names of the variables and the second 
as well as the third correspond to the variables information for each particular 
connection. Note that the activity_type variable represents the target variable node. 
Table 4.2: A sample of the dataset 
11 
duration 
protocol_ 
type service count 
srv_, 
count 
serror 
rate - 
arv_serror 
rate 
rerror_ 
rate srvrerror rate activity-type 
22 tcp ft data I 1 0 0 1 0 normal. 
0 icmp ecr I 508 508 0 0 1 0 smurf. 
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The database of the MIT LL incorporated dataset is shown in figure 4.3. In total 
this database contains the records for about half a million connections. 
SepsMors options 
Q'eb aor; Q Semicolon [ comm p Presence of tale we 
Q space Qo Character and of Wie 
Q Ilore conseciAive aerifcd 
$eperiars 
Q Missn9 vdue Q Trrropose 
Dios View 
service 1 flog ý src_bytes I dsLb1es I-W 
udp private SF 105 146 0p 
udp private SF 105 146 0 
udp private SF 105 146 00 
udp private SF 105 146 00 
udp private SF 105 146 0p 
udp doman_u SF 29 0 0p 
Udp private SF 105 146 00 
udp private SF 105 146 0Ö 
lcp Htp SF 223 185 b0 
udp private SF 105 146 00 
Figure 4.3: The developed database 
Stolfo et al, [2000] define higher-level features that help in distinguishing normal 
connections from attacks. There are several categories of derived features. The 
"same host" features examine only the connections in the past two seconds that 
have the same destination host as the current connection, and calculate statistics 
related to protocol behaviour, service, etc. The similar "same service" features 
examine only the connections in the past two seconds that have the same service 
as the current connection. "Same host" and "same service" features are together 
called time-based traffic features of the connection records. Some probing attacks 
scan the hosts (or ports) using a much larger time interval than two seconds, for 
example once per minute. Therefore, connection records were also sorted by 
destination host, and features were constructed using a window of 100 
connections to the same host instead of a time window. This yields a set of so- 
called host-based traffic features. 
Unlike most of the DoS [Heftich et al, 1999] and probing attacks, there appear to 
be no sequential patterns that are frequent in records of R2L and U2R attacks. 
This is because the DOS and probing attacks involve many connections to some 
host(s) in a very short period of time, but the R2L and U2R attacks are embedded 
in the data portions of packets, and normally involve only a single connection. 
Useful algorithms for mining the unstructured data portions of packets 
automatically are an open research question. Stolfo et al. 2000, used domain 
knowledge to add features that look for suspicious behaviour in the data portions, 
such as the number of failed login attempts. These features are called "content" 
features. A complete listing of the set of features defined for the connection 
records is given in the tables 4.3-4.5 below [Hettich and Bay, 1999]. 
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Table 4.3: Variables list of individual network connection 
eature name description Type 
duration length (number of seconds) of the continuous 
connection 
protocol type 
type of the protocol, e. g. tcp, udp, discrete 
etc. 
service 
I network. service on the destination, d iscrete 
e. g., http, telnet, etc. 
Fsrc_bytes number of data bytes from source continuous to destination 
dst 
-bytes 
number of data bytes from continuous destination to source 
flag normal or error status of the discrete 
connection 
land 1 if connection is from/to the same discrete host/port; 0 otherwise 
wrong_fragment number of "wrong" fragments continuous 
urgent number of urgent packets continuous 
Table 4.4: Content features within a connection suggested by domain 
knowledge 
feature name Description type 
hot number of "hot'' indicators continuous 
number of failed login num_failed_logins , continuous attempts 
logged_in 1 if successfully logged 
in; 0 discrete 
otherwise 
number of "compromised" num_compromised 
[continuous 
conditions 
1 if root shell is obtained; 0 root-shell otherwise 
discrete 
1 if -su root" command su_attempted attempted; 0 otherwise 
discrete 
Inum number of "root" accesses continuous 
number of file creation num_file_creations continuous operations 
num_shells number of shell prompts continuous 
number of operations on I Facces 
access control files 
r us 
Inum-putbound curds number of outbound continuous 
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commands in an ftp session 
1, if the login belongs to the is hot login discrete 'hot" list; 0 otherwise 
lis_guest_login I1 if the login is a "guest"login; (discrete 
0 otherwise 
Table 4.5: Network traffic state variables computed within a2 second time 
window 
Veature name description type 
number of connections to the 
count same 
host as the current continuous connection in the past two 
seconds 
ote: The following features 
refer to these same-host 
connections. 
% of connections that have serror rate "SYN' errors continuous 
% of connections that have rerrorr rate 
I 
" continuous REP errors 
% of connections to the same same srv rate continuous 
_ _ service 
0 %Y( of connections to different diff srv rate v continuous 
_ ices ser 
number of connections to the 
srv count same service as 
the current continuous 
_ connection in the past two 
seconds 
Note: The following features 
refer to these same-service 
connections. 
% of connections that have srv_serror rate 
- "SYN' errors 
continuous 
% of connections that have [srv_rerror_rate 
"REP" e ro continuous r rs 
srv_diff host-rate 
/o of connections to different ° 
hosts continuous 
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4.5- Navie Bayes Supervised Learning and Prediction 
The nave Bayes is dedicated as the learning algorithm and used for characterizing 
the target node. Figure 4.4 shows the developed na7ve Bayes detector model with 
a set of nodes that best characterize the nature of network traffic. The model 
represents a classifier, in which a set of mutually exclusive classes is represented 
as the root node, and the attributes of the objects to be classified depend on this 
target variable. The simplifying assumptions made by this model, are that the 
classes are mutually exclusive and that the attributes are independent given the 
class. The meaning of this assumption is that, once we know the class to which an 
object belongs, the relations between its attributes become irrelevant. In the 
detector model depicted in Figure 4.4, the toot node activity_type represent the set 
of mutually exclusive classes and the leaf nodes are the dataset given attributes. 
The activity_type node is set as the target node. 
activity type 
Figure 4.4: The naive Bayes developed detector model characterizes target 
node association to all other variable nodes 
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The model features the level of contribution of each node variable towards the 
target node activity_type. Based on the given dataset, the analysis of the arcs 
emphasizes the importance of the role of each arc. The arc's thickness is 
proportional to the strength of the probabilistic relations between the target node 
and the other nodes within the network. In order to see the amount of information 
being contributed by each node to the knowledge of the target node is to monitor 
the shade of each variable node. The lighter the shade of the square inside the 
node, the greater the amount of information it carries. The activity_type can be 
verified by at the naive Bayes detector by investigating the nodes at the network. 
Figure 4.5 represents the developed detector model output. From the detector 
output shown in figure 4.5, the developed algorithm model managed in fact to 
learn the association contribution of some variables towards the target node 
activity_type. 
The detection mode enables the identification of the association probabilities for 
different states of any variable, by assigning a particular value to any variable. As 
soon as this kind of variable observation takes place, the probabilities of every 
node are updated to take the new information into account. The detector model 
output (monitor) starts by listing the target node variable sub-monitor output. 
Then we see all the other variable nodes that contributed to the detector 
knowledge in a form of series of sub-monitors. These sub-monitors have been 
ordered in terms of the cost and the amount of information associated with each 
node. The sub-monitors correspond to the most interesting question with respect 
to the cost and information it brings to the knowledge of the target variable. For 
example the detector model output indicates that both an ICMP protocol_type and 
an ecr_i (ECHO_REPLY) service have a major contribution that increases the 
probability of having a smurf attack. 
Figure 4.6 shows the target modality analysis, which allows visualizing for each 
node (in this case the service node), two kinds of information relative to the target. 
Firstly, the type of probabilistic relation binding a particular variable and its 
parameters with the target node variable, that is the smurf activity type. Secondly, 
the information gain brought by each node (in this case the service node), for the 
knowledge of the modality of the target node. 
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activity_type output = 
monitor of the target node 
"activity_type" of the navie 
Bayes detector model. The 
monitor output indicates 
that there is 52.74% 
probability of smurf attack 
protocol_type output = 
monitor of an independent 
variable node 
"protocol_type" of the 
navie Bayes detector 
model. The monitor output 
indicates that icmp protocol 
has 53.04% contribution to 
smurf 
service output = monitor of 
an independent variable 
node "service" of the navie 
Bayes detector model. The 
monitor output indicates 
that echo reply service has 
52.81 % contribution to 
smurf 
Figure 4.5: Nave Bayes detector learned icmp and 
ecr_i (ECHO_REPLY) contributions to smurf 
72 
I 
va«a_trve 
a3. ax 
7E. 37% 0P 
ese% wn 
CHAPTER 4. INVESTIGATION OF NAIVE BAYES APPROACH TO IDSs 
o.. 
00 
" IRC 
 x» 
  . ten 
aonwn 
oanYn_u 
  Rnpr 
  RG 
  Rp_O. la 
 MIp 
IE. p 
In 
'wu 
"Ollw 
  pop -3 
  pnntr 
P. *. 
"mlp 
avrpo 
  ') 
" 41rn1 
 unJ 
 Rmn. 
Figure 4.6: Conditional probability distribution 
The conditional probability distribution shown in figure 4.6 indicates that the 
main service node parameter, ecr i (ECHO_REPLY) is the main contributor to 
the smurf target node variable. This indicates that Natve Bayes learning detector 
model works quite well when tested on actual datasets. Particularly, when 
combined with some of the attribute selection procedures that serve to eliminate 
redundant as well as non-independent attributes. NaYve Bayes assumption of 
independency amongst network traffic variables provided quite useful features. 
Although the underlying structure of the model is quite simple, this model 
performed well in classification problems with a large number of attributes in 
which the task is to classify a unit presenting a combination of attribute values 
into one of the states of the target variable activity_type. The naive Bayes detector 
model managed to feature the level of association contribution of each node 
variable towards the target node activity_type. The conditional independence 
assumptions represented by the detector model allowed the classification to be 
performed in an efficient way. However, this is a simplistic assumption, especially, 
when we are dealing with a complex environment such as networking and 
communication protocols scenario. 
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4.6- Summary 
Navie Bayes approach to network intrusion detection as well as a prediction has 
been investigated. Naive Bayes modelling incorporates independences assumption 
amongst its variable nodes and hence considered to be an independent feature 
model. Naive Bayes models can be trained efficiently in a supervised learning 
setting. The Knowledge Engineering (KE) and extraction incorporated with navie 
Bayes model determine a major step involved in featuring statistical Network 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). A difficulty arises when there are more than a 
few variables and classes, we would require an enormous number of observations 
(records) to estimate these probabilities. Naive Bayes gets around this problem by 
not requiring that we have lots of observations for each possible combination of 
the variables. Rather, the variables are assumed to be independent of one another 
and, therefore the probability that a particular network activity type that heavily 
uses ECHO_REQ service, ICMP protocol, etc. will be a smurf can be calculated 
from the independent probabilities that a network activity_type uses ECHO-REQ 
service, ICMP protocol etc. In other words, Naive Bayes model assume that the 
effect of an variable value on a given class is independent of the values of other 
variable. This assumption is called class conditional independence. It is made to 
simplify the computation and in this sense considered to be "Natve". 
A nave Bayes supervised learning model for detecting network attacks has been 
introduced. The detector model is developed to extract the variable nodes directly 
from a dataset generated by MIT Lincoln Lab. This dataset has been developed to 
evaluate and enhance the research in the field of networks IDSs. Naive Bayes 
detector model works very well when tested on actual datasets, particularly when 
combined with some of the attribute selection procedures that serve to eliminate 
redundant and hence non-independent attributes. However, naive Bayes assumes 
independence amongst network traffic variables of interest. This assumption is a 
fairly strong assumption and is often not applicable. However, bias in estimating 
probabilities often may not make a difference in practice, especially in data 
networks environment, it is the order of the probabilities, not their exact values 
that determine the classifications. In order to overcome this limitation, a Bayesian 
learning network approach has been proposed. Bayesian network [Heckerman, 
1995] provides a set of learning entities that compute models over data stored 
within a network, and each model encodes dependencies among all the variables 
of interest. Bayesian network, as a learning detector model corresponds to an 
adaptive knowledge representation and modelling. Bayesian network is mainly 
associated with the dynamic organisation of a learning detector and the 
association discovery of parent variables and their events. Therefore, it 
automatically gathers information that is contributed to the knowledge of all 
parameters to the target variable node. Next chapter introduces a developed 
Bayesian learning network model for detecting as well as predicting those 
evolving network attacks such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. 
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Chapter 5 
Bayesian Networks & 
Agents-based IDSs 
The previous chapter detailed the technique of naive Bayes supervised learning 
modelling within the context of Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs). 
Due to the limitations of this modelling approach such as independence 
assumptions amongst the model variables, this modelling technique is further 
developed in this chapter using powerful learning method known as Bayesian 
Networks (BNs). Bayesian network [Heckerman, 1995] provides a set of learning 
entities that compute models over data stored within a network, and each model 
encodes dependencies among all the variables of interest. BNs have led to the 
development of learning methods to extract them directly from datasets of cases 
rather than relying on the insight of human domain experts, thus turning BNs into 
a powerful tool for knowledge extraction. Regardless the methods used to detect 
network unauthorised activities, the ultimate goal would be, how well does our 
models detect or classify attacks? 
The Bayesian Learning networks approach is considered to be a promising tool 
used by the intelligent Agents to determine suspicious networks anomaly events 
and consequently relating them to the following dependent occurring illegitimate 
activities. Applying BNs as a learning detection model into this kind of problem 
has not been previously explored. This chapter shows how probabilistically 
Bayesian network detects network attacks, allowing for the generalization of 
NIDSs. It describes the major results achieved from experiments based on real 
time dataset as well as the observations that explain the achieved results. While 
learning detection techniques serve a useful purpose and provide a major solution 
to the state of art NIDSs, these techniques do not provide the ultimate solution to 
the current NIDSs limitations. Therefore, an effective automated response 
mechanism to those detected attacks is required to minimise their effect, hence, 
enhance NIDSs capabilities. The further work chapter proposes other type of 
Agents with Fuzzy intelligence capabilities to initiate successful automated 
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response actions. Fuzzy intelligent Agents are proposed in the further work 
chapter to handle this task with the ability to respond quickly and dynamically 
control the availability of allocated network resources. 
5.1- Bayesian Networks Approach to Networks IDSs 
A Bayesian network [Heckerman, 1995] [Michael, 1999] is a graphical model that 
encodes probabilistic relationships among variables of interest. When used in 
conjunction with statistical techniques, the graphical model has several 
advantages for data analysis. Bayesian network provides a set of learning entities 
that compute models over data stored within a network, and each model encodes 
dependencies among all variables. A Bayesian network can be used to learn causal 
relationships, and hence can be used to gain understanding about a problem 
domain such as networks security and to predict the consequences of intervention 
by combining a prior knowledge and data. Therefore, Bayesian network is 
considered to be a promising and useful approach in determining suspicious early 
events in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) events and consequently relating 
them to the following occurring activities. Learning Agents which deploy 
Bayesian learning approach combine multiple modes that could be learned at 
different network assets such as switches, servers, and/or firewalls. 
5.1.1- Bayesian Network Model Representation 
A Bayesian network [Michael, 1999] represents the joint probability distribution 
for a set of variables. The conditional independence assumptions [Berthold et al, 
1999] encoded by a Bayesian network have the further advantage of simplifying 
the computations of conditional probabilities given some evidence for a set of 
values observed in the network. Using Bayesian networks, we can easily make 
predictions about the value of a variable in a given situation by computing the 
conditional probability distribution of the variable given the values of a set of 
some other variables in the network. Thus, tasks such as prediction and 
classification can be efficiently performed. 
Figure 5.1 represents the joint probability distribution over the Boolean network 
traffic variables defined within a Bayesian network constructed from a prior 
knowledge and data. This network represents a preliminary model of the problem 
of applying Bayesian solution to a network detector that is able to identify Denial 
of Service (DoS) activities. In general, a Bayesian network represents the joint 
probability distribution by specifying a set of conditional independence 
assumptions (represented by a directed acyclic graph), together with sets of local 
conditional probabilities. Each variable in the joint space is represented by a node 
in the Bayesian network. A Bayesian network for a set of variables 
Y={Y,....... Y} consists of (1) a network structure S that encodes a set of 
conditional independence assertions about variables in Y, and (2) a set of Pof 
local probability distributions associated with each variable. These components 
define the joint probability distribution of Y. The nodes in S are in one-to-one 
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correspondence with the variables Y. Given network structure S, the joint 
probability distribution for Y [Newell, 1982] is given by 
n 
P(Y>>"""".. y) =f[p(Yi I Parents(Y)) 
i=1 
where Y, denotes both the variable and its corresponding node, 
and Parents (Y, ) denotes the set of immediate predecessors (parents) of Y, in the 
network S as well as the variables corresponding to those parents. Note the values 
of p(y, I Parents(Y, )) are precisely the values stored in the conditional 
probability table associated with node Y. 
Figure 5.1: A Generic Bayesian network for detecting network DoS events, as 
it represents a set of conditional independence assumptions 
We begin by determining the variables to model, which have been chosen as 
follows: 
" Incoming sequential destination. port scan = (ISDPS) 
" Port scan = (PS) 
" Incoming sequential destination. address scan = (ISDAS) 
" Host scan = (HS) 
" Reconnaissance process = (RP) 
" Excessive CPU computations = (ECC) 
" Degradation of computational resources = (DCR) 
" Buffer overflow = (BO) 
" Degradation of storage resources = (DSR) 
" Resources exploitation = (RE) 
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distribution over all the indicated Boolean variables and constructed from 
networks security prior knowledge. 
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" Excessive incoming ECHO-REP packets = (EIEP) 
" Flooded links = (FL) 
" Delayed queues = (DQ) 
" Bandwidth consumption = (BWC) 
" Invalid TCP sequence number packets = (ITSNP) 
" TCP hijacked session = (THS) 
" Delayed TCP ACK packets = (DTAP) 
" Time-out of half-open TCP handshake process = (THTHP) 
" Receiving out-of-spec TCP packets = (ROTP) 
" Excessive incoming TCP SYN connection request packets = (EITCRP) 
" Resources starvation = (RS) 
" Network Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks = (NDDoSA) 
Consider the node "Time-out of half-open TCP handshake process". The network 
nodes and arcs represent the assertion that "Time-out of half-open TCP handshake 
process" is conditionally independent of its non-descendants "Degradation of 
computational resources" and "Host scan", given its immediate parent "Delayed 
TCP ACK packets". This means that once we know the value of the variable 
"Delayed TCP ACK packets", the variables "Degradation of computational 
resources" and "Host scan" provide no additional information about "Time-out of 
half-open TCP handshake process". Each node has a local entry table that 
provides only the conditional probabilities of its own given its parent variables. 
The set of local conditional independence assumptions described by the network, 
describes the full joint probability distribution for the network. One positive 
feature of Bayesian networks is that they allow a convenient way to represent 
causal knowledge such as the fact that "Delayed TCP ACK packets" causes 
"Time-out of half-open TCP handshake process". In the terminology of 
conditional independence, we express this by stating that that "Time-out of half- 
open TCP handshake process" is conditionally independent of other variables in 
the network, given the value of "Delayed TCP ACK packets". Note this 
conditional independence assumption is implied by the arcs in the Bayesian 
network of figure 5.1. 
From the chain rule of probability, we have p (y) = fl p (y, I y,,....., y, -, 
). Now, 
1-1 
for every Y, , there will be some subset 'r, c{Y,....... Y, _, 
} such that Y, and 
{Y,,...... Y, 
_, 
} I ic, are conditionally independent given ir, . That is, for any y, 
P (Y, I Y1....... y, -, 
) =P (y, l am, ) . Therefore, we obtain p 
(y) =1[p (y, J; t, ) . Also, 
we can see that the variable sets (ßt1....... r) correspond to the Bayesian network 
parents Parents (Y, ),....., Parents (Y. )) , which in turn fully specify the arcs in the 
network structure S. 
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In order to determine the structure of a Bayesian network we order the variables 
somehow, and then determine the variables sets that satisfy 
p(y, I y,....... y, _, 
)=p(y, I; c, )for i=1....... n. According to Figure 5.1 of the 
network structure, we would use the ordering (ISDPS, ISDAS, ECC, BO, EIEP, 
ITSNP, DTAP, ROTP, EITCRP, PS, HS, DCR, DSR, FL, THS, THTHP, DQ, RP, 
RE, BWC, RS, NDDoSA), which represent every Y, node. Therefore 
p (ISDPS, ISDAS....... NDDoSA) = p(ISDPS) p(ISDAS)... p (RE I ECC, BO, DCR, DSR)... 
p (NDDoSA I ISDPS, ISDAS, ECC, BO,....., RS) 
Consequently we obtain the following conditional independencies, by taking the 
advantage of the locality structure of the parent-child configuration: 
p (ISDAS I ISDPS) =p (ISDAS) 
p (ECC I ISDPS, ISDAS) =p (ECC) 
p (RP ISDPS, ISDAS, PS, HS) =p (RP, (ISDPS, ISDAS) I (PS, HS)) 
p (RE 1 ECC, BO, DCR, DSR) =p (RP, (ECC, BO)1(DCR, DSR) ) 
p (NDDoSA I ISDPS, ISDAS....... RS) = 
p (NDDoSA, (ISDPS, ISDAS....... DQ) I (RP, RE, BWC, RS)) 
Having specified the relevant variables as well as their dependency, and assigned 
the conditional probabilities to the nodes, the probabilities are then obtained either 
from a large dataset, an expert, or a combination of both [Jordan, 1999]. The 
advantage of the previous description is that the joint probability of the twenty 
two variables that are indicated in figure 5.1 would require 222 -1= 4194303 
independent numbers are significantly reduced when the conditional 
independence assumptions are exploited. 
5.2- Learning Bayesian Network from a dataset 
Originally, Bayesian networks (BNs) [Berthold and Hand, 1999] were supposed 
to rely on domain experts to supply the necessary knowledge about the 
conditional independence graph including the conditional probability distributions 
that quantify dependencies. BNs [Monti et al. 1999] are probabilistic networks, 
provide a powerful formalism for representing and reasoning under uncertainty. 
The construction of BNs with unusual available domain experts often is a difficult 
and time consuming task. Knowledge acquisition from experts is an expensive 
process because the experts can not explicitly interpret their knowledge. However, 
information is growing rapidly and datasets are becoming increasingly available 
for different disciplines in general and networks security in particular. Therefore, 
the construction time of BNs could be considerably decreased by exploiting those 
prepared datasets. Learning BN graph structure provides much insight into the 
investigated domain that allows inexpensive knowledge discovery. BNs have led 
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to the development of learning methods to extract them directly from datasets of 
cases rather than relying on the insight of human domain experts in general and 
security personnel in particular, thus turning BNs into a powerful tool for 
knowledge extraction. 
Let us assume that the given dataset (sections 4.3.1 & 4.4.2) has n multivariate 
cases y= {y,....... y} from which we need to learn a BN. Each case yk in the 
dataset is a row vector A= {yk,...... y,, t} corresponding to a combination of states 
of I variables. Therefore, y is an nxI matrix. Now, learning [Jensen, 1996] 
represents semi-automatic methods using experience to construct or modify a 
model. So, learning can be divided into two components, qualitative and 
quantitative learning, as follows [Berthold and Hand, 1998] [Jensen, 1996]: 
" Qualitative learning concerns the graphical structure of the model M, 
specifying the conditional independence assumptions among the variables 
in Y. 
" Given a graph model M, quantitative learning specifies the conditional 
probabilities associated to the remaining dependencies in the graph model. 
5.2.1- Selection of the Graphical Structure Model 
In a Bayesian network model [Heckerman, 1996] with n variables, the number of 
possible structure hypotheses is more than exponential in n. One of the approaches 
used by statisticians to select the most appropriate model from those structure 
hypotheses is called model selection. The selected model is considered to be as the 
correct model. This approach could yield accurate results when applied to 
Bayesian network structures. Several experimental results have shown that the 
selection of a single good hypothesis often yields accurate predictions. In this 
section, a definition is given to what is meant by a good model. 
In Qualitative learning, the model selection for the Bayesian graphical model M 
has to be induced from the dataset. Let M= {M0, M1....... Mm} be the set of 
models represent a priori and contain the true model of dependence among the 
variables in Y. Each model in M is assigned a prior probability p(Mj 110), where 
Mj is the model that specifies the conditional dependencies and Io is the prior 
information. Let B(» be the parameter vector associated to the conditional 
dependencies specified by Mj. The given sample information will be used to 
compute the posterior probabilities p(M, I I) from which the most probable 
model in M can be selected, where I, is the posterior information and I, =10 +y. 
Also, p(M, I I) - p(Mj 110)p(y I Mj) (Bayesian Theorem), where p(y I Mj) is 
the marginal likelihood of Mj. Given the assumptions described above including, 
the dataset is complete, and the cases are independent given the parameter vector 
9(J) associated toMj. Also, the prior distribution of the parameters is conjugate 
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to the sampling model p(yI9w») , so that 6V) - D(a,,....... a,,, ) (Dirichlet 
distribution) and the parameters are locally and globally independent. In order to 
select the most probable model, it is therefore sufficient to compute the marginal 
likelihood p(y I Mj) for a given Bayesian network structure model M [Jensen, 
1996] [Cooper et al, 1992] by 
I q, 
P(YI Mi)=1111 
r`a; ý) nr(a; ý+n(YI ý; i)) 5.1 
'_, j_, r(a1 +n(, T, 
))l,., r(a,, k 
where r is the Gamma function. When the dataset is complete, 5.1 can be 
efficiently computed using the hyper-parameters a, + n(y I'Tr) and the precision 
a, +n(ir, ) of the posterior distributions of O, . 
Suppose that we have a trivial scenario of two node variables, x (Y, ) and y (YZ ), 
and a random sample of n cases. Lets assume that Y and YZ are binary variables, 
given that Y, -< YZ (Y can not be parent of Y2 ). With this assumption, we left with 
two possible models to be explored [Berthold and Hand, 1998]: 
" Model Mo specifies that the two variables are independent, so we can have 
p(y 10(0)) = Bi, and p(y21 19(0)) = 021, where 0(0) is the parameter vector 
associated to Mo. 
" Model M, specifies that YZ is a parent of Y, , so that we can define 
p(Yxl 19(')) = 621 and p(y1 I Y2j, 0(')) =9. 
Given Mo, we assume that 62 =(021,022)-D(2,2) and B, = (41,42)- D(2,2), and 
they are independent. Given M,, we assume that 8,, =(O111,4 2)-D(l, l), and 
they are independent. Therefore, a priori, the marginal probabilities of y2J , 
Ylk and Ylk y2j are all uniform and are based on a global prior precision Cr = 4. 
Suppose we collect a random sample from a given dataset, the contingency 
statistics would be as shown in Table 5.1 [Ramoni et a], 1999]. 
Table 5.1: Contingency statistical table 
Y 
Y2 12 Total 
I n(Yn I y21) n(Y12 I Y21) n(Y2, ) 
2 
n(Y,, I Yu) n(Y12 I Y22) n(Y22) 
Total n(y) n(y, 2) n 
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Using a complete dataset, the marginal likelihood under models Mo and M, could 
be found by applying equation 5.1, as follows [Ramoni et al, 1999]: 
2 r(4)r(2+n(Y2j)) z r(4)r(2+n(YJk)). P(YI Mo)=Ili., r(4+n)r(2) 
Hk=º 
r(4+n)r(2) ' 
ý7 Z 
r(4)r(2+n(Y2j))ý7 2 r(2)r(1+n(Ylk I Y2, )) p(YIMl)=11J'' r4+nr2 
flk=' 
r2+n r1 
and the outcome of the following relation would decide which model to chose 
(model discrimination). 
r_ 
P(Mo 1 Io)P(Y 1 Mo) 
AM, I Io)P(Y I MI) 
So, if r<1, model M, is chosen, if r>I model Mo is chosen, and if r =1 then both 
models are equivalent. 
As the number of variables increase, [Monti et al, 1999] [Ramoni et al, 1999] the 
evaluation of all possible models becomes infeasible, so, various heuristic search 
methods have been proposed to limit the search process to a subset of models. 
Heuristic search algorithms [Neapolitan, 2004] "are algorithms that search for a 
solution which is not guaranteed to be optimal, but rather, they often find 
solutions that are reasonably close to optimal". The most common heuristic search 
method is known as K2, which was originally proposed by [Cooper et al, 1992]. 
This method limits its attention to the subset of models that are consistent with a 
partial ordering among the variables: Y, -< Yj (Y can not be parent of Yj ). So, once 
a scoring metric is defined, a search for a high-scoring network structure can be 
carried out. The algorithm assumes a given ordering on the variables and a non- 
informative prior over parameters and structure. However, equation 5.1 is a 
product of terms that measures the evidence of each parents-child dependence, 
which can be exploited to develop search algorithms that work locally. The prior 
probability distribution over the network structures is assumed to be uniform, 
therefore, it can be ignored in comparing network structures. The K2 algorithm 
uses this heuristic to fully exploit the decomposability of 5.1. Having the local 
contribution of a node Y, and its parents 11, to the overall joint 
probability p(y, Mj) by [Ramoni et al, 1999]: 
8(YIn, )=11 
r(a,, ) r(ak+n(xkI; rU)) 
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The K2 algorithm implements a greedy forward stepping search over the space of 
network structures. The algorithm continues to add a parent to each node Y, at a 
time and by computing g(Y, I rl, ). The set II, would be expanded to include the 
parent node that gives the largest contribution to g(Y, 111) , and stops if the 
probability does not increase any longer. 
5.2.2- Estimation of the Graph Conditional Probabilities 
Once the graph model is selected, the conditional probabilities of the BN have to 
be defined. The conditional parameters are represented by the parameters 
9= (9, 
ßk) , where 
0., = p(y; k I'r, , B) , which we are 
interested in estimating it 
from y. The parameter vector 0, = (8, x,....... 9,,,, ) is associated to the conditional 
probability distribution of 1I ;r. Let n(y, k I'cy) be the frequency of 
pairs (yk 12y) in the dataset, and n(Qr, ) = zkn(yk I rr) be the frequency of , r. 
By matching the factorisation of the likelihood into parents-child contributions, 
the joint prior density is 
% 
A0 110) = III I MY 110) 1=1 J=1 
For a complete dataset sample y, local and global independence induce an 
equivalent factorisation of the posterior density of 0 
cý 
P(BIli)-1ýP(B, j 1I0)f BýjkYriýy 
91 k=t 
The prior distribution of B, is assumed to be a Dirichlet distribution with hyper- 
parameters Ia., ....... ajC, 
}, ajk >0 for all ijk. So, we have 0.110 -D 
(aU,....... aij,, ) . 
The prior hyper-parameters a,, k encode the observer's prior belief and, since 
aOk -1 plays the role of n(y, k l r) in the likelihood, they can be regarded as 
frequencies of cases needed to formulate the prior distribution. Therefore, 
a, = 2: j a. 
is the global precision on 6, , which is the parameter vector associated 
to the marginal distribution of Y, and a, =a. Since %determines uncertainty, 
by assuming ask = a/ (c, q, ) for all i, j and k, so that the prior probability of 
(Y, x I r. ) is simply 11 C1 . 
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The assumptions of parameter independence and prior Dirichlet distributions 
imply that the posterior density of0 is a product of Dirichlet densities, and 
9, ý 11 -. D(au, +n(Y1, I icy),....., ark +n(Y,,, I2r )) 
The information conveyed by the sample is therefore captured by simply updating 
the hyper-parameters of the distribution of O by increasing them of the frequency 
of cases (y,,, k I r) observed by the sample. Therefore, the sample information can 
be summarized into the contingency tables collecting the frequencies of the 
parents-child dependency, as shown in Table 5.2 [Ramoni et at, 1999]. This table 
characterises the conditional probabilities discussed in section 5.4.2 and figure 5.3 
for three node variables identified in the given dataset. 
Table 5.2: Contingency table collecting the frequencies of cases 
(Y =Y, kI1, =; ru) 
II, Y, 
y, l yik ,,, yk, 
Row Totals 
; r1 n(y 1 irl)... n(Y, k l zn)... n(y 1x) n(on) 
Zu n(Y, I ffo) ... n(Y, k 
11i, ) 
... n(YC, 
I iry) n(7, ) 
giq, n(Y, 1 I icq, ) ... n(Y, k 
12ca, ) ... n(Y, 1 irq, ) n(;, 9, 
) 
5.3-The Bayesian Unsupervised Learning Detector Models 
Bayesian network models are made of variables represented by nodes and 
relations between its variables represented by arcs. The simulation tool known as 
BayesiaLab is used to visualise, model, and inspect the structure of my developed 
network detector model. In the developed network model, a probabilistic 
representation is associated to each node. BayesiaLab allows accessing, 
visualisation and the modification of the probability distributions of any variable 
node. The SopLEQ learning Method [BayesiaLab Tutorial, 2003] is used by 
BayesiaLab to discover the association between all nodes of the developed 
Bayesian network. SopLEQ is a fast search algorithm for association discovery 
based on a global characterization of the data and on the exploitation of the 
properties of equivalent Bayesian networks. 
In order to develop a learning detector model, a Bayesian network has to be 
learned from the given dataset provided by MIT Lincoln Lab [MIT Lincoln Lab]. 
This network corresponds to the learned knowledge of normal and abnormal 
communications network activities represented by the node "activity_type" and 
associated with the events of other Bayesian network variable nodes. Figure 5.2 
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shows a usable representation of the learned network model and its variable nodes. 
Bayesian network applies adaptive knowledge, which is concerned with the 
dynamic organisation of the detector and the association discovery of parents' 
variables while automatically gathering information that is contributed to the 
knowledge of the target variable. Adaptive knowledge is only available in 
validation mode. Figure 5.2 shows the marked activity_type node as the target 
variable and those directly linked variables, which are heavily contributed to its 
knowledge such as service, protocol 
_rype 
and so on. 
nu 
L. 
activity type wrong ragment 
Figure 5.2: The developed Bayesian Detector Model. The local probability 
distribution(s) associated with each node would be determined to specify 
the conditional distribution for each variable given its immediate parents 
in the network 
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5.4-The Experimental Work and Results 
With the model learning phase completed, the next step involves the 
experimentation and validation mode, which gives access to the communication 
network state, so to interpret the events that are associated with any particular 
network unauthorised activities. Also, the experimentation and validation mode 
enables the identification of the conditional probabilities for different states of any 
variable, by assigning a particular value to any variable. Thus, provides a 
mechanism for characterising empirical evidence on how the developed detector 
model performs. As soon as this kind of variable observation takes place, the 
probabilities of every node are updated to take the new information into account. 
This inference process would allow the verification of the developed network's 
consistency from the point of view of the choice of variable nodes and their 
conditional probabilities. This section covers the major conducted research 
experiments based on simulated models. The results are shown either in tabular or 
displays form. Detailed observations and analysis of achieved results are 
discussed as well to highlight the key points that emerge. The evaluation of the 
achieved results is conducted using a standard validation methods discussed in 
chapter 7. 
5.4.1-The Experimentations and Observations Strategy 
The developed model is using the real time dataset gathered by MIT Lincoln Lab 
for real time detection. The set of experiments proposed here are made in order to 
test the developed model in its test bed environment to the extent that it works as 
it is supposed to, get the expected results, validate it later on, and compare it with 
other achieved results. The Bayesian prediction mechanism is used for all 
experimentations and observations. 
The objectives of the experimental work and tests are as follows: 
" Identification of the conditional probabilities amongst all the dataset 
variables. Many combinations of network attacks were included in the 
dataset to characterise how successful the developed learning model is in 
generalizing and detecting future similar events. 
" Characterise empirical evidence on how the developed learning detection 
model performs. This is to see how many other unauthorised events it 
could recognise. 
" Identify the capability of detecting unseen anomalies previously by the 
developed model for which it has not been trained. 
" Explore the capability of Bayesian learning networks on minimising both 
false positive and false negative error rates. 
" Are Bayesian learning networks able of generalising IDSs? 
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The central strategy of the experiments involves five main stages, as follows: 
Developing the learning detection model by learning Bayesian network 
from the dataset generated by MIT LL, as shown in Figure 5.2. This 
dataset deemed a good test bed for the developed models, since it has 
enough adverse events to enable a meaningful statistical evaluation. The 
learning process used the whole amount of dataset to simulate the real 
world. This stage was a very time consuming, due to the high number of 
variables (40 variable nodes) as well as the number of network 
connections (more than half a million connections). 
Generating the conditional probability tables that represent the quantitative 
part of the probabilistic relations. The conditional probability tables are the 
most commonly used representation models to describe these distributions. 
These tables tend to grow exponentially as the number of parents increase. 
Analyse the developed detection model in order to extract all the 
knowledge embedded in the Bayesian network variable nodes in general 
and the target variable node in particular. The inference results would 
appear on displays that bring information on the probability distribution of 
the target variable and its relation to all other variable nodes. This stage 
would also include the influence analysis with respect to every single node 
in the detector model. This analysis would visualise every variable node 
from the point of view of the type of probabilistic relations and the 
information gain binding all variable nodes. 
Perform Bayesian clustering to the developed model. This is to identify the 
natural partitions of all homogenous variable nodes within the dataset in 
an unsupervised way. This stage allows the discovery of the attributes that 
distinguishes one cluster from the other, i. e., the normal network traffic 
from the abnormal anomalies. 
Observations and visual analysis of the output displays of the detector 
model, and identifying the proper output thresholds to determine 
anomalies. This is to correlate the output data with the learning detection 
method, which is sampled overtime. Since the dataset contains many 
network attacks, a statistically meaningful empirical analysis, at least in 
this stage would be possible to perform. 
5.4.2-The Conditional Probability Tables and Influence Analysis 
As the arcs connecting the nodes of the developed detector model shown in figure 
5.2 constitute- the qualitative part of the network by indicating the direct 
probabilistic dependencies, the conditional probability distributions represent the 
quantitative part, i. e., the type and strength of the probabilistic relations. The most 
commonly used representation models to describe these distributions are the 
conditional probability tables. The concept of the conditional probability tables 
has already been reflected by table 5.2 in section 5.2.2. 
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The conditional probability table of the srv_count variable is shown in figure 5.3. 
The srv_count represents the number of connections to the same service as the 
current connection in the past two seconds. The two column variables count and 
rerror rate correspond to the combinations of the learned grand parents of the 
variable node srv 
_count. 
Such dependency could not be determined by naive 
Bayes model due to its simplistic assumptions. This makes Bayesian network 
modelling more effective in providing such useful information. The L1-L6 
columns, determine the state intervals for srv_count. The L1-L6 correspond to the 
probability distributions, conditionally to each case of both count and rerror_rate 
variables. 
Observation 1: The interpretation of the upper left cell at the first line of this 
table would be: there is 16.667% of chance that the value of srv_count is present 
when both count and rerror rate are low (L 1 in both variable nodes). 
Figure 5.3: The conditional probability table of the srv_count variable node 
The most beneficial measure of the conditional probability tables, is that there 
outcome is featured in the statistical figures, rather than just a binary crisp values. 
This is what we normally need to see in anomaly detection systems. The problem 
with the conditional probability tables is the exponential growth of the number of 
lines with respect to the number of parents, as it's the case for two parents in 
figure 5.3. Their data acquisition can then become quickly a complicated task. 
However, learning of the parameters in the dataset makes it is possible to fill them 
automatically. 
Observation 2: The lower right cell at the last line of the conditional probability 
table indicates that there would be 99.991% of chance that the srv count is 
present when both variable nodes count and rerror_rate are high (L7 in case of 
count variable and L3 in case of rerror rate variable). 
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5.4.3-The Developed Detection Models Inference 
Since the used dataset contains continuous variables, those variables must be 
made discrete. Therefore, a decision tree has been chosen, because the intervals 
are selected according to the information they contribute to the target variable. 
Due to the decision tree's discretisation, with activity 
_rype 
as the target node at 
the detector, all continuous contributed variables are automatically cut up into a 
number of intervals. By considering the knowledge coded by the network detector 
model and all possible observations made on all nodes, it is possible to display the 
marginal probability distribution of the target variable node. The detector model 
displays the probability expressed as a percentage and a bar proportional to the 
probability. 
The target variable node of the developed detector model is called activity_type. It 
can be verified by the detector by investigating the parents' nodes at the network. 
This functionality allows the activation of the variables' displays, which bring 
information on the probability distribution of the target variable. The detector 
output in figure 5.4 shows the target display, which appears at the top of the 
output followed by the variables' displays classified by their relevance. The 
detector output determines the ratio between the information gain and cost. 
Observation 3: From the detector output, the algorithm did in fact recognise that 
there is an ecr_i (ECHO_REPLY) service and an icmp protocol_type association 
that increases the probability of having a smurf attack. The ecr_i service with a 
probability of 52.81% and icmp protocol_type with a probability of 53.10% 
indicate a clear contribution that leads to an increase in the probability of having 
smurf attack, which is 52.74%. These levels of high probability figures reduce the 
false positive as well as the false negative detection rates. 
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activity type output = 
indicates that there is 
52.74% probability of 
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Figure 5.4 (a): Bayesian detector learns a smurf attack and its 
dependence on other variable nodes 
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The detector output shown in figure 5.4 (a) indicates that 53.10% probability of 
using ICMP protocol would lead to smurf attack. So, what would happen if the 
probability of receiving ICMP protocol packets is increased? Would the 
probability of having a smurf attack increase? The next observation gives the 
answer to this question. 
Observation 4: This answer has already been indicated in figure 5.4 (b), which 
shows the maximum ICMP protocol contribution (100 %) to the new smurf attack 
probabilities. Because of the propagation of the new information, the probability 
distributions for the majority of nodes have been updated and as we can see that 
the probability of having a smurf attack increased from 52.74% to 99.32%. 
Observation 5: Let's look at the problem from the opposite direction. If the 
probability of portsweep attack, which represents a reconnaissance process is set 
to 100%, then the state value of some associated variables would inevitably 
increase. What characterizes portsweep attack, is the TCP protocol and private 
service association probability have been increased from 38.26% in figure 5.4 (a) 
to 97.66% and from 25.14% in figure 5.4 (a) to 79.27% respectively, as shown in 
figure 5.5 (a). Also, we can notice an increase in the REJ and RSTR flags. 
Observation 6: In the case of the buffer_overflow attack, see figure 5.5 (b), the 
duration variable which represents the length of the connections in seconds has 
increased from 2.71% in the case of connections lasted > 2.00 seconds (as shown 
in figure 5.4 (a)) to 51.42% (as shown in figure 5.5 (b)). The approach taken here 
is completely different from the previous one. In here, we are not only interested 
in verifying the model. However, the goal is to discover knowledge from the 
dataset. Bayesian networks learning leads to findings that would never have been 
as simple to discover by reading about 500000 records of the dataset. 
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Figure 5.4 (b): Bayesian detector learns conditional dependence of smurf 
attack and other variable nodes on protocol variable 
activiy type 
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Figure 5.5 (a): Bayesian detector learns the variable nodes contribution to 
portsweep attack 
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Figure 5.5 (b): Bayesian detector learns the variable nodes contribution to 
buffer over attack 
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This type of analysis would allow network security analysts to see the amount of 
information being contributed by each node in the detection model to the 
knowledge of the target node. It also indicates the knowledge that can be extracted 
from each variable node in the entire network structure of the developed model. 
This leads to an automatic (learning) detection of network anomalies. The main 
advantage of having probabilistic figures as an output in IDSs is the ability to 
adjust our IDS's sensitivity. This would allow us to trade off between accuracy 
(false positive and false negative error rates) and sensitivity (miss rate). Therefore, 
should the detection function imply a significant emphasis either on minimising 
the false error rate, or maximising the true detection rate, the developed learning 
model should be flexible enough to enable either choice, simply by adjusting the 
probability threshold figures. The developed model is vastly improved with the 
use of Bayesian prediction mechanism. The addition of the prediction model in 
the test bed environment increases its functionality and its usability to the 
maximum. Therefore, the developed model statistically managed to discover the 
attributes that distinguishes the normal activities from the abnormal ones. 
Figure 5.6 shows the influence analysis with respect to target modality, which 
allows visualizing for each variable node, two kinds of information relative to the 
target variable. Firstly, the type of probabilistic relation binding a particular 
variable, that is the service variable node in this case, and the target variable, that 
is smurf activity 
_type. 
Secondly, the information gain that brought by each node 
for the knowledge of the modality of the target node. The diagram indicates that 
the two main service node parameters, ecr_i (ECHO-REPLY) and eco-i 
(ECHO_REQ) are the main contributors to the target variable. Figures 5.7(a) and 
5.7(b) show the conditional probability distribution for srv_count and count 
variables contribution to the smurf target variable node. 
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Figure 5.6: Conditional probability distribution of smurf target variable with 
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Figure 5.7: Conditional probability distribution of smurf parameter of the 
target variable with respect to the srv count and count variables 
The main feature that can be noticed from the detector model output in figures 5.6 
and 5.7 is the ability to give statistical figures that determine the rate of detection 
for any particular unauthorised event with respect to other event. As the future 
network attacks would have a high probability of being developed versions of the 
current ones. Also, having those unauthorised activities being identified 
probabilistically, this means that the developed learning detector would be able to 
provide similar statistical figures for predicting future similar anomalies. 
5.4.4-Bayesian Unsupervised Learning of Dataset Clustering 
Bayesian clustering methods [Ramoni et al, 2001] [ Cheeseman et al, 1996] were 
only recently started for static databases, i. e., under the assumption that the data 
are independent and identically distributed. Bayesian clustering [Witten et al, 
2000] associates instances with clusters probabilistically rather than categorically. 
In this case, for every instance there is a probability or degree of membership with 
which it belongs to each of the clusters. The goal of using clustering [Barash et al, 
2001 ] is the discovery of natural partitions from the examples given in the dataset. 
In addition to the association discovery, the clustering algorithm can also be 
applied to discover the natural partitions for all variables within the dataset. These 
partitions share a set of common properties. 
The data clustering algorithm with automatic selection of the number of classes is 
used. It allows the network to search for the best number of classes for optimal 
partition. Also, it allows the clustering of the data in an unsupervised way, in 
order to find partitions of homogeneous elements. This method clusters network 
traffic and connection requests with similar expression patterns and regions. The 
learned model provides a useful insight on the incoming network traffic, protocols, 
and user requests for connections within each cluster. 
The clustering outcome performs an automatic organisation of the nodes as shown 
in figure 5.8 below. This developed model is based on a naive architecture in 
which node clusters that is used to model the partitions is the common parent of 
all the other variables. Unlike the corresponding supervised learning, the values of 
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node clusters are not observed here. In the automatic selection of the number of 
classes, the search of the number of clusters is carried out by a random walk that 
starts with the specified number of clusters and that increases the number of 
partitions until obtaining empty clusters or reaching the specified maximum 
number of clusters. 
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Figure 5.8: Automatic organisation using clustering 
The model features the level of contribution of each node variable towards the 
target node clusters. Based on the given dataset, the analysis of the arcs 
emphasizes the importance of the role of each arc. The arc's thickness is 
proportional to the strength of the probabilistic relations between the target node 
and the other nodes within the network. In order to see the amount of information 
being contributed by each node to the knowledge of the target node is to monitor 
the shade of each variable node. The lighter the shade of the square inside the 
node, the greater the amount of information it carries. The output characteristics 
of the two major clusters appear in figure 5.9. 
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Figure 5.9: Two identified clusters 
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Observation 7: Figure 5.9 shows the characteristics of each cluster created, by 
setting each state of variable clusters to 100%. The 2nd display (activity 
_type) 
of 
figure 5.9 indicates that the two main initiated clusters are the normal and 
abnormal (smurf activity) network traffic. Figure 5.9 represents a particular type 
of association, which is meant to be a probabilistic type of clustering. The 
algorithm identified two major groups that segmented the population naturally 
into two clusters. Cluster I represents the other mostly used protocols, which are 
tcp and udp respectively, for normal type of traffic. The detector shows that http 
protocol service used on top of tcp with less number of connections to the same 
host as the current connection in the past two seconds as shown in the 5`h display. 
Also, the output of Cluster I indicates that a less number of connections to the 
same service as the current connection in the past two seconds as shown in the last 
display (srv_count variable). 
Observation 8: The Cluster 2 represents the network traffic appears in abnormal 
situation where the attacking protocol-type parameter icmp is used by ecr_i 
(ECHO_REPLY) service to launch smurf attack. This attack has a very high 
number of connections to the same host as the current connection in the past two 
seconds as shown in the 5`h display, which is indicated by the count variable. Also, 
the output of Cluster 2 indicates that a high number of connections to the same 
service as the current connection in the past two seconds as shown in the last 
display (srv_count variable). 
Figures 5.10 (a) and (b) show the influence analysis with respect to target 
modality, which allows visualizing for each cluster, two kinds of information 
relative to the target cluster. Firstly, the type of probabilistic relation binding a 
particular cluster, and secondly, the information gain brought for the knowledge 
of the modality of the target cluster. The diagrams indicate the conditional 
probability distribution for each cluster variable contribution given both clusters. 
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Figure 5.10- Conditional probability distribution of both clusters 
This type of analysis allows network security analysts to see the amount of 
information being contributed by each node to the knowledge of the target cluster. 
It also emphasizes the importance of the role of each variable in the entire 
network structure. The node variables that are near to the cluster are proportional 
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to the strength of the probabilistic relations that represent the global probability 
law. The key features in the developed model can be summarised as follows: 
" Automatic detection of the two main clusters. 
" Automatic detection of the variable nodes, which are irrelevant to the 
clusters. 
" Clear clustering in the presence of many such variables. In the given 
dataset, 31 variables are used. 
" Clustering representation describes which clusters each attribute depends 
on. 
Therefore, the developed model allows the discovery of the attributes that feature 
one cluster (normal) and distinguish it form the other (abnormal). 
5.5- Summary 
The Bayesian supervised learning with decisions-based detection modelling 
technique, which is introduced in chapter 4 has been further developed in this 
chapter using powerful learning methods known as Bayesian Networks (BNs). 
The developed Bayesian network learning detector that has been introduced in this 
chapter is a graphical model that encodes probabilistic relationships among 
variables of interest. When used in conjunction with statistical techniques, the 
graphical detector model has several advantages for network traffic analysis. The 
Bayesian Learning networks approach is considered to be a promising tool used 
by the intelligent Agents to determine suspicious networks anomaly events and 
consequently relating them to the following dependent occurring illegitimate 
activities. BNs are powerful machine learning techniques. They have led to the 
development of learning detection methods to extract them directly from datasets 
of cases that is generated by MIT Lincoln Lab. This is to avoid relying on the 
insight of human security experts, thus turning BNs learning detection into a 
powerful technique for knowledge extraction in general and networks intrusion 
detection systems in particular. 
This chapter showed how probabilistically Bayesian network detects network 
attacks, allowing for the generalization of NIDSs. Simulation scenarios as well as 
experimental results show that the modelled system is effective with minimum 
false positives and false negatives. While learning detection techniques serve a 
useful purpose and provide a major solution, these techniques do not provide the 
ultimate solution to the current NIDSs limitations. As a result, an effective 
automated response mechanism to those detected attacks is required to minimise 
their effect, hence, enhance NIDSs capabilities. The further work chapter proposes 
other Agents with Fuzzy intelligence capabilities to initiate successful automated 
response actions. Fuzzy intelligent Agents are proposed in chapter 6 to handle this 
task with the ability to respond quickly and dynamically control the availability of 
allocated network resources. 
Chapter 6 will discuss the evaluation methodology used to assess the performance 
of the developed learning detection models that are investigated in this chapter. 
By means of evaluation we should be able to determine the effectiveness and the 
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performance of all the proposed models and assumptions. The effectiveness of 
each chosen technique for the supervised and unsupervised learning task will be 
evaluated using well known standard methods. The evaluation criteria as well as 
the learning prediction performance for this task will be introduced in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Evaluation and Performance 
Measurement 
This chapter discusses the evaluation methodology used to assess the performance 
of the machine learning technique at detecting as well as predicting unauthorised 
activities in telecommunication networks using Bayesian methods. By means of 
evaluation, validation as well as empirical evidence, we will be able to determine 
the effectiveness and the performance of all the developed models and 
assumptions in chapters 4 and 5. The evaluation and the learning prediction 
performance for this task will be discussed, together with a description of the 
chosen Bayesian learning tool: the BayesiaLab. The performance of both 
developed detection model algorithms for the supervised and unsupervised 
learning tasks will be evaluated using well known standard methods such as 
confusion matrix. This chapter intends to compare both techniques and hence 
identify their strengths and limitations in general and detecting network anomalies 
in particular. 
6.1- The Evaluation Methodology 
Evaluation [Witten et al, 2000] is the key in making significant progress in 
applying machine learning algorithms to real life problems, such as networks 
security. However, we need systematic ways to evaluate how different learning 
methods work and to compare one with another. Also, we need ways of predicting 
performance based on practical experiments using useful collected data. 
Evaluating the performance of machine learning schemes on a given problem such 
as detecting and predicting unauthorised activities within a network is an issue 
that is not easy as it sounds. So far, in my experiments, it has been assumed that 
what is being predicted is the ability to classify different instances of normal and 
abnormal network traffic activities. In some of my other experimental situations, 
the prediction involves class probabilities rather than only the classes themselves. 
For example, the developed model predicted the smurf activities and indicated 
that in a form of a probabilistic figure based on the behaviour of ICMP protocol. 
Therefore, a mechanism for maximising the success rate of the predictions and 
counting the cost of making wrong decisions and predictions is needed. In most 
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practical machine learning situations, the cost of a misclassification error depends 
on the type of error it is, whether, for example, a positive signal was erroneously 
classified as negative or vice versa. When doing machine learning, and evaluating 
its performance, it is often essential to take these costs into consideration. 
The evaluation methodology used is based upon the reliability and precision of 
unauthorised network activities detection as well as a prediction scheme using 
Bayesian learning techniques. The evaluation methodology should fulfil the 
following requirements: 
Evaluate the hypothesis that machine learning techniques such as Bayesian 
learning can be used to differentiate between normal (legitimate) and 
abnormal (illegitimate) network activities. 
Develop detection and prediction techniques appropriate for classifying as 
well as identifying network anomalies. The evaluation should provide 
acceptable estimation figures for the effectiveness of the classification 
obtained. 
Develop an accurate useful procedure of evaluation of the proposed 
techniques which could be used in the future. This will provide valid 
methods for comparing results obtained from this research experiments 
and/or other similar future work. 
In order to evaluate intrusion detection system, it is required to know both the 
probability of detecting an attack known as a True Positive (TP) and the 
probability of issuing a false alarm known as a False Positive (FP). The majority 
of current intrusion detection systems report different warning levels that enable 
security managers to adjust an alert threshold that effectively trades off (TP) for 
(FP). The security manager will be able to discover more attacks when lowering 
the threshold, however, will probably increase the false alarms rate. Similarly, the 
security manager can increase the threshold to decrease false alarms rate however, 
this may cause the system to miss other additional attacks. By knowing both TP 
and FP and how they fluctuate with the changes in the threshold, it will be 
possible to plot that in a diagrammatic form, as we will see in section 6.5. By 
extracting knowledge from the generated plots, security managers will be able to 
set thresholds to maintain the required amount of analysis effort and the desired 
security level. 
6.1.1- The Performance Criteria 
The evaluation methodology mainly applies five criteria to measure the 
performance of Bayesian learning-based anomaly detection model. In conjunction 
with the achieved statistical measurements, I argue that the cost of miss- 
classification measurement would be a useful measure to consider and that when 
considered as a focus of attention component, the performance of probabilistic 
predictions is certainly important. 
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The performance measurement approach can be summarised as follows: 
" Validate whether the simulation model is featuring an acceptable 
representation of real system given the purpose of the simulation model 
[Kleijnen, 1999]. 
" Measure the prediction performance for the developed detector model 
using the informational loss function [Witten et at, 2000]. 
" Evaluate the precision of the developed Bayesian network detector model 
using confusion matrix [Witten et at, 2000]. 
" Evaluate the performance of the developed models on unseen test set using 
10-fold stratified cross-validation [Witten et at, 2000]. 
The effectiveness of these measures will be summarised and tested for statistical 
significance of the developed models. The machine learning package used in the 
above mentioned evaluation experiments and measurement, BayesiaLab, enables 
the use of several different evaluation features. 
One of the methods [Witten et al, 2000] used for counting the cost and evaluating 
machine learning schemes is known as ROC curves, where the learner is trying to 
select samples of test instances that have a high proportion of positives. ROC 
[O'Connell et al, 2002] is a procedure derived from the early days of radar and 
sonar detection used in the Second World War, hence the name "Receiver 
Operating Characteristic". ROC is used in signal detection to characterise the 
trade off between hit rate and false alarm rate over a noisy channel. The ROC 
curve plots the number of positives included in the sample on the vertical axis (Y- 
axis), expressed as a percentage of the total number of positives or the true 
positive rate, against the number of false positives included in the sample, 
expressed as a percentage of the total number of false positives or the false 
positive rate, on the horizontal axis (X-axis). 
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Table 6.1 [Witten et al, 2000] summarises the ROC way of evaluating the same 
basic trade off, the number of true positives (TP), false positives (FP), true 
negatives (TN), and false negatives (FN), respectively. A set of instances would 
be chosen with a high proportion of yes instances and a high coverage of the yes 
instances. Different technique give different trade offs and can be plotted on the 
ROC diagram. 
Table 6.1: ROC curve's measure is used to evaluate the FP vs. FN trade off 
Method Plot Axes Explanation of axes 
ROC curve TP rate vs. FP rate TP rate TP 
X100% 
TP+FN 
FP rate FP 
X100% 
FP+TN 
The primary goal of my learning detection models, which function as a prediction 
and classification mechanism, is to predict the performance of a classifier on new 
data and assess its error rate on unseen data (i. e. a dataset that played no part in 
the formation of the classifier). The ultimate goal in the anomaly detection task is 
to identify those potentially unauthorised activities and malicious occurrences in 
networks while minimising the rate of incorrectly flagging normal behaviours, i. e. 
false positives. Also, to minimise the rate of failing to identify unauthorised 
activities and malicious behaviours, i. e. false negatives. Both false positives and 
false negatives rate of an entire anomaly detection system must be as low as 
possible. 
The dataset used in the experiments were processed by the developed Bayesian 
network model whose main characteristics are described in chapter 4. This dataset, 
which is generated by MIT LL contains about half a million instances in a form of 
network connections using different network as well as application protocols. The 
learning procedures for developing the Bayesian network detector model received 
only the dataset as an input. In order to increase the efficiency of the experiments, 
accommodate all the dataset, and achieve accurate modelling and simulation 
results, high specification hardware was required. In all of the conducted 
experiments, the methods used and later on compared, received as input the same 
training data. Therefore, I was able to quantify the effect of the local structures on 
the parameter estimation and the structure selection of the developed models. 
6.2- Modelling & Dataset Validation 
Validation [Kleijnen, 1999] determines whether the simulation model is an 
acceptable representation of the real system given the purpose of the simulation 
model. In this case simulation means experimentation, i. e., the model is used 
instead of the real system. In this case, real data is used rather than simulated data; 
however, experimentation is done using a simulated model rather than the real 
system. However, any experimentation calls for statistical analysis, which is only 
part of the whole validation process. The type of statistical procedure to use 
depends on the kind of data that is available for the analysis. When a model 
[Sargent, 1999] is created, it should be developed for a well defined purpose, and 
its validity and performance determined with respect to that purpose. If the 
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purpose of a model is to answer particular questions, the validity of the model has 
to be determined with respect to each question. There are many validation 
techniques that can be used to validate a particular developed model. In Sargent 
[1999], sixteen various validation techniques were discussed, and only eight of 
them were applied here to validate the developed detection model. In addition 
combinations of the eight selected techniques were used, which is quite acceptable 
by the Verification and Validation (V&V) community. The other validation 
techniques are excluded due to their irrelevance to the underlying problem. 
Following Sargent [1999], the validation techniques used to validate the 
developed detection model are. 
" Parameter Variability-Sensitivity Analysis: This technique consists of 
altering the values of the internal parameters of the developed model and 
its inputs to determine the effects upon the model's behaviour and its 
output. The same relationships of change should be possible in the real 
system model. 
" Predictive Validation: The model is used to predict the system behaviour, 
and then comparisons are made between the system's behaviour and the 
model's forecast to determine if they are the same. The empirical evidence 
could be used here to make the comparisons. 
" Operational Graphics: To obtain various performance measures that 
graphically indicate the model behaviour with respect to time, i. e., the 
dynamic behaviours of performance indicators are visually displayed as 
the simulation model moves through time. 
" Historical Data Validation: If historical data exists (or if data is collected 
on a system for building or testing the model), part of the historical data is 
used to build the model and the remaining part is used to determine (test) 
whether the model behaves as the system does. 
" Historical Methods: The three historical methods of validation are 
rationalism, empiricism, and positive economics. Rationalism assumes that 
everyone knows whether the underlying assumptions of a model are true. 
Logic deductions are used from these assumptions to develop the correct 
model. Empiricism requires every assumption, achieved model output and 
outcome to be empirically validated. Positive economics requires only that 
the model be able to predict the future and is not concerned with a model's 
assumptions or structure (causal relationship or mechanism). 
" Multistage Validation: proposed by [Naylor and Finger, 1967] to combine 
the three historical methods of rationalism, empiricism, and positive 
economics into a multistage process of validation. This validation method 
consists of, firstly, developing the model's assumptions on theory, 
observations, general knowledge, and function, secondly, validating the 
model's assumptions where possible by empirically testing them, and 
finally, comparing the input-output relationships of the developed model 
to the real system. 
" Traces: This technique traces the behaviour of different types of specific 
entities in the model to determine if the model's logic is correct and if the 
necessary accuracy is achieved 
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" Turing Tests: To consult experts who are knowledgeable about the 
operations of a system and asked if they can discriminate between system 
and model outputs. 
It is natural [Witten et al, 2000] to measure a classifier's prediction performance 
in terms of the error rate. If the prediction is correct, then it is counted as a success, 
otherwise it is an error. Generally, in order to predict the performance of a 
classifier on new data, such as new incoming network traffic, it is required to 
assess its error rate on an independent dataset that played no part in the 
formulation of the classifier. There are two datasets (in the form of network traffic 
contaminated with different DoS and other attacks) have been provided, the 
training data and the test data. The training data will be used to come up with the 
classifiers. Then the test data will be used to calculate the error rate of the final, 
optimised scheme. Each of the two sets must be chosen independently. The testing 
data set must be different from training data to get a reliable estimate of the true 
error rate and to get good performance in the optimisation or evaluation stage. The 
validation process will be used to optimise parameters of those classifiers, so to 
evaluate which approach would be more suitable. Provided all samples are 
representative, the error rate on the test set will give a true indication of future 
performance. 
Generally, it is not a straight forward to tell whether a sample is representative or 
not. One possible way of evaluating Bayesian Learning approach is to determine 
the error rate using stratified tenfold cross-validation. Stratification [Witten et al, 
2000] is a technique which ensures that random sampling is done in such a way as 
to guarantee that each class is properly represented in both training and test sets. 
The standard way of predicting the error rate estimate of a learning technique 
given a single, fixed sample of data is to use stratified tenfold cross-validation. 
This technique is adopted in such away that the dataset is divided randomly into 
ten parts, in each of which the class is represented in approximately the same 
proportions as in the full dataset. Each part is held out in turn and the learning 
scheme trained on the remaining nine-tenths, then its error rate is calculated on the 
holdout set. Thus the learning procedure is executed a total of ten times, on 
different training sets (each of which have a lot in common). Finally, the ten error 
estimates are averaged to yield an overall error estimate. The stratified tenfold 
cross-validation is a standard evaluation technique in practical terms. 
Due to the possible substantial variance in an individual tenfold cross-validation 
and the approximation of the true cross-validation error figure, it is possible to 
sample from the distribution of cross-validation experiments. This can be 
achieved by using different random partitions of the given dataset, treating the 
error rates calculated in these cross-validation runs as different, independent 
samples from a probability distribution. Therefore, by comparing the average 
error rate over several cross-validations for the learning model, it is possible to 
determine whether the mean of a set of samples of the cross-validation estimate is 
significantly great or significantly less. 
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6.2.1- Model's Detection Validation 
The developed model detection has been validated by comparing its output with 
EMERALD (Event Monitoring Enabling Responses to Live Disturbances) 
detection system's output. EMERALD [Marchette, 20011 is SRI's environment 
for scalable, distributed intrusion detection and network monitoring. Information 
on EMERALD can be obtained from many recent books on intrusion detection 
[Amoroso, 1999] [Bace, 2000] [Marchette, 2001]. Figure 6.1 indicates that the 
developed model output and EMERALD system [Valdes et al, 2001] are detecting 
buffer_overflow activities. Due to data protection reasons part of the information 
on EMERALD's output is hidden. A similar relationship of the developed model 
change appears in the real EMERALD system as a result of internal parameters 
changes. However, the developed model's output provides a probabilistic figure to 
indicate its confirmed prediction. 
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Figure 6.1: Model's detection validation 
Validation Remark 1: The conducted experiments in both, the developed model 
and EMERALD indicate the detection of buffer_overflow event. By altering the 
parameters' values of the related variables in the developed detection model, the 
model's probabilistic behaviour and prediction have been affected in a similar 
way to EMERALD's output. However, the developed model's output provides a 
probabilistic figure to indicate its confirmed prediction, which is not the case in 
EMERALD output. This relatively similar relationship has occurred in the 
developed model as well as the real system, hence confirms both of the validation 
techniques, the parameter variability-sensitivity analysis and predictive validation, 
as mentioned earlier in section 6.2. 
Validation Remark 2: By knowing the underlying hypothesis of the developed 
detection model, its mathematical assumptions and its input/output relationships, 
as indicated in sections 5.2 and 5.4. The model's output can be empirically 
validated by analysing those relationships. For example, the buffer_overflow 
attack can result from an increase in the length of network connections, which is 
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determined by the model's variable duration, as indicated in section 5.4.3. The 
developed model's output does not only determine the detection probability, but it 
also represents a predictive figure for future similar events to buffer overflow 
when changing the value of the model's variable duration, taking into account the 
causal relationship amongst the model's variables. This confirms the validation 
techniques of both, the historical methods and the multistage validation. 
6.3- Learning Prediction Performance 
The outcome of all the conducted detection experiments is either correct, if the 
prediction agrees with the actual value for that particular instance, or incorrect, if 
it does not. When a learning scheme [Witten et al, 2000] such as Bayesian 
learning is applied, results in either a correct or an incorrect prediction, success is 
the right measure to use. This is sometimes called a 0-1 loss function. The loss is 
either I if the prediction is incorrect, or 0 if it is not. One of the well known 
mechanisms for the evaluation of probabilistic prediction is the informational loss 
(entropy) function (- 1092 p, ), i=1 to h, where h is the number of variables. The 
informational loss function represents the information required to express the 
actual class I with respect to the probability distribution p, p2....... pk . The 
informational loss function experienced by variable i gives maximum reward to 
predictors that are capable of predicting the true probabilities accurately. The 
expected value of the informational loss function, which determines the entropy of 
the true distribution [Witten et al, 2000]: 
-PI 1092 Pl -P21092 Pz -"**'-Pk 1092 Pk 
The information loss for the developed detector model in case of predicting a 
smurf event occurrence is shown in Table 6.2: 
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Table 6.2: The information loss of smurf event class occurrence 
, 
Event paramete r Predic tion Probability log: P, Entropy Log of Prediction Probability -P, log, P, 
Apache2 0.0026 -8.587272661 0.022326909 
Back ' 0.0035 -8.158429363 0.028554503 
Buffer overflow j 0.0002 -12.28771238 0.002457542 _ ftp_wrlte 0.0001 -13.28771238 0.001328771 
Guess_password 0.014 -6.158429363 0.086218011 
"Httptunnel 
0.0006 -10.70274988 0.00642165 
Imap 0.0001 -13.28771238 0.001328771 
lpsweep 0.0011 -9.828280761 0.010811109 
Land 0.0001 -13.28771238 0.001328771 
`Loadmodule 0.0001 -13.28771238 0.001328771 
Malibomb 0.018 -5.965784285 0.095452549 
Macon 0.003 -8.380821784 0.025142465 
Multihop 0.0001 -13.28771238 0.001328771 
Named 0.0001 -13.28771238 0.001328771 
Neptune 0.1864 -2.423526235 0.45174529 
Nmap 0.0004 -11.28771238 0.004515085 
'Normal 0.1933 -2.371086457 0.458331012 
Perl 0.0001 -13.28771238 0.001328771 
Phf a .'2 3 0.0001 -13.28771238 
0.001328771 
Pod 0.0003 -11.70274988 0.003510825 
Portsweep 0.0012 -9.702749879 0.0116433 
Processtable j 0.0024 -8.702749879 0.0208866 
Ps 0.0001 -13.28771238 0.001328771 
Rootklt 0.0001 -13.28771238 0.001328771 
Saint 0.0024 -8.702749879 0.0208866 
Satan ' 0.0053 -7.559791925 0.040066897 
Sendmail 
"; ; 
0.0001 -13.28771238 0.001328771 
Smurf 0.5274 -0.923030524 0.486806298 
Snmpgetattack 0.0249 -5.327710447 0.13265999 
Snmpguess m 0.0078 -7.002310161 0.054618019 'Sglattack 4 0.0001 -13.28771238 0.001328771 
Teardrop 0.0001 -13.28771238 0.001328771 
Udpstorm 0.0001 -13.28771238 0.001328771 
Warezmaster 0.0051 -7.615287038 0.038837964 
Worm 0.0001 -13.28771238 0.001328771 
Xlock 0.0001 -13.28771238 0.001328771 
Xsnoop 0.0001 -13.28771238 0.001328771 
Xtertn 0.0001 -13 28771238 0001328771 
The total informational loss is 2.0258106 
Evaluation Remark 1: The informational loss function depends on the 
probability assigned to the class that actually occurred. If a very small probability 
value is assigned to the class that actually occurred, the informational loss 
function will penalize largely. The maximum penalty, for a zero probability 
assigned to an event that actually occurred, is infinite. The informational loss of 
the predicted smurf event class is 2.0268106. This indicates that the developed 
predictor has only been penalised with a factor of 2 which is much less than 
infinite. Because of the high probability of a smurf attack compared to the others 
there is a high likelihood that a smurf attack is tacking place. This is due to the 
acceptable probability assigned to the detection of smurf which is %52.74. This 
probability assignment to the occurred event is quite optimistic. If the probability 
of detecting smurf reaches %100, then the informational loss (entropy) decreases 
to zero, hence, no penalty at all. The robust predictors [Witten and Frank, 2000] 
operating under the informational loss function do not assign zero probability to 
any outcome. This leads to a problem when no information is available about that 
outcome on which to base a prediction. This problem is known as the zero- 
frequency problem. 
110 
CHAPTER 6. EVALUATION AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
6.4- The BayesiaLab Package 
The development of the Bayesian network based detector model and all its 
experiments and evaluations are achieved using the BayesiaLab machine learning 
package. This Java-based implementation provided a useful test bed environment 
for developing and testing all the created models in chapter four and five. 
BayesiaLab is a machine learning modelling and data mining tool developed by 
Bayesia to allow researcher to develop Bayesian network based automatic 
learning models as well as making inference on those developed models. These 
models capture useful knowledge from a dataset. BayesiaLab features knowledge 
modelling that takes into consideration the uncertainty of the domain that 
characterises risk assessment, crisis anticipation and diagnosis. 
The BayesiaLab package provides learning algorithms for probabilistic 
predictions and classifications using naive Bayes, Bayesian networks as well as 
Bayesian clustering and feature selection. It also provides standard evaluation 
methods such as confusion matrix for measuring the performance of the 
developed models. BayesiaLab is the testing and evaluation tool used in this 
chapter to support validating the developed models. BayesiaLab package has been 
used in many commercial applications and academic research laboratories, and 
more information can be found in [BayesiaLab, 2003]. The developed Bayesian 
network detection model has already been published by Bayesia in their Web site. 
6.5- Learning Evaluation and Analysis 
In this section, a targeted evaluation will be used to measure the quality of the 
developed active Bayesian network detector model for the prediction of the target 
variable node and its parameters with respect to the associated dataset. The 
evaluation [BayesiaLab, 2003] is carried out using BayesiaLab tool. Once the 
detection model is learned, it is possible to evaluate its performance on a test set 
(ideally different from the learning set). The tools that are used for evaluating the 
developed Bayesian network detection model are as follows: 
" Three Confusion Matrices allowing to precisely measure the performance 
of the model for each modality (occurrence number, reliability: proportion 
of the cases with a correct prediction, and precision: proportion of the 
cases where the true value is correctly predicted), and 
The following sections will focus on the use of a confusion matrix to evaluate the 
developed Bayesian network detector model. 
6.5.1- Confusion Matrix 
The effectiveness of a learning classifier is its ability to make correct 
classification decisions. There are several evaluation measures used for measuring 
effectiveness including reliability and precision. Classification could be thought of 
a number of binary decisions where each entry in an assignment table is given a 
(0,1) score (a binary yes/on decision). One parameter that is used for evaluation 
is the cost of making wrong decisions and wrong classifications. Optimizing 
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classification rate without considering the cost of the errors often leads to 
inaccurate results. In networks security terms: the cost of incorrectly detecting 
abnormal network behaviour classification has a different cost to the incorrectly 
predicted normal classification outcome. In networks intrusion detection, we are 
mainly concerned with two-class case attack "yes" or no attack "no". The four 
different possible outcomes of a single prediction are shown in Table 6.3, which is 
known as the confusion matrix for the two-class case. The true positives (TPs) and 
true negatives (TNs) are correct classifications. The false positive (FP) is when the 
outcome is incorrectly predicted as yes (or positive), when it is in fact no 
(negative). A false negative (FN) is when the outcome is incorrectly predicted as 
negative when it is in fact positive. These two kinds of error, will generally have 
different costs, likewise the two types of correct classification will have different 
benefits. 
Table 6.3: Different outcomes of a two-class prediction 
Predicted class 
(or values) Yes No 
True or real class 
(or values) 
Yes True Positive (TP) False Negative (FN) 
No False Positive (FP) True Negative (TN) 
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The confusion matrices for the Nave bayes model are shown in figures 6.2 (a), 
(b), and (c), and those for the Bayesian network model are shown in figure 6.3 (a), 
(b), and (c). All these figures are produced using BayesiaLab tool [BayesiaLab, 
2003]. These matrices give feedback about the performance of the detection 
models. Three visualization modes are available, as follows: 
1- Occurrence Matrix: number of cases for each Prediction/Real value, as 
shown in figure 6.2 (a). The predictions of the model appear on the 
columns, the lines are representing the true (real) values that are in the 
dataset. 
2- Reliability Matrix: ratio between each prediction and the total number of 
the corresponding prediction (sum of the line) , as shown 
in figure 6.2 (b) 
3- Precision Matrix: ratio between each prediction and the total number of the 
corresponding real value (sum of the column), as shown in figure 6.2 (c). 
TOM Aeci O 4S 54% 
(b) 
TOM Prod n 95.54% 
tmnrm Mim 
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Figure 6.2: Confusion matrix for the developed Nave bayes detector 
(a) 
Tam p-M. 9564% 
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ra4d aecWim essec 
Ta1N RscüWn 95.57% 
0- 03 Re"WY Vrec on 
(a) 
OD% OD% 00% 00% OD% 0.0% 00% 
(b) 
TWI R- 9557% 
C-t. w n Ml i 
0-rencsa Ra" y ProdaWn 
The confusion matrix indicates the classification results down the main diagonal 
i. e., TPs (assigned values for each abnormal parameter) and TNs (assigned values 
for normal parameter) values, and small, ideally zero, off-diagonal elements for 
both FPs (rows) and FNs (columns). 
The direct evaluation of a Bayesian network detector modelled for the prediction 
of a target variable such the activity_type can be realised by computing its total 
precision and reliability. The precision is the ratio between the number of correct 
predictions and the total number of predictions i. e., the number of the true 
positives divided by the number of the true positives plus the false positives, as 
follows [Witten et al, 2000] [BayesiaLab, 2003]: 
Precision = 
TP 
X100% 
TP+FP 
The reliability is the ratio between number of correct predictions i. e., the number 
of the true positives divided by the number of the true positives plus the false 
negatives, as follows [Witten et al, 2000] [BayesiaLab, 2003]: 
Reliability = 
TP 
X100% 
TP + FN 
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Figure 6.3: Confusion matrix for the developed Bayesian network detector 
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In figures 6.2 & 6.3, both developed models, Bayesian network and Navie bayes 
detectors in chapters 4 and 5 indicate a high similar total precision of 95.44 % and 
95.54% respectively. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 list an alternative view of the main 
readings of the confusion matrices for the Naive bayes and Bayesian network 
model respectively. These lists include the number of occurrences for both real 
and predicted values of all parameters of the activity_type variable as well as the 
achieved reliability and precision (main diagonal values). 
Table 6.4 : List of event parameters' occurrences, reliability and precision of 
Naive bayes model 
1098 1095 99.81 99.54 
flow 22 28 53.57 68.18 
3 1 100 33.33 
sword 4367 4400 98.93 99.7 
158 157 96.17 95.56 
1 1 100 100 
306 415 72.28 98.03 
9 21 38.09 88.88 
e 2 1 100 50 
5000 5077 98.48 100 
1053 1073 95.99 97.81 
18 3 100 16.66 
17 14 64.28 52.94 
58001 57975 99.95 99.91 
84 84 100 100 
60593 52692 95.33 82.9 
2 0 0 0 
2 2 50 50 
87 31 80.64 28.73 
354 416 83.89 98.58 
le 759 768 98.82 100 
16 14 35.71 31.25 
13 8 12.5 7.69 
736 311 58.06 2.44 
1633 2195 68.97 92.711 
17 27 29.62 47.05 
164091 164324 99.85 10C 
ack 7741 15940 41.43 85.311 
2406 1376 62.05 36.69 
2 1 100 5C 
12 1 0 C 
2 0 0 C 
er 1602 1982 97.31 98.12 
2 0 0 C 
9 11 45.45 55.55 
4 3 33.33 25 
13 16 43.75 53.84 
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Table 6.5 : List of event parameters' occurrences, reliability and precision of 
Bayesian network model 
Back 1098 1091 100 99.36 
Buffer overflow 22 36 43.58 77.27 
ftp_write 3 1 100 33.33 
Guess_password 4367 4380 99.2 99.49 
Httptunnel 158 28 75 13.29 
Imap 1 1 100 100 
lpsweep 306 679 44.62 99.01 
Land 9 14 50 77.77 
Loadmodule 2 0 0 C 
Mailbomb 5000 5016 99.68 100 
Mscan 1053 973 98.25 90.78 
Multihop 18 40 15 33.33 
Named 17 12 33.33 23.52 
Neptune 58001 58093 99.79 99.95 
Nmap 84 84 100 10C 
Normal 60593 52811 95.45 83.19 
Perl 2 61 3.27 10C 
Phf 2 0 0 C 
Pod 87 119 73.1 10C 
Portsweep 354 398 83.41 93.78 
Processtable 759 768 98.82 10C 
Ps 16 108 3.7 25 
Rootkit 13 4 25 7.69 
Saint 736 28 53.57 2.03 
Satan 1633 2384 67.23 98.1 E 
Sendmail 17 34 17.64 35.29 
Smurf 164091 164094 99.99 10C 
Snmpgetattack 7741 16462 46.92 99.78 
Snmpguess 2406 6 83.33 0.2 
Sqlattack 2 2 100 10C 
Teardrop 12 48 25 10C 
Udpstorm 2 0 0 C 
Warezmaster 1602 2377 67.35 99.93 
Worm 2 0 0 C 
Xlock 9 52 13.46 77.77 
Xsnoop 4 3 33.33 2E 
Xterm 13 14 35.71 38.4E 
Evaluation Remark 2: The interpretation of the generated confusion matrices 
results, which are listed in both tables 6.4 & 6.5 is as follows: 
" Bayesian network detection model has got a high prediction rate in most of 
the attacks in comparison to Na7ve bayes. This includes Back, 
Buffer_overflow, Guess password, Httptunnel, Imap, lpsweep etc... 
" In the case of Buffer_overflow unauthorised activity for example, there are 
22 cases in the evaluation dataset (Real or True values) 
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" The prediction reliability for the Apache2 unauthorised activity is 
790 * 100% = 99.49% (in case of Bayesian network detection) 790+4 
" The prediction precision for the Buffer over unauthorised activity is 
790 
* 100% = 98.13% (in case of Bayesian network detection) 790+15 
" Navie bayes indicated a high precision in detecting a number of attacks 
such as ftp_write, land, Perl, Pod, Sglattack, Teardrop and Udpstorm. 
However, Bayesian network model managed to detect most of these 
attacks with a reasonable level. 
" The Bayesian network model indicated a high reliability figures in 
detecting most of the attacks and hence outperformed Navie bayes. This is 
characterised with the contribution of many variable to each others. Also, 
the dependency feature that is incorporated with Bayesian network led to 
such a result. 
" For those unpredicted parameters i. e., with zero or nearly zero prediction, 
such as Udpstorm or Worm, the achieved reliability and precision is zero. 
This is due to the inappropriate representation of those parameters. 
" Good classification results correspond to large numbers down the true 
main diagonal on the confusion matrix and small, ideally zero, off- 
diagonal elements 
Despite the fact that it is possible to bundle the testing data back into the training 
data, the used testing data used to test the developed model has been kept separate 
to the training data. The reason for that is because the amount of training data that 
is used to develop the detector model is already huge. In fact what is important is 
that error rates are quoted based on the separation of both training data and testing 
data. This matches the assumption made by Witten et al [2000] that both the 
training data and the test data are representative samples of the underlying 
problem. Provided both samples are representative, the error rate on the test set 
will give a true indication of future performance. The larger the training sample 
the better the classifier, although the returns begin to diminish once a certain 
volume of training data is exceeded. And, the larger the test sample, the more 
accurate the error estimate. However, it is possible to increase our confidence 
significantly through careful examination of the dataset as well as related 
experiments. The accuracy of the error estimate can be quantified statistically, as 
we shall see in the next few sections. 
Evaluation Remark 3: The generated Confusion matrices represent an effective 
measure for the validation of the detection process and on whether a given attack 
classification is valid or not. They also indicate how effective the developed 
detector model is from the point of view of reducing false alarms. Tables 6.4 & 
6.5 indicate that both developed models led to a substantial reduction of false 
alarms, with significant increase in detection rates. This verifies that the 
developed detection techniques actually extracted the right anomaly events for 
enabling learning detection. The significance levels on the generated Confusion 
matrices can be used as tuning parameters for affecting a trade-off between 
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detection rates (i. e., TPs) and false alarms (i. e., FPs). Larger significance levels 
lead to higher thresholds, and vice versa, as mentioned earlier. 
When [BayesiaLab, 2003] one is faced with the problem of predicting the value of 
a particular variable (the value of the target node), the evaluation of the Bayesian 
network detection model can be learned from the dataset by using both the 
number of the processed cases and the number of correct predictions. For all the 
cases of the dataset, the probability of the target value is inferred and the cases are 
stored according to their probability in such a way that the most probable cases 
are placed at the beginning of the list. With a perfect detection model, the cases 
with the target value (p % of the population) are then placed in the first p% cases. 
With a random choice of the cases, the expected detection rate is directly given by 
the selection rate. If someone randomly selects x% of the cases, the expected 
detection rate of the cases with the target value is x%. 
Suppose that one network intrusion detection system receives in average 10000 
packets a minute, able to detect 10% (1000 packets) as unauthorised traffic, with 
another that receives an average 15000 packets a minute, and is able to detect 8% 
(1200 packets) of unauthorised traffic. Which is better? The answer should now 
be obvious: it depends on the relative cost of false positives, i. e. packets that are 
identified as unauthorised that are actually authorised, and false negatives, packets 
that are identified as authorised that are actually unauthorised. Therefore, 
Confusion matrices could be used to compare various intrusion detection models 
and provide a common approach for future intelligent detectors evaluations. 
However, different intelligent network intrusion detection models are based or 
trained on different datasets, so it is quite difficult to ensure effective comparison 
methods unless a common dataset is used for that purpose. 
Validation Remark 3: By using the Confusion matrix to measure the developed 
detection model performance, the model's dynamic behaviour of the detection rate 
has been indicated with respect to the false positives and the sample data 
accumulated during the simulation time of the complete dataset. Taking into 
consideration that only part of the dataset is used for testing purposes. This 
confirms both of the validation techniques, the operational graphics and historical 
data validation. 
Validation Remark 4: By using different techniques to measure the performance 
of the developed models such as the informational lose function and confusion 
matrix, the accuracy of the achieved model's detection performance is quite 
promising and encouraging. The achieved high levels of reliability and precision 
of the developed model's prediction as well as the positive comments received 
from experts working in the area of network security, artificial intelligence and/or 
machine learning domains, all these confirm the Traces and Turing tests 
validation techniques. Expert comments and appreciations are either received 
during conference reviews and presentations, or accepted journal papers for 
publication, and/or during industrial technical exhibitions. 
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The evaluation and validation of the developed detection models have been done 
in the presence of both, normal and anomaly network traffic. This is to establish 
the performance of the developed detection model. Without normal traffic the 
total number of false alarms generated by the model for each attack can not be 
identified, hence, the cost of maintaining the implemented system can not be 
identified as well. The generated large corpus of normal as well as anomaly 
network traffic and the developed learning detector model made it possible to do 
the evaluation and performance measurement. The training data included a few 
months of background traffic with about 40 different types of automated attacks 
that are launched against particular victim machines, see appendix A. The training 
data was labelled indicating attacks and unlabeled test data was used for a blind 
evaluation. The Confusion matrices are able to determine the attack detection rate 
as a function of the false alarm rate for the previously unseen test data. Results 
were analysed separately for each individual network attack using confusion 
matrix. Good use of the training data has been made to develop a networked type 
detector based on Bayesian techniques as a probabilistic approach. 
6.6- Summary 
In this chapter, the evaluation methodology used to measure the performance of 
both developed detection models Bayesian network and Naive bayes has been 
discussed. The developed models are trained to detect as well as predict 
unauthorised activities in telecommunication networks using Bayesian techniques. 
The evaluation and validation criteria as well as the learning prediction 
performance for this task have been discussed, together with a description of the 
chosen Bayesian learning package: the BayesiaLab. 
The evaluation methodology applied standard criteria to evaluate the performance 
of the developed Bayesian learning-based anomaly detection model. In 
conjunction with the achieved statistical measurements, the performance of 
probabilistic predictions has been measured. The evaluation approach covered the 
measurement of the prediction performance for the developed detector model by, 
applying the informational loss function, evaluating the precision parameter using 
the confusion matrix and measuring the performances of the models. The machine 
learning package used in all evaluation experiments and measurement is 
BayesiaLab. The validation of the developed model is based on various combined 
techniques acceptable by the Verification and Validation (V&V) community, such 
as parameter variability-sensitivity analysis, predictive validation, operational 
graphics, historical data validation, historical methods, multistage validation, 
traces and Turing tests. In order to achieve a significant confidence, a careful 
examination of both the dataset as well as related experiments has been carried out. 
The evaluation and validation of the developed detection models have been done 
to establish and measure the performance of the developed detection model. A 
similar relationship of the developed model change appears in the real EMERAL 
intrusion detection system as a result of internal parameters changes. However, 
the Bayesian developed model's output provides a probabilistic figure to indicate 
its confirmed prediction. Having a probabilistic figure to indicate for a particular 
attack occurrence other than a black or white output will help in predicting future 
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similar unauthorised anomalies. According to the generated confusion matrices, 
Bayesian network detection model has got a high prediction rate in most of the 
attacks in comparison to Naive bayes. This includes Back, Buffer overflow, 
Guess_password, Httptunnel, Imap, Ipsweep etc... Navie bayes indicated a high 
precision in detecting a number of attacks such as ftp_write, land, Perl, Pod, 
Sglattack, Teardrop and Udpstorm. However, Bayesian network model managed 
to detect most of these attacks with a reasonable level. The Bayesian network 
model indicated a high reliability figures in detecting most of the attacks and 
hence outperformed Navie bayes. This is characterised with the contribution of 
many variable to each others. Also, the dependency feature that is incorporated 
with Bayesian network led to such a result. 
Although the confusion matrices' results indicate that Bayesian network model 
outperformed Naive bayes from the point of view of predictions as well as 
reliability. The generated Confusion matrices represent an effective measure for 
the evaluation of the detection process and on whether a given attack 
classification is valid or not. They also indicate how far the developed detector 
models are effective from the point of view of reducing the false alarms. 
According to the generated Confusion matrices, both developed model are doing 
well in this regard. The achieved results indicate that both Bayesian network and 
Naive bayes are performing well. The achieved results indicate that the developed 
models led to a substantial reduction of the false alarms, with significant increase 
in the detection rates. In general, the developed detector models can reliably 
detect many existing network attacks with low false alarm rates as long as 
examples of these anomalies are available for training. Also, as a probabilistic 
based detector, it is able to generalise to new attacks, hence, could minimise the 
false rate for unknown future anomalies. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
This chapter summarises the main findings and research contributions. It 
discusses future possible areas for research in the field of applying intelligent 
Agents and machine learning solutions in other aspects. These aspects include 
Computer Science and Engineering problems in general, and networks security 
and management in particular. 
7.1- Main Research Findings 
The Bayesian network applied an adaptive knowledge, which is concerned with 
the dynamic organisation of the detector model and the association discovery of 
parents' variables, while automatically gathering information that contributes to 
the knowledge of the detector target variable. This process represents the learning 
phase of the model. The validation mode enabled the identification of the 
conditional probabilities for different states of any network traffic state variable, 
by assigning a particular value to any variable. The decision tree approach as an 
inference process, allowed the verification of the Bayesian network's consistency, 
from the point of view of the choice of nodes and their conditional probabilities. 
The decision tree has been chosen, because the intervals are selected according to 
the information they contribute to the target variable. A number of learning 
methods have been developed to extract Bayesian networks directly from dataset, 
rather than relying on human limited domain experts. Therefore an existing 
dataset has been used for that purpose. The MIT Lincoln Lab generated and 
distributed dataset enabled us to learn and test the Bayesian network-based 
Network IDS model, so to simulate real time tests. The dataset contains a realistic 
and operational background network traffic contaminated with many different 
attack scenarios, such as recon scans and probs, BW consumption, and resources 
exploitation and starvation related attacks that lead to DDoS attacks. 
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The activity _type 
variable, which has been identified as the target node of the 
developed Bayesian network detection model can be verified by the detector 
model and by investigating the parent nodes at the network. The detection results 
showed that the detector managed to automatically learn the conditional 
dependence of, for example, the protocol variable as a parent to the target variable 
smurf activity_type. As the conditional probability of the ICMP protocol increased 
from 53.10% to 100%, the probability of having a smuf attack has increased from 
52.74% to 99.32%. This indicates that the ICMP protocol has a major 
contribution to the smurf attack probabilities. Therefore, as a result of the 
propagation of any new information being malicious, the probability distributions 
for the majority of nodes have been updated accordingly and especially the target 
node. 
Also, the problem was looked at from the opposite direction, when the probability 
of portsweep attack, which represents a reconnaissance process was set to 100%, 
then the state value of some associated variables increased. What characterizes 
portsweep attack is when the TCP protocol and private service association 
probabilities were increased from 38.26% to 97.66% and from 25.14% to 79.27% 
respectively. Also, an increase in the REJ and RSTR flags was noticed. In the case 
of the buff er overflow attack, the duration variable which represents the length of 
the connections in seconds increased from 2.71% in the case of connections that 
are lasted > 2.00 seconds to 51.42%. The approach taken here was completely 
different from the previous one. In this case there is not only as interest in 
verifying the model, since, the goal here is to discover knowledge from the dataset. 
Bayesian networks learning leads to findings that would not have been possible to 
discover by reading 500000 or more records of the dataset. 
This type of analysis would allow network security analysts to see the amount of 
information being contributed by each node in the detection model, to the 
knowledge of the target node. It also indicates the knowledge that can be extracted 
from each variable node in the entire network structure of the developed model. 
This leads to an automatic (learning) detection of network anomalies. The main 
advantage of having probabilistic figures as an output in IDSs is the ability to 
adjust the IDS's sensitivity. This would allow a trade off between accuracy (false 
positive and false negative error rates) and sensitivity (miss rate). Therefore, 
should the detection function imply a significant emphasis either on minimising 
the false error rate, or maximising the true detection rate, the developed learning 
model should be flexible enough to enable either choice, simply by adjusting the 
probability threshold figures. The developed model is vastly improved with the 
use of Bayesian prediction mechanism. The addition of the prediction model in 
the test bed environment increases its functionality and its usability to the 
maximum. Therefore, the developed model statistically managed to discover the 
attributes that distinguishes the normal activities from the abnormal ones. 
The results showed that Bayesian unsupervised learning models could reliably 
detect the majority of the existing attacks with a minimum of false alarm rates. 
The more detailed information about the attack traffic and connections, the more 
promising is the attack detection models and consequently ensuring better 
automated response actions to be performed. Because detecting network attacks 
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did not completely solve the problem, Intelligent Switch Fuzzy Agents (ISFAs) 
have been proposed to overcome the problem of the overwhelming traffic that 
causes disruptions within a network switching services. The further work chapter 
of the research thesis investigated the need to develop intelligent automated 
response actions, so to minimise the attacks progress time and reduce their effects 
to as low as possible. 
The developed learning models for IDSs are only designed to detect network 
unauthorized activities. As detection is important to secure networks, however, it 
does not provide the ultimate solution to the current limitations of IDSs. Therefore, 
automated response actions to those detected attacks are required, to minimise 
severe attacks, such as DoS. Intelligent Switch Fuzzy Agents (ISFAs) have been 
proposed to overcome the problem of the overwhelming traffic that causes 
disruptions within network switching services. This approach is incorporated with 
a novel model named N Flip-Fly which enables Fuzzy Agents to deal with the 
problem in a real-time manner. N Flip-Fly is a valuable process. It is an 
uncomplicated mathematical-based model. This feature allows the model to 
behave fast enough without affecting non-blocking (i. e., normal) network traffic. 
The potential for using Fuzzy-based systems properly can be enormous. 
According to the simulation results, Fuzzy intelligent Agents are well suited to 
environments where they need to determine system parameters. Human expert 
knowledge for describing Fuzzy membership function for network states is 
required for the model, especially for an environment with a large amount of 
input/output states, such as switched networks. 
In conjunction with speedy blocking packets, there are other issues that could 
occur within network traffic packets, such as a specific pattern at the source and 
destination ports within the TCP/IP packets header, or particular protocol packets 
dominating the traffic, such as ICMP. These and other parameters need to be 
incorporated into the model in order to achieve an effective, self-healing, secured 
network. The dynamic method of calculating the drop possibility by the ISFAs, 
results from the fact that, according to the traffic rate and the switching resources, 
a different set of fuzzy rules applies. Based on these rules the drop rate possibility 
is decided. Unlike Random Early Detection (RED), which is used for 
Differentiated Services (Diff-Serv) QoS provision to set some minimum and 
maximum dropping thresholds for each class, the ISFA uses dynamic traffic state 
dependent thresholds. The ISFAs drop packets based on the actual traffic rate of 
change (inter-arrival rate of packets) i. e. only packets that pose threat to the switch 
are dropped before put in the queues. Since the whole procedure is independent 
of the buffer queue length, the problems of fixed packets dropping of the queue 
thresholds implemented by RED are avoided. Therefore ISFAs managed to 
provide better congestion control and better switch throughput, hence, self-healing 
network. The validation of the developed model is based on empirical evidence 
that is already characterized in the achieved results. 
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The evaluation methodology applied standard criteria to evaluate the performance 
of the developed Bayesian learning-based anomaly detection model. In 
conjunction with the achieved statistical measurements, the performance of 
probabilistic predictions has been measured. The evaluation approach covered the 
measurement of the prediction performance for the developed detector model. 
This was achieved by evaluating the precision parameter using the confusion 
matrix. The machine learning package was used in all evaluation experiments and 
measurement is BayesiaLab. The validation of the developed model is based on 
various combined techniques acceptable by the Verification and Validation (V&V) 
community, such as parameter variability-sensitivity analysis, predictive 
validation, operational graphics, historical data validation, historical methods, 
multistage validation, traces and Turing tests. In order to achieve a significant 
confidence, a careful examination of both the datasets, as well as related 
experiments, has been carried out. 
The evaluation of the developed detection model was completed in the presence 
of both normal and anomaly network traffic. This is to establish the performance 
of the developed detection model. Without normal traffic, the total number of 
false alarms generated by the model for each attack cannot be identified. 
Consequently, the cost of maintaining the implemented system may also not be 
identified. The generated Confusion matrices represented an effective measure of 
the validation of the detection process and of whether a given attack classification 
is valid or not. They also indicate to what extent the developed detector model is 
effective, from the point of view of reducing the false alarms. The achieved results 
indicate that the developed model led to a substantial reduction of the false alarms, 
with significant increase in the detection rates. In general, the developed detector 
model can reliably detect with low false alarm rates many existing network 
attacks as long as examples of these anomalies are available for training. Also, as 
a probabilistic based detector, it is able to generalise to new attacks and hence 
could minimise the false rate for unknown anomalies. 
7.2- Major Contributions of the Research 
The major contributions of the research are as follows: 
The developed detection models of Bayesian network are capable of 
learning network security breaches. This has been achieved using 
unsupervised learning by applying adaptive knowledge extraction 
techniques. The learning models are concerned with the dynamic 
organisation of the intrusion detection and the association discovery of 
parents' variables whilst automatically gathering information that is 
contributed to the knowledge of the detector target variable. This process 
represents the learning phase of the model. The validation mode enabled 
the identification of the conditional probabilities for different states of any 
network traffic state variable, by assigning a particular value to any 
variable. The decision tree approach as an inference process allowed the 
verification of the Bayesian network's consistency in terms of the choice 
of nodes and their conditional probabilities. The decision tree has been 
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chosen, because the intervals are selected according to the information 
they contribute to the target variable. 
A number of learning methods have been developed to extract Bayesian 
networks directly from datasets, rather than relying on human, limited 
domain experts. Therefore, an existing dataset has been used for that 
purpose. The MIT Lincoln Lab generated and distributed datasets enabled 
us to learn and test our Bayesian network-based Network IDS model, in 
order to simulate real time tests. The dataset contains a realistic and 
operational background network traffic contaminated with many different 
attack scenarios, such as recon scans and probs, BW consumption, and 
resources exploitation and starvation related attacks that lead to DoS 
attacks. 
The detection modelling results demonstrated that the developed models 
managed to automatically learn the conditional dependence of, for 
example, the protocol variable as a parent to the target variable smurf 
actfvfty_type. Therefore, as a result of the propagation of any new 
information being malicious, the probability distributions for the majority 
of nodes have been updated accordingly and especially the target node. 
The evaluation has measured the performance of the developed detection 
model. The output of the Bayesian developed model provides a 
probabilistic figure to indicate its confirmed prediction. The existence of a 
probabilistic figure to indicate a particular attack occurrence other than 
black or white, for example Emerald IDS's output, will help in predicting 
future similar unauthorised anomalies. 
In order to validate the Bayesian network detector model, standard 
detection evaluation methods known as informational loss and confusin 
matrix have been applied. Promising results were obtained and analysed 
to determine the detection rate of the target variable value. This rate 
represents the number of responses obtained proportional to the processed 
cases, which represent the sample size for a previously unseen test data. 
The performance results are indicated for a sample of DoS attacks. The 
results demonstrated that Bayesian unsupervised learning models could 
reliably detect the majority of the existing attacks with minimal false 
alarm rates. The more detailed information about the network traffic and 
connections of the attack, then the more promising is the detection model 
and, consequently, the better the automated response actions to be 
performed. 
The evaluation and validation of the developed detection models have 
been done to establish and measure the performance of the developed 
detection model. A similar relationship of the developed model change 
appears in the real EMERAL intrusion detection system as a result of 
internal parameters changes. However, the Bayesian developed model's 
output provides a probabilistic figure to indicate its confirmed prediction. 
Having a probabilistic figure to indicate for a particular attack occurrence 
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other than a black or white output will help in predicting future similar 
unauthorised anomalies. Bayesian network detection model has got a high 
prediction rate in most of the attacks in comparison to Naive bayes. This 
includes Back, Buffer overflow, Guess_password, Httptunnel, Imap, 
Ipsweep etc... Navie bayes indicated a high precision in detecting a 
number of attacks such as ftp_write, land, Perl, Pod, Sglattack, Teardrop 
and Udpstorm. However, Bayesian network model managed to detect 
most of these attacks with a reasonable level. The Bayesian network 
model indicated a high reliability figures in detecting most of the attacks 
and hence outperformed Navie bayes. This is characterised with the 
contribution of many variable to each others. Also, the dependency 
feature that is incorporated with Bayesian network led to such a result. 
The generated Confusion matrices represent an effective measure for the 
evaluation of the detection process and on whether a given attack 
classification is valid or not. They also indicate how far the developed 
detector models are effective from the point of view of reducing the false 
alarms. Natve bayes model indicated relatively better performance of 
producing higher true positive rates in comparison to Bayesian network in 
the case of detecting ipsweep. However, Bayesian network model 
outperformed NaYve bayes in detecting saint. The achieved results indicate 
that both Bayesian network and Naive bayes are performing well. The 
achieved results indicate that the developed models led to a substantial 
reduction of the false alarms, with significant increase in the detection 
rates. In general, the developed detector models can reliably detect many 
existing network attacks with low false alarm rates as long as examples of 
these anomalies are available for training. Also, as a probabilistic based 
detector, it is able to generalise to new attacks, hence, could minimise the 
false rate for unknown future anomalies. 
The future work stage has emphasized the need to develop automated 
response actions using Fuzzy intelligence, in order to minimise the 
progress time of the attack and to minimise its effects as far as possible. 
The automated response actions resulting from the simulated Fuzzy 
intelligence are effectively achieved to control the resources allocation for 
a network under DDoS attack. Applying Fuzzy logic to such an 
environment application problem has not been previously researched. My 
approach extends the first stage proposed and researched Bayesian 
Learning-based NIDSs, by introducing the Fuzzy logic behaviour to 
Agent entities in order to specifically address DoS attacks, including their 
distributed and coordinated versions. This is in order to minimise the time 
between the detection and the response action. 
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7.3- Limitations and Future Areas for Research 
The developed detector model indicated a reliable detection of many existing 
network attacks with low false alarm rates. As a probabilistic based approach, it is 
also able to generalise to new attacks and hence could minimise the false rate for 
unknown anomalies. However, the achieved results and the general applied 
evaluation procedures suggest a possible new direction for further research. There 
should be an emphasise on developing integrated system approaches that can 
intelligently detect, as well as respond to, newly developed network and host 
based attacks. While the achieved results are promising and encouraging, these 
developed models and experiments could be improved by integrating intelligent 
response action mechanisms into the model, in order to minimise the effects of all 
detected network anomalies. It is only the lack of the appropriate tools that 
combine and support the features of two approaches, such as Bayesian approach 
and Fuzzy logic approach, which hinders further improvements. The building of 
bridges between the two techniques could lead to the development of powerful 
tools that would benefit from the strengths of both approaches. 
Despite the fact that the developed models are capable of responding to the 
overwhelming traffic attacks by dropping those malicious packets, the detection 
models do not take into account of possible self-defence mechanisms. The major 
components of any IDS should be well-protected against any attacks and hence 
should be capable of defending themselves before trying to protect other systems. 
Also, the capabilities of dynamic Bayesian networks could lead to improvements 
on those developed models by staging the network on a desired number of time 
steps. Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBNs) are a powerful framework for 
temporal data models applicable for time series analysis [Jordan, 1999] [West et al, 
1999]. DBNs include "time nodes" that are capable of tracing probability 
distribution variations according to the value of the current time step. DBNs are 
still being researched and developed. They could also be learned automatically 
from a dataset [Neapolitan, 2004] and might provide a solution which leads to 
relaxing the processes involved in detecting time varying and evolving anomalies 
such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. These approaches should 
be capable of providing more detailed information about the detected anomalies, 
such as start time, end time, and a list of all processes and connections that were 
time-dependent and part of the anomaly activity. However, improvements should 
continue to produce updated and more detailed datasets. 
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Chapter 8 
Further work: Investigation of 
Fuzzy-based Responsive IDSs 
Chapter 6 showed the developed learning detection models that are statistically 
detect network attacks. While those models provide a major useful purpose, they 
do not provide the ultimate solution to the current NIDSs limitations, mainly the 
lack of required intelligent response actions that minimise the effects of those 
detected network unauthorised activities. This chapter proposes Fuzzy logic 
capabilities to initiate successful automated response actions. Fuzzy logic 
originally extended Boolean logic to handle truth-values between the extremes of 
completely true and completely false. Intelligent Agents that incorporate Fuzzy 
logic techniques have been proposed to handle this task with the ability to respond 
quickly and dynamically control the availability of allocated network resources. 
Applying Fuzzy intelligence into this kind of problem has not been previously 
explored. In today's high speed networks, it is important for network devices to be 
proactive in such a way that they are able to identify deviations in network traffic 
and automatically respond to those deviations in a real-time manner. This is to 
overcome any security problems linked with abnormal traffic before they result in 
any damage or degradation of network Quality of Service (QoS) provision. Real- 
time action allows minimising illegitimate traffic packets at an early stage. 
However, real-time detection and response mechanisms introduce additional 
overheads that may cause network performance degradation, especially when the 
network is under heavy use. Therefore, it is necessary to determine optimal 
policies in order to achieve real-time detection and response. This chapter 
investigates Fuzzy intelligent approach incorporated with an uncomplicated 
mathematical-based model. This developed model has been given a name "N Flip- 
Fly" that leads to achieving self-healing secured switched networks. 
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8.1- The Problem 
Learning detection techniques are considered to be useful tools in providing 
solutions to the current limitations of NIDSs and network systems. However, 
these techniques do not offer the ultimate solution to those limitations. Therefore, 
an effective automated response mechanism to those detected abnormal activities 
is required to minimise their effect and hence enhance NIDSs capabilities. It is 
important for network devices to be proactive and able to identify deviations in 
network traffic, consequently, respond to those deviations in a real-time manner. 
In order to achieve that, network devices need to be more intelligent. 
This chapter focuses on network multilayer switching, which is the technology 
that promises to increase the efficiency of network communications and solve the 
current Bandwidth problems as well as QoS provision from the point of view of 
security. A hybrid switching device [lantronix, 2003] is the latest improvement in 
internetworking technology that combines the packet handling of routers and the 
speed of switching and hence called routing switches. These switches have 
optimised hardware, which makes them able to pass data as fast as layer two 
switches. Besides MAC layer routing, multilayer switches provide routing 
functionality such as multicast and broadcast containment, some Virtual LAN 
(VLAN) services, packet filtering and firewalling. 
Following is some of the Denial of Service (DoS) security problems that are 
associated with current network multilayer switching [Vir, 2000] [lantronix, 2003]. 
"A problem may occur when packets need to be delivered to two different 
destination ports. If in the input queue, a packet B is waiting behind A 
whose output buffer is full and destination port is extremely busy, B may 
have to wait even though its destination port is free. 
" Non-blocking switch architecture has been proposed to overcome that 
problem by for example, having packets forwarded from ports 1 to 4 can 
not block the forwarding of another packet from port 2 to 3. However, this 
is not a permanent solution as traffic from port 2 to 4 and 1 to 3 is still 
blocked. 
" Non-blocking architecture proposes switches with buffer that can absorb 
any temporary bust of traffic. While buffers are needed, they can increase 
the delay in the switch. That is not good as one of the reasons for 
improving to switches is low delays. 
" Another problem can be overloading of the destination port. If more traffic 
is directed to a destination port than it can handle, it is going to buffer that. 
Since buffers are only for temporary bursts, sustained excessive traffic 
could cause collisions and lead to packets loss and the chances of collision 
increase if the destination trunk is slow. 
" Multilayer routing switches incorporating routers features such as 
recalculating the checksum, and rewriting the MAC header of every packet. 
The price paid for this type of intelligent forwarding and filtering is 
usually calculated in terms of latency, or the delay that a packet 
experiences inside the switch. Packet processing delays, switch buffer 
limitations, and the retransmissions that can result slows multilayer switch 
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performance. Therefore, network response times (the user-visible part of 
network performance) suffers as the load on the network increases, and 
under heavy loads, small increases in user traffic often results in 
significant decreases in performance. Regardless the speed of network 
links and switching throughput, increasing loads (multimedia demanding 
applications) results in increasing throughput up to a point, then further 
increases in demand results in rapid deterioration of true throughput. 
The QoS aware switched network is configured to give better service to 
mission-critical, and delay-sensitive applications. DoS attacks, which have 
been proven to work against IP can be deployed within a QoS enabled 
environment. However, other new aspects of concern will be raised with 
respect to the features introduced by QoS provision techniques such as 
Random Early Detection (RED), which implements Differentiated 
Services (Diff-Serv) QoS. DoS problems would enable attackers to 
remove availability of resources from providing the QoS that was offered, 
such as BW consumption. QoS could be degraded to a noticeably poor 
level, such as higher packets drop rate, longer delays, bigger jitter and so 
on. This could lead to completely destroying resource availability and 
consequently severe DoS problems. 
Therefore, protection measures need to be considered for any network technology 
that plans to support QoS. Northcutt [1999] stated that "The interesting advances 
come by doing limited intrusion detection as a software process in the router or 
switch. This is a desperately needed future trend. One advantage of this is that we 
finally achieve real-time, or wire, speed. In all other solutions, we detect the 
intrusion right after the packet has flown by. In this case, we can literally stop it or 
divert it to a honey pot". Multilayer switching is not well designed to withstand 
DoS problems, due to the lack of early intelligent detection and response 
techniques for DoS. 
In this chapter Agents with fuzzy intelligence have been designed and embedded 
within a modelled network switch to detect and respond to an overwhelming 
incoming traffic that consumes a switch resources. Some of intelligent NIDSs 
functionality is proposed to be handled by network switches. This is to overcome 
some of the security problems linked with abnormal traffic passing through 
switches before they result in any damage or degradation of network QoS 
provision. This real-time action allows minimising illegitimate traffic packets at 
an early stage. However, real-time detection and response mechanisms could 
introduce additional overheads that may cause network performance degradation, 
especially when the network is under heavy use. Therefore, it is necessary to 
determine optimal policies in order to achieve real-time detection and response in 
switched networks. This chapter proposes Agents with Fuzzy intelligence 
capabilities to initiate successful automated response actions. Fuzzy intelligent 
Agents are proposed to handle this task with the ability to respond quickly and 
dynamically control the availability of allocated network resources. 
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8.2- Intelligent Agents Approach to Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy logic and fuzzy-based systems [Knapik et al, 1998] are mathematically 
based systems that enable computers to deal with imprecise, ambiguous, or 
uncertain information and situations, i. e. the real world. Fuzzy logic originally 
extended Boolean logic to handle truth-values between the extremes of 
completely true and completely false. Contrary to Fuzzy logic [Hopgood, 2001], 
rule-based systems assume that we live in a clear-cut world, where every 
hypothesis is true, false, or unknown. It also assumes that many systems make use 
of the closed-world assumption, where by any hypothesis that is unknown is 
assumed to be false, while this model of reality is useful in many applications, real 
reasoning process are rarely so clear-cut, such as network security. Zadeh [Cox, 
1999], the founder of fuzzy logic concept in 1965, proposed this concept to help 
computers reason with uncertain and ambiguous information. He stated: 
"Traditional methods of systems analysis are unsuited for dealing 
with systems in which relations between variables do not lend themselves 
to representation in terms of differential or difference equations. Such 
systems are the norm in biology, sociology, economics, and, more 
generally, in fields in which the systems are humanistic rather than 
mechanistic in nature. The methodology of fuzzy if-then rules serves to 
increase the machine intelligence quotient (MIQ) and lower the cost of 
products by making it possible to program their behaviour in the language 
of fuzzy rules, and thus lessen the need for precision in data gathering and 
data manipulation. In this context, the use of linguistic variables and fuzzy 
rules may be viewed as a form of data compression. It is certain to have a 
wide-ranging impact by showing how fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic can 
be employed to exploit the tolerance for imprecision, and how they make it 
possible to address problems that lie beyond the reach for traditional 
methods. " 
Generally, in information networks security, we are dealing with imprecise and 
uncertain information such as the event sequences produced in system logs used 
by IDSs. The problem becomes more complicated when it comes to detecting 
suspicious or unauthorized activities such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attacks. This uncertainty led to the weakness of traditional IDSs by either their 
inability sometimes to detect and analyse this sort of attacks or produce what is 
known by false positives. Because network hackers' behaviour is not crisp, except 
in some trivial domains or contexts, it is a tedious and potentially error-prone 
process to analyse a human's expertise, and keep computer systems deal with 
using traditional methods and logic. This is especially true when the logic is full 
of unpredicted expectations. 
Enhancing Agents with fuzzy reasoning capabilities can give them the ability to 
exist within domains where knowledge may not be quite as crisp as we are used to 
dealing with in traditional computing approaches. Since Agents will exist in the 
real world, therefore equipping them with fuzzy capabilities would improve their 
ability to cope with imprecise systems' events and users with uncertain behaviour. 
Fuzzy-logic [Jang, et al., 1997] provides suitable searching capabilities to retrieve 
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certain patterns in uncertain environment. This feature would help in searching 
and identifying suspicious network traffic or processes that are semantically 
related to particular DoS patterns. Because the matches are members related to the 
target by their percentage of "belonging" to a fuzzy set representing the target 
pattern, the presentation of the detection results can include some indication of 
how closely they are related to the target pattern. 
8.3- Modelling Intelligent Fuzzy Agents 
Figure 8.1 shows a high level Agents-based Network Intrusion Detection System 
(NIDS). The Agents-based NIDS could also be part of or embedded in a network 
device, such as a routing switch. The Agents use both the incoming and outgoing 
traffic information within the network. It would be appropriate to represent the 
Agent behaviour by fuzzy IF/THEN rules, at a suitable level of precision. In this 
case, the designer has to manually derive the IF/THEN rules from a dataset or 
studying network traffic behaviour, which requires a major effort. However, the 
main features of fuzzy logic [Altrock, 1995] are that it efficiently represents the 
environment knowledge, and it is easy to verify and optimize. 
Agents-based 
NIDS 
Network Services 8 
Incoming Resources 
JOutgoing 
Trafc Traffic 
Figure 8.1: Agents-based NIDS in a relation with a network incoming and 
outgoing traffic 
Unlike classical set theory [Jang, et at., 1997] where one deals with objects whose 
membership to a set can be clearly described, in fuzzy set theory membership of 
an element to a set can be partial, i. e., an element belongs to a set with a certain 
grade (Possibility) of membership. The key differences between fuzzy and crisp 
sets are that [Hopgood, 2001]: 
" An element has a degree of membership (0-1) of a fuzzy set. 
" Membership of one fuzzy set does not preclude membership of another. 
The limitations of the classical set come from the point of not being reflective to 
the natural human concepts and thoughts, which tend to be abstract and imprecise. 
The flaw in classical sets comes from the sharp transition between inclusion and 
exclusion in a set. More formally a fuzzy set A in a universe of discourse U is 
characterized by a membership function p4 :U -- [0,1] , which associates each 
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element x of Ua number , u,, (x) in the interval [0,1] which represents the grade of 
membership of x in the fuzzy set A. Therefore, the definition of a fuzzy set is a 
simple extension of the definition of a classical set in which the characteristic 
function is permitted to have any values between 0 and 1. For example, the fuzzy 
term Bandwidth (BW) consumption might be defined by the fuzzy set as shown in 
Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1: Fuzzy Term LowBW 
Bandwidth 
consumption 
Grade of 
Membership 
525 % 1.0 
30% 0.8 
35% 0.6 
40% 0.4 
45% 0.2 
50% 0.0 
If the BW consumption (X), which is the universe of discourse represents a 
collection of objects denoted generically by x, then a fuzzy set such as LowBW in 
X is defined as a set of ordered pairs: LowBW ={(XOJULo, Bw(x))Ixe X), where 
PLOWBW (x) is called the membership function (or MF) for the fuzzy set LowBW, 
The MF maps each element of X to a membership grade between 0 and 1. So 
PLowBW (25 %) = 1, , uLOWBW (30 %) = 0.8 and so on. The Grade of membership 
values constitutes a possibility distribution of the term LowBW. 
The table 8.1 can also be shown graphically, as shown in figure 8.2. 
1.0 
I LowBW 
0.0' 1- BW 25 50 
consumption (°h) 
Figure 8.2: Possibility distribution of LowBW 
Each linguistic (fuzzy) variable has an associated fuzzy term set that is the set of 
values that the fuzzy variable may take. For example, the fuzzy variable BW 
consumption might have the primary term set (Low, Medium, High), where each 
primary term represents a specific fuzzy set. 
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8.3.1- Fuzzy Modelling of an Automated Responsiveness 
The concept of Denial of Service (DoS) event could be modelled around the 
variable DoS. The values of the variable DoS can be high (the network suffers low 
throughput due to excessive BW consumption), or low. Across this range of 
values, we can view particular ranges as representing various ideas about the 
network DoS attacks. We might slice up this range in such sections as Big 
Resource Loss [BRL], Medium Resource Loss [MRL], and Small Resource Loss 
[SRL]. Figure 8.3 illustrates how DoS is decomposed into a set of fuzzy regions. 
DoS 
ISRLI 1MRLj IBRLI 
U 1 
6 
I 
0 
%50 (BW Consumption) 
Figure 8.3: Term set decomposition of the DoS variable 
These fuzzy regions are not crisply defined however, as the value of network 
throughput moves up or down; we feel it is more or less compatible with one 
concept rather than one of the neighbouring concepts. For example, as you move 
deeper and deeper into the BRL region, the compatibility of the value with MRL 
begins to decline, and the compatibility with the idea of BRL begins to increase. 
Each of these semantic partitions becomes a fuzzy set associated with the variable 
DoS. 
Let us consider that we are given the imprecise statement. The chance of DoS 
attack to take place is high. If DoSh is the fuzzy set of high (severe) DoS attack, 
then we might define the membership function uDoSh in terms of BW 
consumption such that: 
f[DoSr, (100%) = 1.0 f1DoSh (50%) = 0.3 
f1DoSh (90%) = 1.0 uDoSh (40%) = 0.1 
, uDoSh 
(70%) = 0.7 uDoSh (30%) = 0.0 
f lDoSh (60%) = 0.5 /LDoSh (20%) = 0.0 
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These values correspond with the reasonably linear membership function as 
shown in figure 8.4 (a). 
1w 
DoS Medium DoS H DoS 
ý 
as 
ý 
ý 
c,, 
ý 
0 10 30 50 70 90 100 0 10 30 50 70 90 100 
Bandwidth Consumption (%) Routing Allocated Resources (%) 
Figure 8.4 (a): Fuzzy representation Figure 8.4 (b): Fuzzy representation of 
of DoS attack in terms of BW response action in terms of Routing 
consumption Allocated Resources or Buffer 
(RAB) 
Thus the Bandwidth consumption of 25%, which represents a possibility of DoS 
attack may have some (non-zero) degree of membership to both fuzzy sets 
medium and low, see figure 8.4 (a). This is represented by the overlap between the 
fuzzy sets. The sum of the membership functions for a given value can be 
arranged to equal 1, but this is not a necessary requirement. The statement "The 
chance of DoS attack to take place is high" is an example of a fuzzy statement 
involving a fuzzy set (high routing switch DoS) and a fuzzy set variable (BW 
consumption) or (allocated buffer). A fuzzy variable is one that can take any value 
from a global set (e. g., the set of all BW range or allocated buffer size), where 
each value can have a degree of membership of a fuzzy set (e. g., high DoS) 
associated with it. 
Generally, we cannot give an absolute number for Bandwidth to represent a DoS 
attack. However, we might say that a BW consumption of greater than 90% would 
be regarded as a sign of high DoS case. This does not mean that we would 
eliminate 85% of BW consumption. Also, BW consumption alone is not the only 
indicator for DoS. Anyway 85% is not a bad DoS picture. We can only look for 
90% as the point where we would say that the network is highly DoS attacked. 
Networks with lower BW consumption might still be of interest but to a lesser 
degree. As BW consumption increases, the compatibility of the network with the 
criterion for highly DoS attacked steadily increases. The BW consumption range 
of 70-90 is still important. There is not any particular point where we would say 
this is a definite "no" and the next case is a definite "yes" except may be down 
there at the bottom end, may be just a little above 90%. 
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8.3.2- Defining Fuzzy Rules 
If a variable [Hopgood, 2001 ] is set to a value by crisp rules, its value will change 
in steps as different rules fire. The only way to smooth those steps would be to 
have a large number of rules. However, only a small number of fuzzy rules are 
required to produce smooth changes in the outputs as the input values alter. The 
number of fuzzy rules required is dependent on the number of variables, the 
number of fuzzy sets, and the way in which the variables are combined in the 
fuzzy rule condition. Now let us consider the following fuzzy rule base: 
Rule #1 
" IF BW_CONSUMPTION is Low THEN 
ALLOCATED BUFFER RESOURCES is Low 
Rule #2 
" IF BW_CONSUMPTION is Medium THEN 
ALLOCATED BUFFER RESOURCES is Medium 
Rule #3 
" IF BW CONSUMPTION is High THEN 
ALLOCATED BUFFER RESOURCES is High 
Suppose the measured BW consumption is 85%, see figure 8.4 (a). As this is a 
member of both fuzzy sets High and Medium, Rules #2 and 3 will both fire. The 
Routing Allocated Buffer (RAB), we conclude, will be somewhat high and 
somewhat medium, see figure 8.4 (b). Figure 8.4 (a) shows the possibility that the 
BW consumption DoS is high, uDoSh, is about 0.85 and the possibility that BW 
consumption DoS is medium , uDoS 
is about 0.15. As a result of firing the rules, 
the possibilities that the Routing Allocated Buffer (RAB) is high and medium, 
LLRABh and /CRAB, , are set as follows: UtRABh = max[uDoSh, JLRABh ]& pRABm 
= max[pDoSm , ARAB. J. The initial possibility values 
for RAB are assumed to be 
zero if these are the first rules to fire, and thus pRAB,, and pRABm become 0.85 
and 0.15, respectively. These values can be passed on to other rules that might 
have RAB as high or RAB as medium in their condition clauses. 
8.3.3- The Defuzzification Process 
Deffuzification is particularly important when the fuzzy variable is a control 
action such as "set RAB", where a specific setting is required. The first step in 
defuzzification is to adjust the fuzzy set in accordance with the calculated 
possibilities. A commonly used method is Larsen's product operation rules [Lee, 
1990], in which the membership functions are multiplied by their respective 
possibility values. The effect is to compress the fuzzy sets so that the peaks equal 
the calculated possibility values, as shown in figure 8.5. The second step for 
defuzzification is finding the centroid, sometimes called the centre of gravity, 
centre of mass, or centre of area method. The deffuzzified value is taken as the 
point along the fuzzy variable axis that is the centriod, or balance point, of all the 
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scaled membership functions taken together for that variable. The deffuzzified 
value is the balance point along the fuzzy variable axis of this composite shape. 
When two membership functions overlap, both overlapping regions contribute to 
the mass of the composite shape. If there are N membership functions with 
centroids c; and areas a; then the combined centroid C, i. e., the defuzzified value 
is [Hopgood, 2001]: 
NN 
ac, a, 8.1 
i=1 f=1 
DoS Medium DoS High DoS 
/ý 
--------------- 
Medium High 
-------------------------- 
0 10 30 50 70 80 90 100 
Bandwidth Consumption (%) 
0 10 30 50 70 90 100 
Routing Allocated Buffer (%) 
Figure 8.5: Membership functions from fuzzy rules. Membership functions 
for RAB are derived from Rules #1 and 2, for a BW consumption of 85% 
When the fuzzy sets are compressed using Larsen's product operation rule, the 
values of ci are unchanged from the centroid of the uncompressed shapes, C;, and 
a; is simply A A. Al is the area of the membership function prior to compression. 
For isosceles triangles C, is the midpoint along the base, and for right angle 
triangles Ci is approximately 29% of base length from the upright [Hopgood, 
2001]. Therefore, 85% BW consumption would result in Routing Allocated 
Buffer (RAB) to be adjusted by the switch's Fuzzy Agent to 58.1%, as shown in 
Figure 8.6. 
1 Overlapping area 
=, makes a double 
ry contribution to the 
'mass' 
i. + 
0 10 30 50 70 90 100 
Routing Allocated Buffer (%) 
Balance point (C) = 58.1% using 6.1 
Figure 8.6: The defuzzification process using bounded range 
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The features for incorporating fuzzy logic into Agents would give them some 
semblance of those qualities that are considered intelligent and are manifold, as 
we shall see in the next sections. From the foregoing discussion we can see that 
Intelligent Agents [Murch and Johnson, 1999] incorporating fuzzy logic 
capabilities would be well suited to environments where they need to maintain 
autonomy in the face of conditions that would break more rigidly coded solutions 
with precise logical constructs. 
8.4- Modelling Fuzzy Agents- based Intelligent Switched Networks 
This section proposes Intelligent Switch Fuzzy Agents (ISFAs) models to 
overcome some of the limitations that are associated with current NIDSs as well 
as multilayer network switching. ISFAs are Agents that incorporate a fuzzy 
intelligence that is designed to respond to Denial of Service (DoS) events, such as 
an overwhelming useless traffic directed to a particular switched network. 
Currently network switches vary in their physical design. At the centre of a switch 
is a type of switching element which controls the ports to which each packet is 
forwarded. Packet-based switches use two main methods for routing traffic 
[lantronix, 2003] [Tyson, 2003]: 
" Store-and-forward: The switch saves the entire packet to the buffer and 
analyses it for errors or other problems before forwarding it to its 
destination. If the packet has an error, it is discarded. Otherwise, the 
switch looks up the destination address and sends the packet on to the 
destination node. 
" Cut-through: These switches examine the destination address as soon as a 
packet is detected by the switch before forwarding it to its destination, 
even as the rest of the packet is coming into the switch. Many switches 
combine the two methods, using cut-through until a certain error level is 
reached and then changing over to store-and-forward. Cut-through method 
provides no error correction. 
The three most popular configurations of switching elements in use are [lantronix, 
2003] [Tyson, 2003]: 
Shared memory: This type of switch stores all incoming packets in a 
common memory buffer shared by all the switch ports (input/output 
connections), then sends them out through the correct port to their 
destinations. 
Bus architecture: uses an internal transmission path (common bus) that is 
shared by all of the ports using TDMA. These switches have a dedicated 
memory buffer for each port, as well as a process to control the internal 
bus access. 
Matrix: This type of switch has an internal grid with the input ports and 
the output ports crossing each other. When a packet is detected on an input 
port, the destination address is compared to the lookup table to find the 
appropriate output port. The switch then makes a connection on the grid 
where these two ports intersect. 
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8.4.1- Transport level of Fuzzy Agency 
In order to overcome transport level problems such as TCP SYN, ISFA could 
respond to TCP SYN flood events by performing several processing steps on 
every TCP packet received at the switch. The problem here [Scambray et al. 2001 ] 
[ Criscuolo, 2000] is that most systems allocate a finite number of buffering 
resources and adds an entry to the connection queue when setting up a potential 
connections or connection that has not been fully established. Since the SYN 
ACK is destined for an unavailable host in the TCP SYN attack, the last part of 
the "three-way handshake" is never completed, the resource allocated is useless 
and entry remains in the connection queue until a timer expires, typically for 
about one minute. While most systems can sustain hundreds of concurrent 
connections to a specific port (for example, 80), it may only take a dozen or so 
potential connection requests to exhaust all resources allocated to setting up the 
connection. This can lead to filling up the connection queue and deny TCP 
services. Current network operating systems allow users to setup the number of 
TCP concurrent connections as well as their expiring time. 
When a concurrent server [Stevens, 1994] invokes a new process to handle each 
client, the listening server should always be ready to handle the next incoming 
connection request. That is the underlying reason for using concurrent servers. But 
there is still a chance that multiple connection requests arrive while the listening 
server is creating a new process or is busy running other higher priority processes. 
Each listening end point has a fixed length queue of connections that have been 
accepted by TCP (i. e., the three-way handshake is complete), but not yet accepted 
by the application. The application specifies a limit to this queue, commonly 
called the backlog. This backlog is between 0 and 5, inclusive (Berkeley-derived 
TCP implementation). However, current network operating systems allow users to 
set up the backlog. When a connection request arrives (i. e., the TCP SYN 
segment), an algorithm is applied by TCP to the current number of connections 
already queued for this listening end point, to see whether to accept the 
connection or not. The backlog is expected to specify the value by the application 
to be the maximum number of queued connections allowed for this end point. 
Considering [Stevens, 1994] that the backlog value specifies only the maximum 
number of queued connections for one listening end point. These connections 
have already been accepted by TCP and are waiting to be accepted by the 
application. This backlog has no affect whatsoever on the maximum number of 
established connections allowed by the system or on the number of clients that a 
concurrent server can handle concurrently. If there is room on this listening end 
point's queue for this new connection, the TCP module ACKs the SYN and 
completes the connection. The server application with the listening end point will 
not see this new connection until the third segment of the three-way handshake is 
received. 
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As the TCP SYN flooding [Schuba et al. 1998] [Leiwo and Zheng, 1997] 
initialises many connections to the victim server without completing the TCP 
handshake process and hence the allocated resources are not effectively used. In 
order to overcome this problem each received TCP SYN packet by the switch is 
dealt with by the ISFA, as shown in figure 8.7. 
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Figure 8.7: The Fuzzy Agent (ISFA) generates TCP control packets in 
response to different conditions to block resources consumption by TCP 
SYN flooding attacks 
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A sample fuzzy rule situation for preventing deliberate buffer starvation is 
expressed by the phrase: 
" IF Server Rxed-TCP-SYN packets is High 
AND TCP-ACK-DELAY is High 
THEN AllocatedBuffer is High 
Once the ISFA receives the TCP SYN+ACK packet from the victim server, it 
generates TCP ACK packet to complete the connection. Any duplicated ACK 
packet received later on will be discarded by the server. This is according to 
TCP/IP protocol implementation, as shown in CASE ONE in figure 8.7. However, 
if the TCP ACK packet is delayed, the expiry timer triggers the ISFA to generate 
a TCP RST packet, the connection is moved to the CLOSED state and the 
allocated resources by the server are released. Each TCP connection is allocated 
resources according to the previously defined fuzzy rule. This will stop the server 
from exceeding the resource limits. The ISFA will take a decision based on the 
TCP state machine to determine the correct state actions for each TCP connection. 
This is to avoid the current TCP protocol modifications, and simultaneously will 
block exceeding the resources limits. 
The Fuzzy buffer allocation is a2*1 (a "two-by-one") process. That means there 
are two input variables and one solution variable. It is often convenient to think of 
such a process as a matrix of actions in an M*N array. The Fuzzy states of one 
input variable form the horizontal axis, and the Fuzzy states of the other input 
variable form the vertical axis. At the intersection of a row and column is the 
Fuzzy state of the solution variable. This form of representation, very common in 
control engineering field, is called a Fuzzy Associate Memory, or FAM. Figure 
8.8 shows the Fuzzy Association Memory (FAM) for the buffer allocation 
controller implemented by the ISFA, which includes all nine required rules. 
Rxed-TCP-SYN ii 
> L ow Medium High CK TCP 
DE 
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Medium Low Medium High 
High Medium Medium High 
Figure 8.8: The FAM for the buffer allocation controller to overcome TCP 
SYN harmful events 
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8.4.2- Network level of Fuzzy Agency 
When ISFA receives a useless damaging type of traffic, it follows particular fuzzy 
rules defined to overcome a modelled switch buffer overloading. ISFA would 
detect and automatically respond to any received overwhelming traffic that is for 
example in the form of an increased number of ICMP_ECHOREPLY traffic. 
Attackers tend to send IP broadcast ICMP_ECHOREQUEST packets with 
spoofed source IP addresses to any particular unsecured network or a number of 
networks in the Internet. These networks would be used for amplifying traffic 
toward the victim network. The hosts at the amplifying network respond to the 
broadcast by replying with ICMP_ECHOREPLY packets towards the victim 
network. 
Threats that may lead to Denial of Service (DoS) [Millen, ]992] can be divided 
into those through resource allocation and those through resource destruction. 
However, once the ISFA receives this type of traffic, it is supposed to follow the 
rules identified to overcome this problem and smoothly avoid any deliberate 
excessive BW consumption and traffic congestion, as shown in figure 8.9. Any 
received ICMP_ECHOREPLY that does not correspond to any legitimate internal 
network ICMP_ECHOREQUEST would be discarded by ISFA. 
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A sample fuzzy rule situation is expressed by the phrase: 
" IF the Router Spoofed Rxed-ICMP-ECHOREPLY packets is High 
AND Txed-ICMP-ECHOREQUEST is Low 
THEN AllocatedBuffer is Low 
Figure 8.10 shows the Fuzzy Association Memory (FAM) for the buffer allocation 
controller implemented by the ISFA, which includes all nine required rules. 
Spoofed Rxed- 
Txed- ICMP-ECHO Low Medium High 
ICMP- REPLY 
ECHOREQ 
Low Low Low Low 
Medium Medium Medium Medium 
High High High High 
Figure 8.10: The FAM for the buffer allocation controller to overcome Smurf 
DoS attack 
The ISFA (Intelligent Switch Fuzzy Agent) would only allow controlled incoming 
ICMP-ECHOREQUEST packets from within an organisation's Intranet with 
friendly known source IP addresses and within the limits specified in the fuzzy 
rules. ISFA would represent a network intrusion detection sensor, in which 
specific threats are being sought. Reducing the number of items a NIDS is looking 
for will increase its performance [Intrusion. com, 2001]. In this case we can 
prevent the internal network resources from being particularly overloaded by a 
DoS event that would consume its BW. The ISFA might not need to update a 
switch to block source addresses of those ICMP_ECHORELY packets, unless it 
makes sure that they do not belong to the internal network or other legitimate 
network addresses. In order to improve the controlling process of buffer 
management, an extra knowledge about the type of traffic will be required for the 
switch is likely to receive. The knowledge base is enriched with the traffic 
characteristics for better decisions making via logical reasoning based on the 
pattern matching and symbolic manipulation. 
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8.5- Model Design and Simulation Scenarios 
The model design of the Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) for an Intelligent Switch 
Fuzzy Agent (ISFA) is based on a known behaviour of a modelled network 
matrix-type 4*4 switch, which is adapted from Mathworks [The Mathworks, 
2002]. The modelled switch accepts a traffic that is generated using other network 
nodes or LANs. These networks are modeled using packet generators. In normal 
circumstances the packets that are received by the switch are passed to their 
designated destinations as shown in figure 8.11 (a). The upper 4 scope diagrams 
represent the packets traffic passes through the 4 input ports of the modeled 
switch. The lower 4 scope diagrams represent the packets traffic forwarded to its 
destinations (i. e. the 4 output ports). However, when the switch is subjected to a 
simulated DoS attack in the form of an overwhelming heavy traffic that consumes 
the 1S` port BW, the port that carries heavy traffic would dominate the switch by 
denying the other input ports from being served by the switch, as shown in figure 
8.11 (b). 
I =PME laffmilliffn 
Figure 8.11 (a): All incoming traffic Figure 8.11 (b): The incoming traffic 
has been forwarded to its from ports 2,3, and 4 is blocked due 
destinations to the overwhelming traffic at port 1 
The switch model accepts incoming packets from whatever link that triggers any 
of its input ports. Therefore, it does not really reflect normal switching behaviour. 
However, the scenario of overloading one particular port with an overwhelming 
traffic that reduces the switch's performance could be generated using currently 
available DoS tools. 
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8.5.1- The Modelling environment 
MATLAB simulation environment is used to provide the Fuzzy intelligence 
behaviour and packets traffic generation using Fuzzy logic and Communications 
toolboxes. MATLAB provides a powerful computing environment for automatic 
control systems design, signal processing, modelling, analysis, and algorithm 
development. Its accurate numeric computation and built-in visualisation make it 
a useful tool to work with complex systems and data arrays. The MATLAB Fuzzy 
Logic and Communications Toolboxes offer specialised functions and interface 
tools that speed up the solution of application-specific problems. SIMULINK 
adds an intuitive block-diagram tool to the MATLAB environment for interactive 
simulation of non-linear dynamic behaviours, such as network resources 
allocation. With Real-Time Workshop, it is possible to generate portable code 
from SIMULINK block diagrams for rapid prototyping and implementation of 
real-time systems, such as data networks. The Fuzzy Logic Toolbox draws upon 
these capabilities to provide a powerful tool for fuzzy system design, analysis, and 
simulation. The following sections describe the use of the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox to 
design the ISFAs and simulate resources allocation and availability problems 
resulted from network and transport layers directed Denial of Service (DoS) 
activities. The experimental work is based on a Fuzzy Agent model built on top of 
the modelled matrix-type switch that is tested against simulated DoS events. 
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8.5.2- The Developed Model 
As the switch's performance is reduced when one of its ports is subjected to a fast 
heavy traffic load, the inter-arrival time of the received packets has been chosen 
as an input variable to a fuzzy model. This input parameter would be evaluated by 
the ISFA in such away that when the inter-arrival time between any incoming 
successive input packets reaches a predefined threshold value that allows traffic 
from one particular port to dominate the switch resources, the ISFA discards those 
packets that facilitate these characteristics. As the input-output data of the switch 
became available, a mathematical model is developed for fuzzy inference, as 
shown in figure 8,12. The inversion and integration part of the model is given a 
name "N Flip-Fly". As the name implies, it inverts the incoming traffic packets 
and integrates the inter-frame gap of every last adjacent incoming packets 
accessing a particular port of the modeled network switch. 
>t2$ <t=s 
Packst 3 Packet2 Ij PacketI 
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Inversion 
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Figure 8.12: A developed mathematical model for measuring incoming 
packets inter-arrival time 
Therefore, the developed Intelligent Switch Fuzzy Agent (ISFA) has been 
designed to detect overwhelming traffic and respond to it by controlling its 
incoming rate in such away that a traffic coming from one particular port does not 
dominate the switch's resources. The ISFA has been located at the input of each 
port of the switch. Figure 8.13 shows the detailed design of the ISFA, which 
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includes the inversion process, the integrator, and the fuzzy controller. The Outl 
test point in figure 8.13 represents the inverted input traffic that normally passes 
through port I of the switch. Out2 is an integrator output, which gives an 
indication for the inter-arrival time of the incoming packets that fed to the Fuzzy 
Inference System (FIS). Out3 is the FIS output, which represents the control 
decision making process. Finally, Out4 depicts the released packets that constitute 
a harmless behaviour to the switch. This allows the other input ports to resume 
their incoming traffic to pass the switch, and being forwarded to their designated 
destinations, as previously shown in figure 8.11 (a). 
C. 4A 
Figure 8.13: The detailed structure of the ISFA model 
Let us consider modelling the concept of the Smurf DoS event around the variable 
spoofed Rxed-ICMP-ECHOREPLY packets that are discussed in the previous 
section. The values of this variable view the speed of such packets received by the 
switch from outside the internal network. The second variable defined is the Txed- 
ICMP-ECHOREQUEST packets, which represents the legitimate outgoing ICMP 
ECHOREQUEST packets from within the internal network. This variable has 
been chosen in order to compare it with any incoming ICMP-ECHOREPLY 
packets including the previous attacking packets (i. e., Spoofed Rxed-ICMP- 
ECHOREPLY) traffic. This is to ensure only the legitimate either Txed ICMP- 
ECHOREQUEST or Rxed ICMP-ECHOREPIY packets are allocated at the buffer 
queue within the switch. The allocated buffer represents the consequent variable 
of the defined fuzzy rules. The defuzzification process adjusts the fuzzy sets of the 
buffer queue variable in accordance with the calculated possibilities resulted from 
the antecedent variables. The deffuzified value or balance point would represent 
the allocated buffer queue at the switch. 
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The rule structure of the ISFA's Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) makes it easy to 
incorporate the expertise gained about the switch directly to the modelling process. 
Consequently, a high level possibility distribution for deliberate BW consumption 
has been identified, as indicated in figure 8.14. figure 8.15 shows the actual input 
variable possibility distribution, which is the inter-arrival rate. 
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Figure 8.14: A high level possibility distribution for BW consumption 
Figure 8.15: The actual measured possibility distribution for the input 
variable "TrafficRate" 
Observation 9: Figure 8.16 indicates the signals that depict different test points 
of the ISFA model behaviour. The output test points have already been identified 
earlier in figure 8.13. The ISFA's ability to control the resources allocated for 
routing network traffic, as shown in figure 8.16, indicates that the allocated 
resources are manageable. The higher rate of incoming spoofed 
ICMP_ECHOREPLY packets traffic coming towards the internal network could 
not disallow the ISFA to effectively prevent the switch's buffering resources and 
network BW from being overloaded. The ISFA managed to drop all of the 
spoofed received ICMP_ECHOREPLY packets allowing most of the resources 
allocated for legitimate network traffic. The harmless traffic that is allowed to 
pass through the switch is depicted in Out4 of figure 8.16. The ISFA continues to 
monitor and manage the buffer allocation so that it ensures enough storage space 
for legitimate users, traffic. 
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Figure 8.16: The signal outputs at different stages of ISFA 
Observation 10: Unlike Random Early Detection (RED) [Rossides et al. 2000], 
which is used for Differentiated Services (Diff-Serv) QoS provision to set some 
minimum and maximum dropping thresholds for each class, the ISFA uses 
dynamic traffic state dependent thresholds. In RED, when the buffer queue size 
exceeds the minimum threshold, it starts dropping randomly packets based on 
probability which depends on queue length. If the buffer queue size exceeds the 
max threshold then every packet is dropped, i. e. drop probability is set to 1. The 
problem with this approach is that when it starts dropping packets, it does not 
differentiate between normal and abnormal ones. This is what makes RED 
vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) activities. The ISFAs drop packets based on 
the actual traffic rate of change (inter-arrival rate of packets) i. e. only packets that 
pose threat to the switch are dropped before put in the queues. This would 
minimise the legitimate packets queuing and latency problems and hence increase 
the throughput of the switch. 
Observation 11: The ISFAs offer better ability to linguistically describe the 
switching dynamics, so to better tune the system according to our class of service 
policy. The dynamic way of calculating the drop possibility by the ISFAs comes 
from the fact that according to the traffic rate and the switching resources, a 
different set of fuzzy rules applies, and based on these rules the drop rate 
possibility is decided. Since the whole procedure is independent of the buffer 
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queue length, the problems of fixed packets dropping of the queue thresholds 
implemented by RED [Rossides et al. 2000] are avoided. Therefore ISFAs 
managed to provide better congestion control and better switch throughput and 
hence achieving self-healing switched network. 
Observation 12: The ISFA is capable of controlling the usage of the queue 
(backlog) resources allocated for TCP SYN segments in a similar way to the 
network level traffic, as shown in figure 8.16. The server application specifies the 
limit to this queue. A highly received TCP SYN packets traffic in conjunction 
with highly delayed corresponding TCP ACK packets still enables the ISFA to 
effectively prevent the server application queue from being unnecessarily filled. 
The ISFA controls the number of connections already queued for any particular 
listening point, to see whether to accept a new connection or not. This allowed 
most of the buffering resources to be only allocated for legitimate TCP handshake. 
Observation 13: Also, the ISFA is capable of reserving a reasonable amount of 
the buffer resources for higher received TCP SYN packets with a short delayed 
TCP ACK packets traffic, as shown in figure 8.16, allowing most of the resources 
allocated for legitimate TCP handshake. Notice that the amount of buffer reserved 
in this case does not differ to the previous case, this is because when ISFA 
allocates buffer for TCP packets it does not necessarily mean that this amount of 
allocated buffer has to be filled, and it is only reserved. The full amount of the 
buffer allocation will not be reached due to the reasons mentioned earlier. The 
results indicate that the developed model would establish the required real-time 
mechanisms, which are essential for any switched network protections. 
8.6- The Fuzzy Rules Knowledge Base 
When a variable [Jang, et al., 1997] [Hopgood, 2001] is set to a value by crisp 
rules, its value will change in steps as different rules fire. The only way to smooth 
those steps would be to have a large number of rules. However, fuzzy rules only 
require a small number of rules to produce smooth changes in the outputs as the 
input values alter. Fuzzy rules define variables and values linguistically and are 
considered to be an efficient tool for quantitative modelling of words or sentences 
in a natural or artificial language. The number of fuzzy rules required is usually 
dependent on the number of variables, the number of fuzzy sets, the way in which 
the variables are combined in the fuzzy rule condition and the nature of the 
problem. 
Observation 14: As the Intelligent Switch Fuzzy Agent (ISFA) is designed in 
such away that its Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) is used as a controller, only its 
output produces a crisp value. This output crisp value decides whether a particular 
packet has the right to pass through the switch or not. This is to ensure that there 
is no single link that could dominate the switching resources. The ISFA uses the 
Sugeno fuzzy model, which has a typical fuzzy rule IF x is A and y is B then z= 
f(x, y), when f is a constant, we then have a zero-order Sugeno fuzzy model, which 
can be viewed either as a special case of the Mamdani fuzzy inference system, 
which produces fuzzy outputs. 
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Observation 15: Since ISFA rules has a crisp output, the overall output is 
obtained via a weighted average, thus avoiding the time-consuming process of 
defuzzification required in a Mamdani model [Jang, et al., 1997]. The output of 
the ISFA's FIS represents a two class pattern recognition outcome for decision 
making. Figure 8.17 determines the fuzzy rules that have been identified based on 
the switch behaviour and incoming and outgoing traffic characteristics. It shows 
the state of the incoming traffic rate within the feature that dominates the switch 
(i. e., abnormal state), consequently, the fuzzy logic controller response would be 
at the packet discard state (Response = 0.15). 
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Figure 8.17: The fuzzy rules base 
Observation 16: The ISFA will not allow any buffer allocation for Spoofed- 
ICMP-ECHOREPLY packets. This will ensure buffer resources availability for 
legitimate network traffic and avoid deliberate BW consumption, despite the 
presence of ICMP DoS traffic within the router. Figure 8.16 indicates a smooth 
buffer allocation for TCP handshake connection establishment. The ISFA will 
only allow buffer allocation for legitimate received TCP/SYN packets. The ISFA 
generates TCP ACK for each TCP SYN packet to complete the connection. Any 
duplicated ACK packet received later on will be discarded. If a TCP ACK packet 
is delayed, the expiry timer triggers the ISFA to generate a TCP RST packet, the 
connection is moved to the CLOSED state and the buffer resources are released. 
This will ensure buffer resources availability for legitimate users and avoid 
deliberate buffer consumption. 
The Fuzzy Agents-based IDS is proposed to overcome the risks associated with 
the current NIDSs, which have traditionally focused only on detecting those 
attacks. Fuzzy Agents are considered to be a useful tool to provide intelligently 
automated response actions in a form of managing resources availability when a 
DoS takes a place, and provide a solution that can be implemented in a cost- 
effective manner without any TCP/IP protocol or hardware modifications. In order 
to use fuzzy modelling and design a FIS, we rely on our own knowledge 
(common sense, simple physical laws, and so on) of the target system, which is 
the switch and the traffic that passes through its resources in this case. Therefore, 
the main two limitation of fuzzy modelling are: 
lt relies on the information provided by human experts who must be 
familiar with the target system 
Sometime it relies on trial and error method 
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CHAPTER 8. FURTHER WORK 
Identifying and collecting the major useful data generated by system, network, 
protocol, and application activities is essential for analysing the security of 
network states and detecting signs of network violations and unexpected 
behaviour. 
8.7- Summary 
Most of current NIDSs are designed only to detect network attacks. As detection 
provides a significant role to secure networks, however, it does not solve the 
security problem completely. Therefore, automated response actions to those 
detected attacks are required to minimize the effects of the severe attacks, such as 
Denial of Service (DoS) events. Intelligent Switch Fuzzy Agents (ISFAs) have 
been proposed to overcome the problem of the overwhelming traffic that causes 
disruptions within network switching services. This approach is incorporated with 
a novel model named N Flip-Fly which enables Fuzzy Agents to deal with the 
problem in a real-time manner. N Flip-Fly is a valuable process. It is an 
uncomplicated mathematical-based model. This feature allows the model to 
behave fast enough without affecting non-blocking (i. e., normal) network traffic. 
The potential for using Fuzzy-based systems properly can be enormous. 
According to the simulation results, Fuzzy intelligent Agents are well suited to 
environments where they need to determine system parameters. Human expert 
knowledge for describing Fuzzy membership function for network states is 
required for the model, especially for an environment with a large amount of 
input/output states, such as switched networks. 
In conjunction with speedy blocking packets, there are other issues that could take 
place within network traffic packets, such as a specific pattern at the source and 
destination ports within the TCP/IP packets header, or particular protocol packets 
dominate the traffic, such as ICMP. These and other parameters need to be 
incorporated in the model in order to achieve an effective self-healing secured 
network. The dynamic way of calculating the drop rate by the ISFAs comes from 
the fact that based on the traffic rate and the switching resources, a different set of 
fuzzy rules applies. Based on these rules the drop rate possibility is decided. 
Unlike Random Early Detection (RED) [Rossiden et al. 2000], which is used for 
Differentiated Services (Diff-Serv) QoS provision to set some maximum dropping 
thresholds for each class, the ISFA uses dynamic traffic state dependent 
thresholds. The ISFAs drop packets based on the actual traffic rate of change 
(inter-arrival rate of packets) i. e. only packets that pose threat to the switch are 
dropped before put in the queues. Since the whole procedure is independent of 
the buffer queue length, the problems of fixed packets dropping of the queue 
thresholds implemented by RED are avoided. Therefore the developed ISFAs 
managed to provide better congestion control and better throughput for a switch 
under denial of service, hence, achieving self-healing network. The validation of 
the developed model is based on empirical evidence that is already characterized 
in the achieved results. 
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Appendix A: A sample of the MIT Lincoln Lab training dataset 
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Appendix B: A sample of a locally generated training dataset at 
C4MCR 
Frame Time SrcMACAddr DstMACAddr Protocol Description Src Other Addr Dst OtherAddr Type 
OtherAddr 
1 473.631048 LOCAL 00500403B53F SMB R transact OAK 143.167.251.168 
2 473.631048 LOCAL 00500403B53F NBT SS: Session Message, Len: 6144 OAK 143.167.251.168 
3 473.641062 00500403B53F LOCAL TCP . A...., len: 0, seq: 3418083244-3418083244, ack 143.167.251.168 OAK IP 
4 473.641062 00500403B53F LOCAL MSRPC c/o RPC Request: call OxDCC opnum 0x45 con 
143.167.251.168 OAK IP 
5 473.641062 LOCAL 00500403B53F MSRPC c/o RPC Response: call OxDCC context 0x0 hi 
OAK 143.167.251.168 
6 473.641062 00500403B53F LOCAL MSRPC c%o RPC Request: call OxDCD opnum 0x1A con 
143.167.251.168 OAK IP 
7 473.641062 LOCAL 00500403B53F MSRPC c%o RPC Response: call OxDCD context 0x0 hi 
OAK 143.167.251.168 
3400 1865.212043 3COM 4A3B46 LOCAL ICMP Echo: From 143.167.251.238 To 143.167.251.229 
143.167.251.238 OAK IP 
3401 1865.212043 LOCAL 3COM 4A3B46 ICMP Echo Reply: To 143.167.251.238 From 
143.167.251.2 OAK 143.167.251.238 
3402 1866.233512 3COM 4A3B46 LOCAL ICMP Echo: From 143.167.251.238 To 143.167.251.229 
143.167.251.238 OAK IP 
3403 1866.233512 LOCAL 3COM 4A3B46 ICMP Echo Reply: To 143.167.251.238 From 
143.167.251.2 OAK 143.167.251.238 
3404 1866.253540 3COM 6586D0 BROADCAST ARP_RARP ARP: Request, Target IP: 
143.167.251.136 
3405 1866.273569 0001024005DB BROADCAST NBT NS: Query req. for WORKGROUP <1B> 
143.167.251.136 143.167.251.255 
3406 1867.024649 0001024005DB BROADCAST NBT NS: Query req. for WORKGROUP <IB> 
143.167.251.136 143.167.251.255 
3407 1867.244966 3COM 4A3B46 LOCAL ICMP Echo: From 143.167.251.238 To 143.167.251.229 
143.167.251.238 OAK IP 
3408 1867.244966 LOCAL 3COM 4A3B46 ICMP Echo Reply: To 143.167.251.238 From 
143.167.251.2 OAK 143.167.251.238 
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Appendix C: List of network attacks contained within the 
dataset of MIT Lincoln Lab 
This Appendix describes the attacks used in dataset to train the developed Bayesian 
detection model. The first section is an overview of the attacks themselves. It describes 
the categories that are used to classify the attacks, and describes the various ways an 
attack could be run. The second section lists every attack in the dataset, it gives a 
detailed explanation of each attack [MIT Lincoln Lab] [Marchette, 2001] [Northcutt, 
1999] [Northcutt et al, 2001 ]. 
Overview 
This section describes the attacks and how they were run. It first defines the four classes 
of attacks and lists which attacks are in each class. 
Attack Classification 
An attacker who has access to a local account on a computer 
User To Root system is able to elevate their privileges by exploiting a bug in the operating system or a program that is installed on the 
system. 
An attacker who has the ability to send packets to a machine 
Remote To Local over a network (but who does not have an account on that 
machine), gains local access (either as a user or as root) to 
that machine. 
An attacker uses network services to collect information 
Probing/Surveillance about a host (such as what services it offers, or what users have accounts on the machine). Such information can often 
be useful in staging a later attack. 
Denial Of Service An attacker who has the ability to send packets traffic to a 
(DoS) particular machine or a network denies others access to the 
resources or services of that machine or network. 
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The following table breaks down all the exploit types by category and 
platform 
Classification Solarfis (BSM) SunOS Linux 
Eject 
User To Root Ir 
fbconfig 
Fdformat 
Ps 
Loadmodule Perl 
xterm 
Dictionary Dictionary Dictionary 
Ftp-write Ftp-write Ftp-write 
Guest Guest Guest 
Phf Phf Phf 
Remote To Local XIock Xlock Xlock 
Xsnoop Xsnoop 
[ 
Xsnoop 
Imap 
Named 
Sendmail 
Apache2 Apache2 Apache2 
Back Back Back 
Denial of Service 
(DoS) 
ý 
Mailbomb 
iNeptu 
flood)ne(syn I 
Mailbomb 
Neepune(syn 
flood) 
Mailbomb 
Neptune(syn flood) 
UDP Storm UDP Storm [UDP Storm 
Syslogd Teardrop 
IP Sweep IP Sweep . IP Sweep 
Nmap Nmap Nmap 
Portsweep . Portsweep 
Portsweep 
Probing/Surveillance Process Table Process Table Process Table 
Satan Satan Satan 
Smurf Smurf Smurf 
Land 
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Description of Attacks 
Apache2: is a DoS attack against an apache Web server where a client sends a request 
with many http headers. Typical HTTP requests to Apache Web server contain less than 
20 headers, whereas an Apache2 attack will have requests containing thousands. This 
causes the load average of the node to increase significantly, storage resources usage to 
rise dramatically, and usually the target node will crash. 
Back: is a DoS attack against the Apache Web server. In this attack, requests were sent 
that contained a large number of front slashes "P', on the order of seven or eight 
thousand. This leads to a temporary slowdown of the target node and becomes unable to 
process other requests. Once the attacker stops launching his/her requests, the target 
node recovers. 
Buffer overflow: These attacks are network based in the sense that they operate by 
sending packets with particular data to an application running on a remote machine. The 
basic requirement is a program that places data into a buffer without doing any bounds 
checking to make sure that the data do not extend beyond the buffer. Data that overflow 
the buffer can overwrite the execution stack or parts of the program and hence be 
executed as if they were legitimate parts of the program. By careful manipulation of the 
data placed on the stack, the user can execute pretty much anything desired, with the 
same permission level as that of the targeted program. Thus, if the program is owned by 
root, the attacker's program is executed as root. 
Ftp write: The Ftp-write attack is a Remote to Local User attack that takes advantage 
of a common anonymous ftp misconfiguration. The anonymous ftp root directory and 
its subdirectories should not be owned by the ftp account or be in the same group as the 
ftp account. If any of these directories are owned by ftp or are in the same group as the 
ftp account and are not write protected, an intruder will be able to add files (such as an 
rhosts file) and eventually gain local access to the system. 
Guess_password: The Guess_password attack is a Remote to Local User attack in 
which an attacker tries to gain access to some machine by making repeated guesses at 
possible usemames and passwords. Users typically do not choose good passwords, so 
an attacker who knows the username of a particular user (or the names of all users) will 
attempt to gain access to this user's account by making guesses at possible passwords. 
Dictionary guessing can be done with many services; telnet, ftp, pop, rlogin, and imap 
are the most prominent services that support authentication using usernames and 
passwords. 
Httptunnel: In an Http Tunnel attack, the attacker gains local access to the machine to 
be attacked and then sets up and configures an http client to periodically query a web 
server that the attacker has setup at some remote host. When the client connects, the 
server is able to send cookies that could request information be sent by the client, such 
as the password file on the victim machine. In effect, the attacker is able to "tunnel" 
requests for information through the http protocol. 
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IMAP: Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) is a popular remote access mail 
protocol enabling users to access their email accounts form internal and external 
networks. The "open-access" nature of this service makes it especially vulnerable to 
exploitation, because openings are frequently left in firewalls to allow for external email 
access. Attackers who exploit flaws in IMAP implementations often gain instant root- 
level control. The Imap attack exploits a buffer overflow in the Imap server of Redhat 
Linux 4.2 that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary instructions with root 
privileges. The Imap server must be run with root privileges so it can access mail 
folders and undertake some file manipulation on behalf of the user logging in. After 
login, these privileges are discarded. However, a buffer overflow bug exists in the 
authentication code of the login transaction, and this bug can be exploited to gain root 
access on the server. By sending carefully crafted text to a system running a vulnerable 
version of the Imap server, remote users can cause a buffer overflow and execute 
arbitrary instructions with root privileges. 
Ipsweep: An Ipsweep attack is a surveillance sweep to determine which hosts are 
listening on a network. This information is useful to an attacker in staging attacks and 
searching for vulnerable machines. 
Land: is a DoS attack. In this attack, a TCP SYN packet is constructed with the same 
source and destination IP addresses and both set to the target machine. It is a DoS attack 
where a single packet is all that is needed by this attack, hence called the killer packet. 
Loadmodule: The Loadmodule attack is a User to Root attack against SunOS 4.1 
systems that use the xnews window system. The loadmodule program within SunOS 
4.1. x is used by the xnews window system server to load two dynamically loadable 
kernel drivers into the currently running system and to create special devices in the /dev 
directory to use those modules. Because of a bug in the way the loadmodule program 
sanitizes its environment, unauthorized users can gain root access on the local machine. 
Mailbomb: is a DoS attack. The idea behind this attack is to send hundreds or 
thousands of mail messages to a particular server. If the mail messages are large, the 
mail queue can fill up and the target node crash. Also, the disk can fill up with these 
messages, causing other legitimate messages to be undelivered or to be lost. 
Mscan: or Multi-scan, it scans for vulnerabilities that are present in a large number of 
systems connected to the Internet. Mscan is a probing tool that uses both DNS zone 
transfers and/or brute force scanning of IP addresses to locate machines, and test them 
for vulnerabilities. This tool enables the attacker to scan whole domains and complete 
ranges of IP addresses to discover well-known vulnerabilities in many services. 
Multihop: Multi-day scenario in which a user first breaks into one machine 
Named: The Named attack exploits a buffer overflow in BIND version 4.9 releases 
prior to BIND 4.9.7 and BIND 8 releases prior to 8.1.2. An improperly or maliciously 
formatted inverse query on a TCP stream destined for the named service can crash the 
named server or allow an attacker to gain root privileges. 
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Neptune: or "SYN flood", is a DoS attack that utilizes a half-open TCP connection. 
When a TCP connection is not completed within a certain time, the connection "times 
out" and the allocated resources are freed. If enough connections can be initialized 
before the timeout occurs, the allocated resources are wasted and the data structure can 
overflow. The generated packets are spoofed in such away that are unreachable, hence, 
no particular host responds to the SYN/ACK sent by the target node, forcing the TCP 
connections to stay open. Refer to section 6.4.1 for more details about this attack. 
Nmap: is a program that is useful for collecting data no a network. It is a very powerful 
tool that is designed for security analysis. It performs a various scans on a system or 
network to detect vulnerable open ports and other security holes. However, it has been 
used by attackers to gather information about their targeted networks. Nmap is a 
general-purpose tool for performing network scans. Nmap supports many different 
types of portscan options include SYN, FIN and ACK scanning with both TCP and 
UDP, as well as ICMP (Ping) scanning. The Nmap program also allows a user to 
specify which ports to scan, how much time to wait between each port, and whether the 
ports should be scanned sequentially or in a random order. This tool operates by sending 
different packets to the target node or nodes and monitoring what comes back. For 
example, it sends packets to a list of ports to determine what services are active. In order 
to do that, it can use stealthy techniques, such as sending only the SYY flag, the so 
called "half-open" or SYN scan. It can also send packets with strange flag combinations 
such as SYN and FIN both set. The purpose of these is to see how the target node and/or 
its operating system will react. This is known as operating system fingerprinting. 
Normal: characterizes a normal network traffic by legitimate users 
Perl: The Perl attack is a User to Root attack that exploits a bug in some Perl 
implementations. Suidperl is a version of Perl that supports saved set-user-ID and set- 
group-ID scripts. In early versions of suidperl the interpreter does not properly 
relinquish its root privileges when changing its effective user and group IDs. On a 
system that has the suidperl, or sperl, program installed and supports saved set-user-ID 
and saved set-group-ID, anyone with access to an account on the system can gain root 
access. 
Phf: It is an exploit scan that targets Web servers. The Phf attack abuses a badly written 
CGI script to execute commands with the privilege level of the http server. Any CGI 
program which relies on the CGI function escape_shell_cmd () to prevent exploitation 
of shell-based library calls may be vulnerable to attack. In particular, this vulnerability 
is manifested by the "phf' program that is distributed with the example code for the 
Apache web server. The attacker is trying to execute a Web CGI-bin on PHF: PHF is a 
tool that was run on Apache Web servers. It enabled visitors to search phonebook 
listings. This exploit, however, would allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands. 
PHF has a listing in the CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) database (under 
CVE-1999-0067). 
Pod: is a DoS Ping of Death attack that affects many operating systems. It has been 
widely reported that some systems will react in an unpredictable fashion when receiving 
oversized IP packets. Possible reactions include crashing, freezing, and rebooting. 
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Portsweep: Surveillance sweep through many ports to determine which services are 
supported on a single host. 
Processtable: is a novel DoS attack and developed by MIT Lincoln Lab to be used as 
part of a test of intrusion detection systems. The idea behind this attack comes from the 
fact that each time an incoming TCP connection is received, a process is forked. By 
initiating many connections, the attacker can fill up the process table. Once the table is 
full, no new processes can be spawned, hence, nothing can be done on the target node. 
Ps: The Ps attack takes advantage of a race condition in the version of 'ps' distributed 
with Solaris 2.5 and allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privilege. 
This race condition can only be exploited to gain root access if the user has access to the 
temporary files. Access to temporary files may be obtained if the permissions on the 
/tmp and /var/tmp directories are set incorrectly. Any users logged in to the system can 
gain unauthorized root privileges by exploiting this race condition. 
Rootkit: Multi-day scenario where a user installs one or more components of a rootkit 
Saint: SAINT is the Security Administrator's Integrated Network Tool. In its simplest 
mode, it gathers as much information about remote hosts and networks as possible by 
examining such network services as finger, NFS, NIS, ftp and tftp, rexd, statd, and other 
services. The information gathered includes the presence of various network 
information services as well as potential security flaws. These flaws include incorrectly 
setup or configured network services, well-known bugs in system or network utilities, 
and poor policy decisions. Although SAINT is not intended for use as an attack tool, it 
does provide security information that is quite useful to an attacker. SAINT's behaviour 
is controlled by a configuration file which allows the user to specify several parameters. 
The most important parameters are the list of machines to scan, and how heavily to scan 
these machines (light, normal, or heavy). In light mode, SAINT will probe the victim 
for dns and rpc vulnerabilities and will look for unsecured NFS mount points. In normal 
mode SAINT will also check for vulnerabilities in fingerd, rusersd, and bootd, and will 
perform a portscan on several tcp (70,80, ftp, telnet, smtp, nntp, uucp) and udp (dns, 
177) ports. Heavy mode is the same as normal mode except that many more ports are 
scanned. A Saint scan of a network leaves a distinct signature that will vary depending 
on the level of scanning being performed. The Saint program performs each scan in a 
nearly deterministic fashion. To identify a Saint scan, an intrusion detection system 
needs to be able to recognize the distinct set of network traffic the scan creates. 
Satan: is a popular integrity-scanning tool. It is a network probing tool which looks for 
well-known weaknesses. Satan is an early predecessor of the Saint scanning program. 
While Saint and Satan are quite similar in purpose and design, the particular 
vulnerabilities that each tools checks for are slightly different. Satan operates at three 
different levels, where Level 0 is lightest. 
Sendmail: The Sendmail attack exploits a buffer overflow in version 8.8.3 of sendmail 
and allows a remote attacker to execute commands with superuser privileges. By 
sending a carefully crafted email message to a system running a vulnerable version of 
sendmail, intruders can force sendmail to execute arbitrary commands with root 
privilege. 
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Smurf: is a DoS attack that consumes Bandwidth (BW). There are three participants in 
this attack: the attacker, the target, and an amplifying network that is compromised to 
launch the attack on behalf of the attack originator. The attacker constructs echo request 
packets (ping) with the target as the source IP address and the amplifying network as the 
destination IP addresses. The generated packets are broadcasted by the attacker to 
maximize the number of responding machines. The nodes at the amplifying network all 
respond to the echo request with packets traffic destined for the targeted machine or 
network. Due to the large number of incoming packets, the target machine will not be 
able to process those packets, hence, legitimate connections will be delayed and buffers 
will be overloaded. Refer to section 6.4.2 for more details about this attack. 
Snmpgetattack: A scenario in which an attacker guesses the SNMP community 
password and remotely monitors router activity. The SNMP password is set to "public" 
by default, and is often never changed from this default value. 
Sqlattack: Gain access to a shell on a remote system by escaping out of Postgres SQL. 
Once attackers have access to a shell they may execute other exploits to further elevate 
their privileges. 
Teardrop: is a DoS attack that exploits a flaw in the implementation of TCP/IP stacks. 
In this scenario, the attacker transmits a series of packets in such away look like normal 
fragmented packets, but those fragments overlap instead of being disjoint. This leads to 
crashing the target machine. 
Udpstorm: is a DoS attack that causes network congestion and slowdown. When a 
connection is established between two UDP services, each of which produces output, 
these two services can produce a very high number of packets that can to a DoS on the 
machines where services are offered. It causes two targeted machines to attack each 
other. The idea is that there are a number of ports that will respond with another packet 
if a packet is received. Echo (port 7) and chargen (port 19) are operating like this. Echo 
will echo the received packet back, while chargen will generate a stream of characters. 
Let us consider a UDP packet with destination port 19 and source port 7. The packet 
generates come characters from the destination machine, headed for the echo port of the 
source machine. The source machine echoes these packets back, generating even more 
packets, and so on. Eventually, both machines are spending all their time sending 
packets back and forth until one or both of them go down. 
Warezmaster: Anonymous FTP upload of Warez (usually illegal copies of copywrited 
software) onto FTP server. 
Worm: Attacker releases a self-replicating program which gains access to machines by 
using a priori knowledge of valid usernames and passwords. 
Xlock: In the Xlock attack, a remote attacker gains local access by fooling a legitimate 
user who has left their X console unprotected, into revealing their password. An attacker 
can display a modified version of the xlock program on the display of a user who has 
left their X display open (as would happen after typing 'xhost +'), hoping to convince 
the user sitting at that console to type in their password. If the user sitting at the machine 
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being attacked actually types their password into the Trojan version of xlock the 
password will be sent back to the attacker. 
Xsnoop: In the Xsnoop attack, an attacker watches the keystrokes processed by an 
unprotected X server to try to gain information that can be used gain local access the 
victim system. An attacker can monitor keystrokes on the X server of a user who has 
left their X display open. A log of keystrokes is useful to an attacker because it might 
contain confidential information, or information that can be used to gain access to the 
system such as the username and password of the user being monitored. 
Xterm: The Xterm attack exploits a buffer overflow in the Xaw library distributed with 
Redhat Linux 5.0 (as well as other operating systems not used in the simulation) and 
allows an attacker to execute arbitrary instructions with root privilege. Problems exist in 
both the xterm program and the Xaw library that allow user supplied data to cause 
buffer overflows in both the xterm program and any program that uses the Xaw library. 
These buffer overflows are associated with the processing of data related to the input 
Method and preeditType resources (for both xterm and Xaw) and the *Keymap 
resources (for xterm). Exploiting these buffer overflows with xterm when it is installed 
setuid-root or with any setuid-root program that uses the Xaw library can allow an 
unprivileged user to gain root access to the system. 
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Appendix D: Target Analysis Report 
The target analysis report is an editable report for the target node (in this case, the 
activity_type node). This report is generated using BayesiaLab and due to its large 
content, part of it has been excluded. The main sections of the report are as follows: 
1- Marginal probability distribution: Probability distribution of the target variables 
when the analysis knowing the observed variables (context). 
2- Node relative significance with respect to the information gain brought by the 
node on the knowledge of the target node: List of nodes, sorted by descending 
order according to their relative contribution to the knowing of the target 
variable. The nodes that do not bring any information do not appear in the list. 
That corresponds to the target node analysis described above. 
3- Node relative significance with respect to the information gain brought by the 
node on the knowledge of the target value: For each value of the target, list of 
nodes, sorted by descending order according to their relative contribution to the 
knowing of the target value (if the node has only two modalities, this list is 
identical to the preceding one). The nodes that do not bring any information do 
not appear in this list. That corresponds to the target modality analysis described 
above. 
4- Modal Value: For each influencing node, description of the modal value with 
respect to the context and the observed modality of the target node. This modal 
value comes with its probability. This section allows establishing the profile of 
this target value. 
5- A priori Modal Value: For each influencing node, description of the modal value 
when the target node is unobserved (but knowing the context). That makes it 
possible to define the profile when the target variable is unobserved. 
6- Variation: Measure indicating the variation between the modal values of the two 
profiles. This value is measured only when these values are identical. Positive 
values appear in blue and indicate an information gain to the knowledge of the 
node value when the target value is observed. Negative values appear in red. 
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When the modal value is not equal to the a priori modal value, the modal value 
appears in blue. 
VýIarginai Probabilities, 
smurf 55.00% 
normal 20.30% 
neptune 14.90% 
snmpgetattack 2.10% 
mscan 1.20% 
snmpguess 1.10% 
saint 0.90% 
satan 0.70% 
apache2 0.40% 
warezmaster 0.40% 
pod 0.30% 
processtable 0.30% 
mailbomb 0.30% 
guess_passwd 0.20% 
udpstorm 0.20% 
portsweep 0.20% 
ftp write 0.20% 
multihop 0.20% 
imap 0.20% 
sqlattack 0.10% 
rootkit 0.10% 
sendmail 0.10% 
ipsweep 0.10% 
land 0.10% 
xterm 0.10% 
buffer_overflow 0.10% 
nmap 0.10% 
perl 0.10% 
xsnoop 0.00% 
xlock 0.00% 
worm 0.00% 
teardrop 0.00% 
loadmodule 0.00% 
httptunnel 0.00% 
back 0.00% 
ps 0.00% 
phf 0.00% 
named 0.00% 
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Tode relative significance with respect to the information gain 
prought by the node on the knowledge of activity_type 
src bytes 1.0000 
service 0.9626 
protocol_type 0.8526 
dst_host same src_port_rate 0.8142 
count 0.8119 
srv_count 0.7217 
dst_host_diff_srv_rate 0.6805 
dst_host_srv_count 0.6224 
dst_host_same_srv_rate 0.6212 
flag 0.5717 
diff_srv_rate 0.5554 
dst bytes 0.4164 
same_srv_rate 0.3932 
dst_host rerror_rate 0.3532 
logged in 0.3056 
rerror_rate 0.2533 
srv_rerror_rate 0.2210 
dst_host_srv_rerror_rate 0.2105 
dst_host_serror_rate 0.1798 
dst_host_count 0.1795 
srv_serror_rate 0.1347 
dst_host_srv_serror_rate 0.1261 
dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate 0.1260 
srv_diff_host_rate 0.1213 
serror_rate 0.0555 
duration 0.0506 
num_root 0.0422 
num compromised 0.0422 
num_file_creations 0.0331 
num_access_files 0.0291 
is_host_login 0.0157 
num failed logins -0.0120 
urgent -0.0202 
hot -0.0330 
land -0.0341 
root-shell -0.0345 
wrong_fragment -0.0444 
is guest login -0.0531 
su_attempted -0.0800 
num shells -0.0990 
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Node relative significance with respect to the information gain brought 
by , the node on the knowledge of the target value (DoS & normal activities) 
activity type,! smurf (55.007. ) 
-^ýNode FWtight r Modal Value A priori modal value Variation 
protocoltypc 1.0000 icmp 100.00% icmp 56.20% 0.8314 
src_bytes 0.7716 <1032.000 100.00% <-1032.000 55.90% 0.8391 
srv_count 0.9343 >508.000 78.12% >508.000 44.20% 0.8216 
dst_host same srcj)ort rate 0.9172 >0.990 100.00% >0.990 56.90% 0.8135 
service 0.8708 ecr i 99.98% ecr i 37.70% 0.7930 
count 0.6 990 >302.0 0 079.91% >302.000 45.70% 0.8062 
dst host_srvcount 0.4-816F>254 000 99.89% >254.000 68.80% 0.5379 
dst_host diff srv_rate 0.4309 <-0.000 100.00% <=0.000 71.10% 0.4920 
dst_host_same srv_rate 0.3562 >0.990 99.89% >0.990 75.90% 0.3963 
dst bytes 0.3223 <=0.000 99.99% I<0 . 000 77.20% 0.3732 
flag 0.2824 SF 100.00% SF 80.70% 0.3094 
diff srv_rate 0.2373 <-0.045 99.89% <-0.045 82.40% 0.2778 
logged 
_in 
0.2017 100.00% F O-1 0.2601 
same_srv_rate 0.1996 >0.995 99.89% >0.995 82.80% 0.2708 
dst_host rerror_rate 0.1879 X0.000 100.00% <=0.000 85.00% 0.2344 
rerror rate 0.1671 <=0.000 100.00% <-0.000 86.00% 0.2092 
srv rerror rate 0.1539 <0.070 100.00% <=0.070 87.00% 0.2009 
dst_host srv_rerror rate 0.1534 <=0.000 99.99% <=0.0 0F 87.10% 0.1991 
dst host count 0.1280 >254.000 99.99% >254.000 87.60% 0.1909 
dst_host_srv_diff host rate 0.1070 <-0.000 100.00% <=0.000 89.80% 0.1552 
dst_host senor rate 0.0931 < 0.000 100.00% <=0.000 91.00% 0.1360 
srv_serror rate 0.0863 <=0.000 99.89% <=0.000 91.80% 0.1219 
senor rate 0.0833 <=0.000 99.89% <=0.000 92.00% 0.1188 
dst_host srv senor rate 0.0820 < 0.000 100.00% <=0.000 92.10% 0.1187 
srvdiff host_rate 0.0598 <=0.000 100.00% <=0.000 93.80% 0.0923 
duration 0.0389 <=0.000 99.87% <=0.000 95.20% 0.0691 
hot 0.0030 <=0.000 100.00% <=0.000 99.20% 0.0116 
root shell -0.00 9 
F0 100.00% 0 99.60% 0.0058 
is_guest_login -0.004610 
- 100.00% r_ 99.70% 0.0043 
num_compromised -0.0046 <-0.000 99.99% <=0.000 99.70% 0.0041 
wrong_fragment _ F-0.006_3 FO 100.00% 0 99.90% 0.0014 
num shells -0.0063 <-0.0 00 100.00% <=0.0 00 
P-6666% 0.0000 
num root -0.0067 <=0.000 100.00% <=0.000 99.90% 0.0014 
urgent -0.0067 <-0.000 100.00% <=0.000 99.90% 0.0014 
su_attempted -0.0067 0 100.00% [OF 100.00% 0.0000 
num failed Jogins -0.0068 <=0A00 99.99% <=0.0 0 
F79-9. io 
o 0.0013 
num file creations [-0.0074 <=0.000 100.00% <=0.000 100.00% 0.0000 
land ýý^ -0.0075 j0 100.00% 
[0-100.00% 0.0000 
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num access_files '[--0-. 0076 <-0.000 100.00% <=0.000 100.00% 0.0000 
is_host login -0.007710 100.00% 
r 100.00% 0.0000 
, », 
< :., 
_ _,, « ,., actiyitY_type normal 
(2030%) -. .. ý. 
', ';;; 
Node Weight Modal Value A priori modal value Variation 
service 1.0000 ihttp 57.29% ecr i 57.70% 
src bytes 0.9168 <=504.000 93.90% <=/032.000 55.90% f- 
count 0.8331 <=88.000 48.64% >302.000 45.70% 
dstbytes 0.7374 >293.000 63.42% <=0.000 -77.20%1 
dst_host_same_src_port rate 0.6639 <-0.000 38.64% >0.990 56.90% 
logged_in 0.64401 71.47% r0- 83.50% 1 
protocol_typc 0.5517 tcp 73.82% icmp 56.20% 
rsrv_count 0.4630 <=82.000 56.82% >508.000 44.20% 
srv_diffhost rate 0.2960 <=0.000 63.21% <=0.000 93.80% -0.5246 
dst host count 0.2921 >254.000 46.35% >254.000 87.60% -0.9183 
dst host srv_diff host rate 0.28 1 [X0.000 52.45% <=0.000 89.80% -0.7757 
dst_host srv_count 0.1515 >254.000 58.17% >254.000 68.80% -0.2 222 
dst_host_rerror rate 0.0952 X0.000 98.50% <=0.000 85.00% 0.2126 
flag 0.0903 SF 99.93% SF 80.70% 0.3083 
dst_host diff srv_rate 0.0887 X0.000 70.75% <=0.000 , 
71.10% -0.0071 
dst host srv_serror rate 0.0557 r<--0.000 97.88% <=0.000 92.10% 0.0878 
dst host srv_rerror rate 0.0370 <=O. 000 98.76% <=0.000 87.10% 0.1813 
dst host same_srv_rate 0.0318 >0.990 80.82% >0.990 75.90% 0.0905 
serror rate 0.0 881 <=0.000 99.86% <=0.000 92.00% 0.1183 
same_srv_rate 0.0112 >0.995 98.74% >0.995 82.80% 0.2540 
srv_rerror rate 0.0056 [x. 070 99.86% <=0.070 87.00% 0.9989 
dst_host serror rate Ö. 0037 ý0.000 97.67% <=0.000 91.00% 0.1021 
rerror rate 0.0022 . 000 99.79% <=0.000 86.50% 0.2062 
land -0.0112 
10 -100.00% 100.00% 0.0000 
hot -0.0263 <=0.000 99.11% <=0.000 99.20% 0.0059 
num shells -0.0335 <=0.000 100.00% <-0.000 100.00% 0.0000 
su attempted -0.0442 
r0-r1-O0-. 00% to 100.00% 0.0000 
num_compromised -0.4453 X0.000 99.96% <=0.000 99.70% 0.0038 
is_host login -0.05 44 
IÖ 100.00% 100.00% 0.0000 
diff srv_ratc -0.0515 <-0.045 98.89% <=0.045 82.40% 0.2631 
is_guest_login -0.035810 100.00% 99.70% 0.0043 
root_shell -0.0559 
r0 99.99% 0 99.60% 0.0056 
num_file creations -0.0581 X0.000 100.00% <=0.000 100.00% 0.0000 
srv_serror rate -0.0584 <ý. 000 99.86% <=0.000 91.80% 0.1214 
duration -0.0752 X0.000 95.05% <=0.000 95.20% -0.0023 
wrong fragment -0.0994 _0 99.99% 99.90% 0.0013 
num_access_files 1 -0.1010 <=0.000 99.57% <=0.000 100.00% -0.0062 
num_failed_logins -0.1 114 <=0.0 00r 99.88% <-0.0 0r 99.90% 0.0011 
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urgent -0.1142 < 0.000 99.99% <=0.000 99.90% 0.0013 
num root -0.1370 < 0.000 100.00% <=0.000 99.90% 0.0014 
Node weight Modal Value A priori modal value Variation 
flag 1.0000 64.60% SSF 80.70% 
diff srv_ratc 0.9939 <=0.240 97.70% <=0.043 82.40% ý 
same_srv_ratc 0.9546 <-0.325 95.74% >0.995 82.80" r- 
dst_host_samc_srv_rate 0.9453 F<--0.080 96.57% >0.990 75.90% f^ 
dst host diff srvrate 0.9335 >0.040 97.71% <-0.000 71.10% 
src bytes 0.9 557 <-1.000 99,95% <=1032.000 SS. 90% f-- 
dst host srv_count 0.9136 <-20.000 90.70% >254.000 68.80% 
service 0.7128 private 90.77% ecr t 57.70% 
dst_host same src_port_rate 0.5847 [<--0.000 97.83% >0.990 56.90% 
dsthost rerrorrate 0.4601 >0.970 66.13% <-0.000 85.00% 
count 0.4558 «302.000 93.53% >302.000 45.70% r 
protocol_type 0.4333 tcp 98.28% icmp 56.20% 
srv_rerror rate 0.4172 >0.990 66.27% <-0.070 87.00%1 
srv_count - [-0-. 4159[<--82000 [-82.27% F>508000 44.20% 
dst_host_srv_rerrorraty 0.3840 >0.980 66.33% <=0.000 87.10% r- 
rerrorrate .. 35 6 
[>0.9 80r 65.73% <=0.000 86.50% 
senor rate 0.1104 k0.000 63.75% <=0.000 92.00% -0.4846 
dst host srvserror rate 0.1054j<-0.000 67.73% <=0.000 92.10% -0.4435 
dst host serror rate 0.0523 X0.000 65.54% <-0.000 91.00% -0.4734 
srv_serror rate 0.0271 <Z000 67.11% <=0.000 91.80% -0.4519 
dst_bytes -0.0393 [0.000 96.40% <=0.000 i, 77.20% 0.320 3 
dst_host srvdiff host rate -0.0669 < 0.000 99.32% <-0.000 89.80% 0.1454 
urgent -0.0790 X0.000 100.00% <-0.000 99.90% 0.0014 
num_shells -0.0888 X0.000 100.00% <=0.000 100.00% 0.0000 
hot 1-0.0927 Z-0.000 99.23% <=0.000 99.20% 0.0004 
is_host_login -0.0932 0 100.00% 
r 100.00% 0.0000 
root shell -0.1039 100.00% 
r 99.60% 0.0058 
is-guest login -0.1074 
[0 98.97% r 99.70% -0.0106 
su attempted 110 100.00% r-I100.00% 0.0000 
logged in -0.1138 
j- 97.78% r 83.50% 0.2278 
wrong_fragm7nt -0.1 44710 000.00% o 99.90% 0.0014 
num file creations -0.14 6 
[<-0.0 00 99.96% <=0.000 100.00% -0.0006 
num compromised -0.1422 <-0.000 99.96% <=0.000 99.70% 0.0037 
land 1-0.1454 10 100.00% r 100.00% 0.0000 
dst host_count -0.1582 >254.000 98.04% >254.000 87.60% 0.1624 
duration -0.16 4 
r<-0.000 99.54% <=0.000 95.20% 0.0642 
num_failed_logins -0.1694 <-0.000 99.96% <=0.000 99.90% 0.0008 
num_access_files -O. 1707 <-0.000 99.99% < 0.000 ; 100.00% -0.0002 
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srvdiff host ratc -0.2244 <=0.000 98.84% <=0.000 93.80% 0.0756 
num root -0.2291 X0.000 100.00% <-0.000 99.90% 0.0014 
activitytype = apache2 (0.40*/9) 
Node Weight Modal Value A priorl modal value Variation 
dst_host_rerror rate 1.0000 < 0.970 85.19% <=0.000 85.00% 
flag 0.6675 RSTR 65.99% SýF 80.70% r- 
dst_hostcount 0.6376 >254.000 84.53% >254.000 87.60% -0.0515 
wrong_fragment 0.47 33 J- 99.64%Jo 99.90% -0.0038 
hot 0.4788 < 0.000 99.94% <=0.0 0 r-99 20% 0.0107 
dst host srv_rerror rate 0.4047 r<--0.000 45.44% <=0.0 00 87.10% -0.9388 
dst host diff srvrate 0.3592 <-0.030 52.85% <=0.000 71.10% F^ 
dst host_srv_count 0.3423 <-254.000 48.90% >254.000 68.80% 
serrorrate 0.3201 <-0.000 44.88% <-0.000 92.00% -1.0356 
service 0.2936 ýhttp 79.48% ecr ! 57.70% 
root_shell 0.2357 i 
J[-99.67% J 99.60% 0.0010 
is_guest login 0.2342 ý 99.78% r0 99.70% 0.0011 
protocol_typc 0.2303 tc 96.68% icm 56.20% 
num_compromised 0.2246 <-0.000 98.46% <=0.000 99.70% -0.0181 
rerror rate 0.2163 X0.000 41.11% <=0.000 r86.50%[7-1.0733 
same srvrate 0.1200 >0.995 79.86% >0.995 82.80% -0.0522 
duration 0.1175 >2.000 63.34% <=0.0 0' 95.20% 
dsthost srv _serror rate 
0.1008 X0.000 41.87% <=0.000 92.10% -1.1371' 
logged in 0.0611 79.25% r 83.50% 
srv count 0.0173 X82.000 41.85% >508.000 44_20% 
urgent 0.0010 X0.000 99.89% <=0.000 99.90% -0.0001 
num file creations T 0.0008 X0.000 99.74% <-0.000 100.00% -0.0038 
num toot 0.0004 <-0.000 ! 99.58% <=0.000 99.90% -0.0046 
land -0.0000 
Jo 100.00% 100.00% 0.0000 
is host login ^ -0.0001 0 100.00% 
10 100.00% 0.0000 
dst bytes -0.0008 >293.000 63.41% <=0.000 77.20% 
dst host same src_port_rate -0.0220 <-0.000 96.67% >0.990 56.90% 
r- 
dst host serror rate -0.0861 X0.780 45.60% <=0.000 91.00% 
r 
diff srv_rate -0.0934 <-0.045 86.28% <=0.045 82.40% 0.0664 
src bytes -0.1156 >1032.000 52.30%J<-1032.000 , 
55.90%r- 
srv diff host rate -0.1240 <=0.000 70.96% <=0.000 93.80% -0,4026 
srvrerror rate -0.157 <-0.950 33.18% <=0.0 00 87.00% 
- 
count -0.1672 <=88.000 43.53% >302.000 45.70% 
num access files -0.2004 <Z. 000 99.24% <=0000 ; 100.00% -0.0110 
num shells -0.2228 X0.000 99.94% <=0.000 100.00% -0.0008 
num_failed Logins -0.2273 <-0.000 98.68% <=0.0 00 ; 99.90% -0. U 178 
su attempted -0.4372 
r0 99.86% J 100.00% -0.0020 
dst host_same srv rate -0.5640 >0.990 50.74% >0.990 75.90% -0.5810 
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dst host srvdift host rate r-O. S680 <kp00 90.62% <-0.000 89.80% 0.0131 
srv serror rate "1.0264 <<0.000 49.16% <s0.000 91.80% -0.9011 
type- 
Node 1Veight Modal Value A priori modal value Variation 
su_attempted 1.0000 0 1100.00-/. 10 100.00% 0.0000 
is_host login 1.0000 55 100.00% 0-ý 100.00% 0.0000 
is_guest login 1.0000 ý5- 99.13% 99.70% -0.0083 
logged in 1.0000 1 99.13% 0- 83.50% 0.2476 
dst host srv count 1.0000 >254.000 86.12% >254.000 68.80% 0.3239 
dst bytes 0.9957 -0.000 91.98% <-0.000 77.20% 0.2528 
dst host_srv_rerror rate 0. -9 7 3-7 F<-0.000 93.65% <-0.000 87.10% 0.1045 
srv_count 0.967! X82.000 68.15% >508.000 r44.20%1 
flag 0.9530 SF 61.14% FF 80.70% -0.4005 
dst host samc_srv_rate 0.92 2 r>0.990 60.25% >0.990 75.90% -0.3331 
protocol_type 0.6365 is pf 44.45% kmp 56.20% 0.7490 
wrong fragment 0.6134 0 69.86% [0 99.90% -0.5161 
urgent 0.6130 <-0.000 100.00% <-0.000 99.90% 0.0014 
num_root 0.61 9 7<-0.000 99.10% <-0.000 99.90% -0.0116 
land 0.6128 ßr0 100.00% 100.00% 0.0000 
num shells 0.6127 <-0.000 99.98% <-0.000 100.00% -0.0002 
Inum file 
_creations- 
0.6127 <-0.000 100.00% <<0.000 100.00% 0.0000 
same srv_rate 0.6084 >0.995 94.43% >0.995 82.80% 0.1897 
service 0.5905 ecr i 59.53% ecr t 57.70% 0.0449 
dst host diff srv rate 0.5841 <-0.000 59.80% <-0.000 71.10% -0.248 
dst host rerror rate 0.5814 <-0.000 92.17% <-0.000 85.00% 0.1169 
rerror rate 0.5699 <-0.000 67.39% <=0.000 86.50% -0.3601 
srv_rerror rate 0.5495 <-0.070 68.59% <=0.070 87.00% -0.3431 
src bytes 0.4949 > 1032.000 75.581? Io<-1032.000 55.90% 
diff srv_rate 0.4550X0.045 92.39% <-0.045 82.40% 0.1650 
srv_serror_rate 0.3925 <-0.000 90.60% <-0000 91.80% -0.0190 
dst host same_src. j)ort_rate 0.3853 >0.990 58.07% >0.990 56.90% 0.0295 
count 0.3686 X88.000 68.97% >302.000 V 45.70% r 
dst host senor rate 0.3439 <-0.000 89.87% <<a000 91.00% -0.0181 
dst_host srv_senror rate 0.2 666 [<-0.000 90.06% <e0.000 92.10% -0.0323 
hot 0.2 449 <-0.000 97.99% <-0.0 0' 99.20% -0.0178 
serror rate 0.2945 X0.000 00.55% <<0.000 92.00% -0.2229 
num_access_files 0.2932 [<-0.000 99.98% <<0.000 100.00% -0.0002 
num_failed logins 0.2882 X0.000 93.92% <=0.000 99.90% -0.0891 
duration 0.0874 X0.000 56.55% <-0.000 95.20% -0.5515 
root shell 0.04 44 5 98 223% 0 99.60% -0.0200 
num_compromised -0.0108 <-0.000 93.05% <<0.0 0r 99.70% -0.9996 
dst_host count -0.1006 >254.000 64.05% > 54.000 V 87.60% -0.4518 
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dst_host_srv 
_diff 
host rate -0.5176 <-0.000 67.55% <=0.000 89.80% -0.4108 
srv diff host rate -0.5505 <=0.000 ! 95.33% <=0.000 93.80% 0.0233 
Node Weight Modal Value A priori modal value Variation 
Isu_attempted 1.0000 0- 100.00% [0 100.00% 0.0000 
num_access_files 1.00 0 r<=0.000 98.88% <=0.000 100.00% -0.0163 
is_host_login 1.0000 100.00% I0 100.00% 0.0000 
urgent 1.0000 <=0.000 99.93% <=0.000 99.90% 0.0004 
root_shell 1.00001 98.81 % [0 99.60% -0.0115 
dst_host_same_src_port_rate 0.9996 <=0.000 74.15% >0.990 56.90% 
srv_serror rate 0.9633 <=0.000 88.51% <=0.000 91.80% -0.0526 
rerror rate 0.9242 <=0.000 83.03% <=0.000 86.50% -0.0591" 
dst host srvrerror rate 0.8588 <=. 000 [-63.25%r<-9.000_ 87.10% -0.4617 
dst_host_diff srv_rate 0.7600 <=0.040 51.25% <=0.000 71.10% 
duration 0.7425 <=1.000 64.69% <=0.000 ". 95.20% ý- 
logged_in 0.71811 64.51% [0 - 83.50% -0.3722 
service 0.6849 ecr i 49.52% ecr 1 57.70% -0.2205 
src_bytes 0.6801 >1032.000 ir -82.00% <=1032.000 55.90% 
dst_host_srv_serror rate 0.6180 <=0.000 89.49% <=0.000 92.10% -0.0414 
land 0.6128 ý0 > 100.00% 0 100.00% 0.0000 
num_fle_creations 0.6127 <=0.000 99.86% <=0.000 100.00% -0.0020 
num_root 0.6125 <=0.000 99.44% <=0.000 99.90% -0.0067 
diff srv_rate 0.6078 <=0.045 83.06% <=0.045 82.40% 0.0115 
dst_host_rerror_rate 0.5850 <=0.070 65.05% <=0.000 85.00% [ 
srv_rerror rate 0.5700 <=0.070 86.94% <=0.070 87.00% -0.0010 
ýserror_rate 0.5675 <=0.000 87.88% <=0.000 92.00% -0.0661 
dst host_srv_count -x0.5438 <=254.000 66.80% >254.000 68.80% 
srvcount 0.5089 <=3.000 66.53% >508.000 44.20% 
srv_diff host rate 0.4703 <=0.000 91.10% <=0.000 93.80% -0.0421 
dst_host count 0.3113 >254.000 78.29% >254.000 87.60% -0.1622 
hot 0.29 8 r<=0.000 99.93% <=0.000 
_ 
99.20% 0.0106 
wrong_fragment 0.2943 0 97.90% [0 99.90% -0.0292 
protocol_type 0.2942 tep 57.27% icmp 56.20% 
is_guest_login 0.2939 0 100.00% FO -[-9-9o 0.0043 
num_shells 0.2935 <ý. 000 
_ 
99.93% <=0.000 100.00% -0.0010 
same_srv rate 0.2917 >0.995 81.03%0 >0.995 82.80% -0.0312 
flag 0.2907 (S-F ^ 83 19% [S-- 80 70% 0.0438 
num_failed_logins 0.2882 <-0.000 96.08% <=0.000 99.90% -0.0563 
num_compromised 0.2807 <=0.000 94.05% <=0.000 99.70% -0.0842 
dst_host srvdiff_host_rate ; 0.2721 <--ý. 000 87.67% <=0.000 89.80% -0.0346 
dst_host serror rate 0.2533 <=0.000 86.13% <=0.000 91.00% -0.0 993 
dst host 
_same srv_rate 
0.24 2 [<=0.970 ý 55.38% >0.990 75.90% = 
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count 0.2240 <=3.000 61.42% >302.000 ; 45.70% r-- 
dst bytes 
.. 0513 <=0.000 54.77% <=0.0 0.77.20% -0.4951 
. Fsýýzý :. ý. Wý ' . em activih_type a udpatorm 
(0.20%) 
. "ßiä a. 
' s. _ä ßa, I Node Weight Modal Value A priori modal value j Variation 
logged_in 1.0000 0 99.15% 83.50% 0.2479 
wrong 
_fragment 
1.0000 [0 100.00% jo 99.90% 0.0014 
land 1.000010 100.00% 1100.00% 0.0000 
is_guest_login 1.0000 0^ 100.00% r0 99.70% 0.0043 
num_shells 1.0000 F<=-0.000 100.00% <=0.000 100.00% -0.0000 
su_attempted 1.0000 99.15% 0 100.00% -0.0123 
urgent 1.0000 <=0.000 97.45% <=0.000 99.90% -0.0359. 
dst host srv 
_count 
0.9996 <=254.000 46.15% >254.000 68.80% ý 
dst host same_srv 
_rate 
0.9976 <=0.970 29.02% >0.990 75.90% ý- 
dst_host_srv_serrorrate 0.9946 <=0.000 47.88% <=0.000 92.10% -0.9438 
num_compromised 0.9796 r<-=O. 000 90.67% <=0.000 99.70% -0.1370 
ldst host srv_rerror rate 0.4428 <=0.000 62.35% <=0.000 87.10% -0.4823 
rdst_host 
count 0.9215 >254.000 66.86% >254.000 8760% -0.3898 
dst host serror rate 10.8532 <=0.000 30.76% <=0.000 91.00% -1.5647 
dst host diff srv rate 0.8060 >0.040 38.42% <=0.000 71.10% [- 
srv_rerror rate 0.7958 0.070 48.74% <=0.070 8700% -0.8359 _ 
flag 0.7742 SF 14.52% Si 180.70% -2.4744 
srv_count 0.7474 <=3.000 53.09% >508.000 44.20% 
same_srv_rate 0.7133 >0.995 52.18% >0.995 82.80% 0.6663 
duration 0.6745 <=1.000 51.76% 0.000 95.20% ý- 
srv_serror rate 0.6441 <=0.000 47.87% <=0.000 91.80% -09394 
dst host_same- srcvort 
_rate 
0.6395 <=0.020 
, 
26.52% >0.990 56.90% r- 
hot 0.6310 <-0.000 53.07% <=0.000 99.20% -0.9025 
serror rate 6.6124 <=0.000 39.33% <=0.000 . 92.00% -1.2261 
num_root . 6026 <=0.000 97.44% <=0.000 99.90% -0.0360 
dst host rerror_rate 0.5677 <=0.000 34.18% <=0.0 0r 85.00% -1.3142 
diff_srv_rate . 0.5547 <=0.045 40.16% <=0.045 82.40% -1.0368 
root_shell 0.5218 j 88.90% 1 99.60% -0.1640 
count 0.49 18 F<---3.000 31.71% >302.000 Ö 45.70% r 
rerror rate 0.4862 <=0.000 38.51% <=0.000 86.50% -1.1675 
dst host srv_diff_host_rate 0.4633 <=0.000 85.55% <=0.000 89.80%' -0.0699 
num_failed_logins 0.4424 <=0.000 93.21% <=0.000 99.90% -0.1000 
service 0.4160, ecr i 73.82% re-c; 71 
_ 
57.70% 0.3554 
src bytes 0.4006 <=1.000 28.22% <=1032.000 55.90% 
protocol type 7 0.3988 udp 37.64% icmp 56.20% 
is host_login -0.0 001 0 99.15% 100.00% -0.0124 
num_file_creations -PO-0005 <=0.000 ! 100.00% <=0.000 100.00% 0.0000 
dst_bytes -0.0823 <=0.000 88.67% <=0.0 0f 77.20% 0.9999 
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num_access_files -0.4166 <=0.000 99.99% <=0.000 100.00% -0.0001 
srvdiff host rate -0.4459 <=0.0 0 86.42%<=0-000 93.80% -0.1182" 
activity_t pe. ýland 
Node Weight Modal Value A priori modal value Variation 
num_access 
_files 
1.0000 <=0.000 99.52% <=0.000 100.00% -0.0069 
root_shell 1.00 0 [0 94.72% 10 99.60% -0.0725 
is_host login 1.000010 99.76% r? 100.00% -0.0035 
is_guest_login 1.0000 99.27% FO-; 99.70% -0.0062 
urgent 0.9999 <=0.000 99.28% <=0.000 99.90% -0.0089 
num_root 0.9999 <=0.000 98.77% <=0.000 ,, 
99.90% -0.0164 
num_failed_logins 0.9830 <=0.000 91.71% <=0.000 99.90% -0.1234 
hot 0.9811 <=0.000 82.83% <=0.000 99.20% -0.2602 
srv_serror rate 0.9728 >0.530 52.90% <=0.000 91.80% 
dst_host srv_serrorrate 0.9634 <=0.000 36.04% <=0.000 92.10% -1.3538 
dst_host_rercor_rate 0.9137 <=0.000 55.62% <=0.000 85.00% -0.6118 
dst_host_count 0.8983F>254.000 7 1.59% >254.000 87.60% -0.2912 
dst host srvcount 0.8398 >254.000 38.01% >254.000 68.80% -0.8559 
flag 0.8076 SO 32.52% SF 80.70% ý 
dst_host_sercor rate 0.7967 >0.780 36.85% <=0.000 R 91.00% 
F 
dst host_srv 
_rerrorrate 
0.7767 <=0.000 73.59% <=0.000 87.10% -0.2431 
same_srv 
_rate 
0.7609 >0.995 64.06% >0.995 82.80% -0.3701 
diff srv _rate 
0.7081 <=0.045 57.90% <=0.045 82.40% -0.5091 
senor rate 0.6685 -0.330 41.92% ý<=0-. 000 ^ 92.00%- 
dst host same src_port-rate' 0.5008 >0.990 49A514>9.990 56.90% -0.4 958 
duration 
_ 
0.4952 <=1.00 45 0° 95.20% 
- . 
22/0< - 0.000 
_- 
service 0.3832 ecr i 73.87% ecr t 57.70% 0.3564 
dst host_same_srv rate 0.2653 >0.990 52.32% >0.990 75.90% -0.5367 
src bytes 0.1553 <=1.000 37.57% <=1032.000 55.90% F 
wrong fragment 0.0006 0 99.13% G 99.90% -0.0112 
num_file_creations -0.0001 <=6.000 99.88% <=0.000 100.00% -0.0017, 
dst host_srv_diff_host rate -0.0008 <=0.000 85.59% <=0.000 89.80% -0.0693 
terror rate -0.0070 <=0.000 57.06%F<=0.000 86.50% -0.6003 
srv_diff host_rate -0.0123 <=0.000 91.13% <=0.000 93.80% -0.0416 
protocol_type -0.0135 tcp 58.77% icmp 56.20% 
num_compromised -0.0357 <=0.000 91.36% <=0.000 99.70% -0.1261 
dst bytes -0.0928 <==0.000 83.95% <=0.000 77.20% 0.2210 
srv_count -0.1735 <=3.000 41.73% >508.000 44.20% 
F 
dst_hostdiff srvrate -0.1751 <=0,000 47.21% <=0.000 . 71.10% -0.5907, 
count -0.1752 <=3.000 28.41% >302.000 45.70% 
F 
srv_rerror rate -0.2844 <=0.070 66.47% <=0.070 87.00% -0.3884 
logged_in -0.7590 
-98.31% FO- 83.50% 0.2356 
su_attempted -0.8246 
[ 99.76% j 100.00% -0.0034 
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num_shells -0.8246 <=0.000 99.99% <=0.000 100.00% -0.0001 
land -0.8246 
j 100.00% r "r100.00% 0.0000 
activity type=-buffer overflow (0.10%) - 
Node Modal Value A priori modal value Variation Weight 
is_host_login 1.0000 98.39% r0 ! 1100.00% -0.0234 
dst host srv_diff host-rate 1.0000 <=0.000 87.85% <=0.0 00 i 89.80% -0.3316 
urgent 1.0000 <=0.000 96.68% <=0.000 99.90% -0.0472 
dst host_srv_rerror_rate 1.0000 <=0.000 71.62% <=0.000 87.10% -0.2823 
is_guest_login 0.9999 0 99.73% 0 99.70% 0.0004 
service 0.9822 ecr i 77.46% ecr 1! 57.70% 0.4249 
dst host same_srv_rate 0.9752 >0.990 61.46% >0.990  75.90% -0.0044 
count 0.9119 <=88.000 34.97% >302.000 45.70% r 
serror rate 0.9111 =0.000 64.04%F<=9.000 92.00% -0.5226 
dst_host count 0.8715 >254.000 74.97% >254.000 87.60% -0.2247 
srv_serro-r rate 0.2290 <=0.000 67.60% <=0.000 91.80% -0.4415 
dst host_srv_serror rate 0.7959 <=0.000 71.79% <=0.0 00 92.10% -0.3594 
dst_host same_src_port_rate 0.6776 >0.990 40.53% >0.990 56.90% -0.4893 
same_srv_rate 0.6588 >0.995 74.73% >0.995 82.80% -0.1480 
dst_host_serror_rate 0.5542 <=0.000 64.18% <=0.000 91.00% -0.5038 
protocol_type 0.4728 tcp 49.70% ýcm-- 56.20% 
duration 0.3906 <=1.000 45.82% <=0.000 95.20% 
src bytes 0.28 8[>1032.000 40.57% <=1032.000 55.90%r-, 
num_root 0.2755 <=0.000 91.90% <=0.000 99.90% -0.1204 
flag 0.1093 SF 45.30% SF 80.70% -0.8329 
root shell 0.0860 [ [77.58%[(- 99.60% 
hot 0.0330 >2.000 50.33% <=0.000 99.20% 
logged_in 0.0071 ý- 97.81% [0- 83.50% 0.2282 
wrong fragment 0.0011 ýý 99.23% 99: 90% -0.097 
_ su_attempted 0.0000 0 99.39% ro- ; 100.00% -0.0088 
num_file_creations -0.0004 <-0.000 99.75% <=0.000 100.00% -0.0037. 
num_access_files - .. 0 110 000 98.42% "100.00% -0.0229 
srv 
_diff 
host rate -0.0073 <-0.000 91.82% <=0.000 93.80% -0.0307 
dst bytes -0.0090 <=0.000 84.57% <=0.000 77.20% 0.1316 
srv_count -0.1071 <=3.000 38.16% >508.000 44.20% 
r 
- dst_host_rerror_rate -0.4830 <=0.000 52.94% <=0.000 
r85.00% 
-0.6832 
dst_host_srv_count -0.5 334 >254.000 47.30% >254.000 68.80% -0.5405 
rerror rate -0.5 442 <=0.000 66.20% <=0 000 86.50% -0.3859 
diff srv_rate -0.3301 <=0.045 73.70% <=0.045 82.40% -0.6609 
num_shells -0.8246 <=0.000 99.88% <=0.000 100.00% -0.0017 
land -0.8246 
-- 100.00% [0 100.00% 0.0000 
num_compromised -0.8533 <=0.000 89.82% <=0.000 99.70% -0.1506 
dst_host_diff srv rate -1.0191 <=0.000 60.19% <=0.0 00 71.10% -0.2402 
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srv_rerror rate -1.3111 <ý. 070 70.451. 
F< =0.070 87.00% -0.3043 
nur failed logins -1.59 8 
F< 
. 000 93.33% <=0.000 99.90% -0.0981 
'. activity_type -teardrop (0.00%), ',,, '; :,; ,,.. ". ý 
Node Height Modal Value priori modal value Variation 
land F? 0 100.00% 100.00% 0.0000 
dst_bytes ? <=0A00 84.05% <=0.0 0 077.20% 0.1226 
is_host_login [_ ?0 99.24% 0 100.00% -0.0110 
protocol_type udp 70.84% icmp 56.20% F_ 
srv diff host_rate -? <=0.000 96.99% <=0.000 93.80% 0.4482 
logged_in .? 
Fo 100.00% 83.50% 0.2602 
num_root -? <=0.000 98.45% <=0.000 99.90% -0.0 110 
diff srv 
_rate -? <=0.045 
66.38% <=0.045 82.40% -0.3118, 
dst_host_rerrorrate r -? <-0.000 46.99% <=0.000 85.00% -0.8553 
serror rate -?, <=0.000 59.27% <=0.000 92.00% -0.6344 
srv_serror_rate -? <=. 000 60.89% <=0.000 91.80% -0.5923, 
same_srv_rate .? >0.995 70.97% >0.995 82.80% -0.2225 
duration .? <=1,000 ; 59.35%F<=0.000 95.20% 
dst host_same_srv_rate ? <=0.970 37.63% >0.990 75.90% 
service ? ecr i 75.90% ecr i 57.70% 0.3956 
dst host_count [ -? >254.000 64.3 6% >254.000 87.60% -0.4447 
srv_count -? <=3.000 70.74% >508.000 44.20% 
dst_host_diff srv_rate F -? 
F<--0.030 46.28%F<=0.000 71.10% 
dst host_serror rate -? <=0.000 45.29% <=0.000 91.00% -1.0065 
src bytes -_^rý ? F<--504 000 67.62% <=1032.000 55.90%r 
dst host_same srcport 
_rate 
ý? <=0.990 , 61.36% >0.990 56.90% _ 
root_shell -? OF 95.37% 0 99.60% -0.0626 
urgent-? ; x. 000 99.23% <=0.000 99.90% -0.0097 
num_shells -? <=0.000 100.00% <=0.000 100.00% 0.0000 
su_attempted -? 0 99.99% 
0^ 100.00% -0.0001 
num_access_files r -? <=0.000 100.00% <=0.000 100.00% -0.0001 
wron g_fragment -? 0 99 99%0 
ý0 -- 99 90% 0 0013 
num_failed Logins F-y <=0.000 91.73% <=0.000 "; 99.90% -0.1230 
num compromised -? 
F_=-6-665 88.73% <=0.000 99.70% -0.1682 
rer or rate -? <=0.000 63.16% <=0.000 ! 86.50% -0.4537 
hot T_.? <=0.000 87.52% <=0.000 ', 99.20% -0.1808 
srv_rerror_rate __ '[-? <=0.070 65.62% <=0.0_70'[ 87.00% -0.4069 
dst host srv_rerror rate r -? <=0.000 75.76% <=0.000 87.10% -0.2012 
flag -? SF 33.64% SF 80.70% -1.2625 
dst host srv_diff hostrate -? <=0.000 84.84% 
_655, F 89.80% -0.0820 
cAUnt-? <=3.000 54.98% >302.000 45.70% F 
dst host srv count <=254.000 62.40% >254.000 68.80% [- 
dst host_srv serror rate "? <=0.000 55.54% <=0.0 0 092.10% -0.7297 
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isguest login F -7 
[0- 100.00% T- 99.70% 0.0043 
num f le creations -?, X0.000 100.00% <=0.000 100.00% -0.0001 
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